Declining Images: Photographic Visibility, Spectatorship and the Apparatus by Cassar, Ignaz
Declining Images 
 
Photographic Visibility, Spectatorship and the Apparatus 
 
 
Ignaz Cassar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
The University of Leeds 
School of Fine Art, History of Art and Cultural Studies 
 
June, 2009 
 
 
 
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit 
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and 
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
 
One cannot do a PhD alone. Many people are to be thanked. My supervisor Gail Day 
who went along patiently with my changing ideas and who has intervened incisively 
in the right moments to open my mind to new areas I would otherwise not have 
considered exploring. I would also like to acknowledge Roger Palmer and thank him 
for his involvement in earlier stages of this work. The path of this research has been 
marked by great excitement, stress, sheer luck, disappointment, exhilaration, serious 
doubts, institutional obstacles and many other ups-and-downs but doing a PhD is an 
amazing and privileged route of intellectual discovery. This discovery could not have 
happened without the financial support of several funders to whom I would like to 
express my gratitude: the University of Leeds for awarding me a three-year doctoral 
research scholarship; the School of Fine Art, History of Art and Cultural Studies for 
supporting my research and conference attendances; the College Art Association for 
offering me a travel grant to their 2007 conference in NYC; the Autonomous 
Province of Bolzano/Bozen, Italy, for granting me a bursary for my studies; and my 
family in Italy who has added not only much extra money when it was most needed 
but has also made sure that there were moments when life would not simply always 
be turning around the thrills of academic work. 
 
Further thanks must go to: the inspirational and intellectually generous environment 
fostered by the Centre for Cultural Analysis, Theory and History, and its director 
Griselda Pollock; the editorial team of parallax, Barbara Engh, Martin McQuillan, 
Lynn Turner and Marcel Swiboda, for sharing their professional opinions on the past 
and future of cultural studies and the networks of academic publishing; Joanne 
Crawford, for her early morning Hegel lessons; Alexandra Parigoris, for polishing up 
my French; Fred Orton, for triggering my interest in the endeavours of the social 
history of art. Many ideas in this thesis have been further stimulated and moulded into 
greater clarity (I hope!) in dialogue with others: Andrew Warstat (allegory and other 
tropes), Eve Kalyva (conceptual art and its discontents), Mark Dawson 
(psychoanalytic encryptions), Liz Watkins (filmic matters), Miglena Nikolchina 
(sublation’s doings), Miranda Mason (for everything else), Cornelia Vismann 
(thinking ‘in camera’), Sas Mays (open archives), Eric Prenowitz (reading more 
Derrida), Peter Mörtenböck (sustaining latency’s potentialities), Peggy Phelan (the 
 3 
stage of inversion), Nicola Foster (philosophizing photography), Diane Morgan 
(translation matters), Lee Rodney (Canadian paradoxes), Uriel Orlow (the rhetorics of 
research), Jay Prosser (photography’s withouts), Andrea Fitzpatrick (politicizing 
contemporary art). 
 
PhD experience, in England and beyond, was also shared with: Francesco Ventrella, 
Michelle Gewurtz, Branislava Kuburović, Fiona Philip, Alex Hannay, Isabelle de la 
Court, Ha Young Joo, Rowan Bailey, Silvia Casini, Manuel Ramos, Ian Balch, 
Jennifer Pollard, Aikaterini Tsola, Suzy Freake, D. Ferrett, Mike Belshaw, Yuk Hui, 
Anna Johnson, Patrick Duggan, Inge Wierda, Melinna Kaminari, Zowie Davy, 
Fabienne Collignon, Sophie Orlando, Peter Kilroy, Aaron Levy. 
 
Very special thanks go to Paris: to Maroun H. Salloum and Nabil Mourani without 
whom Facing Lacan could not have been realized; and to Peter Mucha for his 
generous hospitality and support – against all odds! Additional backup I received 
from: Claire Harbottle reminded me of darkroom procedures; Dominique Begin 
looked closely at my works and texts and also told me about la vie montréalaise; 
James Mackay shared his memories of Jarman and entrusted me, for a day, with a 
film reel of Blue; Morten Norbey Halvorsen actualized a brilliant online presence; 
Lara Pawson and Julian Richards continue to make me laugh. 
 
I am also indebted to the folks at Goldsmiths, London: Gavin Butt, Nicole Wolf, Paul 
Halliday, Irit Rogoff, Astrid Schmetterling, Lisa Blackman. 
 
And to David Dibosa, for being there.  
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Theresia and Josef. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Abstract 
 
The thesis provides a critical framework for addressing a range of modalities of 
visibility within the field of photography. Such modalities are explored under the 
rubric of three key terms: latency, inversion and sublation. Each of these terms is 
deployed as a means of attending to three photographic spaces: the latent image; the 
photographic negative; the archived photograph. The drive of the thesis moves 
towards a consideration of a plurality of photographic forms, among them forms that 
have hitherto remained marginal within representational economies that invest in 
definitive images. 
 
Declining Images renders the photograph in its latent state as a ground for 
understanding the constitution of the photographer’s subjectivity in relation to 
libidinal attachments to the image. The photographic negative acts as a means of 
disinvesting critical attention away from authorized images and returning instead to 
the processual work that sustains image-production. Alongside this, the archived 
image offsets its potential for visibility through an emphasis on its assignment to 
sequestered space. 
 
The photographic forms outlined above, conventionally seen as tangential to the 
circulation of images, proffer an occasion for a series of theorizations. The discussion 
of latency compares the elaboration of the term within Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory to the conceptual reception of latent images in the field of photography. The 
debate around inversion addresses the refusal of the photographic negative to deliver 
meaning in favour of the inconclusive and the non-normative. The arguments around 
sublation address archivization, foregrounding the implications that Hegelian thought 
might have for the role of the photograph in the archive. 
 
The work of the thesis draws one back to the constitution of the photographic act in 
phenomena that have been systematically occluded in the theories and histories of art 
and photography: the latent, the negative and the archived. Such phenomena are 
integral to the exploration of the epistemological entwinements of photography and 
visibility. 
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Photography has no identity, but the photograph may,  
for the photograph captures meaning even as the inexhaustible 
 openness of the photographic appears to be captured and  
fixed by the discursive apparatus of the frame. The workings  
of capture, however, clearly exceed the framing of the photograph. 
John Tagg1 
 
In short, the photograph cannot simply be the transcription of a thing  
that renders itself as natural, not least because it is flat and not  
three-dimensional. On the other hand, photography cannot be art 
as it copies mechanically. That is the twofold disaster of photography.  
Would one want to postulate a theory of photography, then one would 
 have to set out from this contradiction, from this difficult situation. 
Roland Barthes2 
 
 
 
Topologies: Larger Pictures of Photography  
 
It is commonly argued that photography is without an identity. Its many faces can 
show up in fields of any kind and as applications of any purpose. Indeed, we are not 
overstating our case when we say that photographic imaging technologies and its 
derivatives are everywhere, doing everything. As such, the case has been argued that 
to critically think photography it needs first of all to be pluralized. If we want to 
capture some of photography’s heterogeneity, then a critical approach to photography 
must begin with problematizing the notion of its own body as one of incoherence. 
There can only be photographies – a plural, one should note, that English grammar 
does not provide all too easily.3 
 
Photographies, then. Think 2009: think satellites; think CCTV; think Google’s online 
Street View; think your mobile phone; think the laptop that generates these letters and 
that could take an image of my writing self at any time… All terms, we realize, which 
neither include a reference to the ‘photo’ nor to the ‘graph.’ And yet, they are 
common means of photographic technology. From its inception in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century, when it became possible to graph the photo-image, to 
stabilize its transient apparition in phōs, photography has mutated into so many 
applications and devices that we can simply afford to overlook their presence – so 
many that I could only fail to give a comprehensive overview of them. Indeed, to 
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push this argument further, we could say that the term ‘photography,’ in its most 
immediate image as a practice (professional, amateur or neither of the two) and in its 
most recognizable connotation of the camera-holding, image-taking photographer, is 
far from being able to cover the vast universe of photographies. This is evident in the 
fact that we do not need to make use of the term ‘photography’ anymore yet are still 
able to photograph: the laptop can take my image. That this technologically 
inaccurate statement is acceptable in everyday parlance attests to the thorough 
integration of photographic apparatuses into the materials of our technologically 
supported lives. 
 
As it might become clear, the notion of photography that I employ here is required to 
cover large and unstable grounds – it is always one of potential photographies. As 
such, I invite the reader to think big. I issue this invitation so as to think through 
larger pictures of photography, the ones that only begin to emerge once we look 
beyond the photograph’s surface or put the camera aside. To do so we must abandon 
the kind of narrowing vision of photography that settles to my mind all too quickly 
for certain tropes of practices (journalistic, artistic, amateur, familial, etc.) or for 
certain professional fields (medical, juridical, geographic, astronomic, etc.) or for 
specific forms of photographic appearance (the digital, the analogue, the fine art print, 
the projected slide, the moving image, etc.) – although, admittedly, such narrowing is 
of course done for substantiating one’s arguments with analytical precision. While 
such a breaking down into analyzing particular instances is often necessary to gain a 
sense of their specificities (historical, material, phenomenological, sociological), I do 
not wish to give up the potential space of thinking photography in its more 
comprehensive historico-technological layering. This space is, it should be stressed, 
potential, and the writings that follow reflect this. As such, Declining Images is not a 
positing of a top-down statement of what photography is; it is not a systemic vision or 
media theory of photography, and neither is it a historical account of photography – 
even though my discussions remain in dialogue with and make use of them.4 Rather, 
the discussions in this thesis are borne by the idea of thinking photography not by 
isolating (or establishing) distinctive aspects such as artistic schools, historical 
periods, technological positions, etc., but by trying to pursue an open path that could 
potentially enable links, by reading specific instances, to wider issues not 
immediately associated with photography. 
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We could call this approach a topological one. With this I mean an associative 
approach that works through different topoi where pictures, concepts, narratives, 
metaphors and photographs of photography might resonate with others. The motive 
of topology, significant in psychoanalysis which imported it from mathematics, is 
useful not only at the descriptive level to give an overview of the structuring of the 
materials I have chosen to explore but is also useful in its ‘abstracting’ sense so as to 
disassociate ourselves from the most apparent manifestations of photography and the 
discourses, pace art history, that are invested in their containment. What is to be 
gained from my claim of a topological thinking of photography? Reconsidering in 
this introduction what one has done – and what has been done to one in the space of 
writing – necessitates not only a summarizing of the materials that have been brought 
together in the course of this project but demands also a reflection on the motivating 
concerns that brought this thesis into its particular shape. And this shape is best 
served with circumscribing it as a topological thinking of photography. Why? First of 
all, in thinking photography topologically I hope to move us beyond the primary 
means of photography such as the ‘photographer,’ the ‘picture,’ the ‘scene,’ etc., 
which are most regularly considered to be locus of attention of photographic enquiry. 
Crucially, this ‘photographic enquiry’ can be interpreted variously: not only as our 
theoretical enquiry here or elsewhere into photographic issues but also as the 
photographer’s enquiry using the photographic instruments at her disposal. It could 
also be read as photography’s enquiry into itself. This potential intersection of 
different but photographic modes of enquiry articulates also my second argument in 
support of the topological – that of the photographic act as the wider sphere of 
photographic operations. 
 
 
Sensing Remotely 
 
‘To photograph.’ Anyone can do it – anyone who has access to its apparatus. And 
even if one has no access to it, or does not want to access it, one might already be a 
part of its picture. This is so because to photograph is also ‘to be photographed.’ By 
thinking in photographic acts, this passive mode begins to achieve as much 
importance as the active practice of photographing; it is perhaps of even greater 
urgency for our present times that confront and, indeed, penetrate us with ever more 
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refined technological apparatuses of visual imaging, be this for purposes of political 
surveillance, scientific research or leisurely laissez-faire. Yet let us not be convinced 
all too quickly by my words: a self-identified anthropologist observed that my claim 
of everybody being potentially involved in photography would be ‘too western’ an 
assumption, reminding me kindly of the fact that there are ‘camera-less cultures’ or 
people who do not practise photography at all – either, as I would argue, because it is 
culturally irrelevant, economically not sustainable, or socially inacceptable. Fine. But 
I still feel committed to my claim so as to reinstate it because what the 
anthropologist’s critique overlooks is the fact that photography is not just a matter of 
being sufficiently equipped with the necessary technology or a matter of executing 
the role of the photographer. One is also photographed.5 
 
However, we should not regard this ‘being photographed’ as a passive falling prey to 
the ‘photographing subject.’ Rather, ‘to be photographed’ is to practise photography, 
which is to say that practising photography entails always more positions than just 
those that are readily visible or considered to be in action of some sort.6 To think 
otherwise would be to reduce photography yet again to a one-dimensional entity, 
thinking it reductively from the most commonly assumed positions of either ‘the 
photographer’ or ‘the photograph.’ However, the fact that this observation comes 
from the anthropological corner merits further consideration given that photography 
and anthropology established themselves roughly at the same time.7 Photographic 
imaging technology was instrumental for the emerging scientific discourse of 
anthropology in the nineteenth century; likewise, photography was thereby given one 
of its first prominent scientific roles. Indeed, in its early days, anthropology was still a 
discipline carried out without the anthropologist’s direct involvement of what we now 
understand as ‘fieldwork.’ It was photography that was out there in the ‘real’ world.8 
Photography delivered the evidence directly to the anthropologist’s desk, which he 
therefore did not have to leave. It was professional photographers who did the work 
in the field and created the photographic data for analysis.  
 
Anthropology’s assertive seizing of photography’s services reflects the remarkable 
trust given to its evidentiary force and alleged objectivity – a trust that stands firmly 
in the line of Enlightenment’s ‘ocular epistemology’ as well as its tireless, almost 
obsessive work on optical devices: Spinoza made lenses, Descartes sliced ox eyes, 
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Kircher designed projectors. Anthropology’s photography is no exception to this 
ideological investment in the truth of the visible. Yet, the reciprocal dealings between 
photography and anthropology also enabled crossovers of professional roles. If it was 
possible to outsource the fieldwork to ‘non-anthropological’ photographers, then this 
attests also to a historically specific shaping of anthropological research practice – in 
this case a practice that is brought about and built around photography so as to benefit 
from its produce. But the possibility for this productive division of labour rests also in 
photography’s ability of ‘remote sensing,’ both in terms of its execution (the 
photographer can be substituted) and in terms of its photographed subject (the subject 
is woven into the photographic event in any case). And it is precisely because of 
photography’s ability of doing things remotely that it would be of critical benefit for 
us to think of photography as act. 
 
Photography consists of photographic acts.9 If we understand the photographic act as 
a topology of the entire photographic operations as they originate from and relate to a 
specific spatiotemporal event, then the photograph, as the most visible and 
appreciated outcome of this act, is only one player among others. And the 
photographed subject, the ‘scene,’ becoming the referent of this photograph, is also 
not of such primary importance anymore. Similarly, if needed at all, the figure of the 
photographer, usually seen as the creative mind behind the photograph, might also 
not be able to claim centre stage. At the same time, we are also relieving the ‘study’ 
of photography, and photography itself, of its image-centred approach. Having 
cleared the photographic stage, other players of the photographic act can begin to 
appear. Three of these more inconspicuous players are the subjects of this thesis: the 
latent photograph; the photographic negative; the archived photograph. All three are 
part of the photographic act but are conventionally occluded in the theories and 
histories of art and photography. Yet they are integral to photography’s doings. No 
functional photographic picture without its footing in an archive; no photographic 
print without its negative; no photographic negative without its latent impression. As 
such, they attest to the in-between spaces that sustain the legitimized photograph of 
representation: the captured but undeveloped and hence invisible image; the 
developed and visible but inverted image; the authorized but archived and hence 
indefinitely invisible image. 
 
 14 
 The Withouts of Photography 
 
Given the wider silence on these three ‘images’ of photography, this thesis reflects on 
the reasons for this silence by exploring their material and phenomenal dimensions 
and the discourses that frame them into this possible silence. John Tagg’s largely 
Foucauldian-informed engagement with photography and its linkages with the 
apparatuses of surveillances and social regulation, the workings of the judiciary and 
the productions of evidence as well as the construction of historical epistemes 
through photography sets the tone for my introductory discussion here.10 Photography 
photographs anything; and insofar as it processes whatever comes before its lens it 
can be said that photography has no intrinsic identity to itself. One does not need to 
fully go with Tagg’s claim that ‘photography has no identity,’ because photography’s 
often attributed lack of identity can, in itself, be understood as one of the 
characteristics of photography. If the uncertain and always shifting identities of 
photography have caused photography right from its beginnings to drift between 
much-contested dichotomies (scientific application or artistic form? technological 
invention or natural discovery? analytical instrument or creative tool?) that have 
shaped up over time into well-rehearsed (and often clichéd) debates, becoming in 
themselves significant representatives of modernist discourse, theories that go under 
the label of the ‘postmodern’ have been keen to settle inside photography’s 
ambiguous locations. The ‘lack’ of a stable or coherent identity of photography has 
productively resonated with the political projects assembled under the aegis of the 
postmodern. The uncertain and malleable identities of photography have been 
welcomed in the articulations of the postmodern and, indeed, have helped to give 
form to its critical frameworks.11 Emphasis has thereby been placed on stressing 
photography’s inseparability of the discursive and institutional terrains that lay claim 
to and make use of it. Thus, one cannot examine the arena of photography without 
considering the political, socio-economic and historical networks in which 
photography not only finds itself enmeshed but through which its meanings are also 
determined. And, as we can understand Tagg’s proposition, a critical approach to 
photography unfolds within this tension: between the discursive apparatus seeking to 
frame the photograph’s meaning and the photograph’s image that threatens to 
undermine such meaning-securing framings. Perhaps one might amend Tagg’s words 
by saying that photography has no fixed identity as its identities are always 
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engendered within the scopes of photographic applications and the methodological 
and discursive contexts in which photography is utilized.  
 
Yet with this premise, then, it might indeed make sense to say that photography has 
no identity so as to bring out more clearly its involvement in producing meanings not 
only alongside but also always already within certain socio-cultural practices and 
technological fields. Tagg’s take on photography can be seen as representative of the 
wider critical interventions that have emerged in Anglophone scholarship in the 
1970s and 80s – gathering critical momentum most notably with the publications of 
Susan Sontag’s On Photography (1977), Roland Barthes’ arrival of La chambre 
claire (1980) and Victor Burgin’s edited collection Thinking Photography (1982).12 
What they come to share, one might say if we are to believe in a vantage point of 
retrospection, is a commitment to stretch reflections on photography beyond the 
formation and narration of a photographic canon, the research on technological 
taxonomies and applications, or the campaigning for the aesthetic legitimization of 
the photographic picture as art.13 Absorbing the politically engaged work that came 
out of the then emerging fields of cultural studies and poststructuralist film and 
gender theories, and theoretically underpinned by semiotic, psychoanalytic and 
Marxian models of analysis, studying photography began to matter insofar as 
photography was brought into relief as a complex matter that is entangled in manifold 
practices serving different ideological purposes. If we were to reduce the various 
contributions of that time to one single message, then it would have to be the 
following: thinking photography is not just a matter for the practitioner or the 
photograph’s spectator precisely because photography is adoptable and adaptable to 
any application and discourse.  
 
And within this (postmodern) conception of photography it would be pointless to 
search for a nucleus exclusive to photography such as more formal approaches to 
photography have attempted to do with a view, for example, to liberate photography 
from its subsidiary status as reproductive tool – to bring photography into its own 
dimension: the Stieglitzian productions of a Pictorialist aesthetics formed one such 
attempt to allow for the possibility of individual expressiveness in this ‘mechanical’ 
medium and to make it into something ‘else’; a Szarkowskian training to give us ‘the 
photographer’s eye’ was another such attempt to help us represent our worlds by way 
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of bringing out an ‘essence’ that would be unique to photography.14 Indeed, one could 
evoke a history of photography as the ongoing tarrying with the question of how to 
best serve photography’s spirit, or conversely, of how to realize photography in 
photographic practice – of how to do photography photographically. Many more 
‘positioning’ manifestos, essays, curatorial projects and photographic works could be 
cited in the evolving histories of photography – all of them, one could say, 
endeavouring to grasp the diverse ‘photographic phenomena’ as they are played out 
in their political, societal, aesthetic and historical realities: Baudelaire’s polemics on 
the societal roles of photography and its rivalry with the fine art tradition;15 Moholy-
Nagy’s creative flirtations with photography’s technological aspects which 
emphasized a representation that would take into account the conditions of the 
industrial era;16 Benjamin’s critical highlighting of photography’s democratizing 
potentials, its disseminatory powers but also its ontological fraying of art;17 Bazin’s 
belief in photography’s transference of reality without the corrupting interference of 
the artistic hand;18 Kracauer’s professing of an ideal photographic realism;19 or, more 
recently, Wall’s call for engaging with photography as a depicting agent as 
exemplified in his tableau photographs.20 
 
While my selective summoning of some of the better-known debates on photography 
sidesteps, admittedly, strict distinctions between the sphere of ‘photography’ on the 
one hand and that of ‘art’ (or other categories) on the other, at the same time as 
aligning dangerously close different historical contexts, I do so not with the intention 
to make a claim for a historiographic model of photography. Rather, what these 
differing and differently motivated debates in their proximity to each other can bring 
into view is a fascination with photography not just as a practice to be carried out, an 
art to be appreciated, a technology to be understood, and so on, but a photography as 
a critically signifying field the meanings of which need not be treated as the exclusive 
issue of photography qua photography. To put this more clearly: what does the term 
photography hold that no other term could harness? Or again: what can we only think 
through resorting to photography – through having to think photographically as it 
were.  
 
With these questions I inevitably dilute my hopes in a postmodern ideal of 
photography that seeks to resist the temptation of a photographic essence or of 
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positing some kind of ontological kernel. However, I take up this gamble here so as to 
facilitate a space for thinking photography elsewhere, in places that are not tied to 
photography’s discourse of privileged materials, procedures, etc. – not just in mere 
terms of its aesthetic resonance with other forms of representation (evident in artistic 
concepts such as painting’s photographic realism) but in terms of any of its signifying 
echoes, metaphorical presences, analogical appearances, in short, its displacements, 
anywhere.21 And in this sense I will shift our ‘photographic’ view and contend that 
Sigmund Freud, for example, practises photography: his familiar photographic 
metaphors aimed at illuminating the dynamics between unconscious wishes and their 
censoring are thereby as much a matter for photography as they are for 
psychoanalysis. Freud does photography – not with a camera but with a metaphor.22 
Indeed, one could say that he does photography with psychoanalysis. At the same 
time we are also prompted, in this case with Freud, to consider what psychoanalysis 
could contribute in (re)formulating models of photography. What kinds of 
problematics could only be put forth under the signs of photography? To put this 
more drastically: what could Freud not have thought without his detour into 
photography? With this we return to my earlier suggestion of a topological approach 
to photography that seeks to hold open spaces for imagining photography otherwise, 
from within and without. Declining Images is grounded in this non-hierarchical 
approach to materials, practising photography with different means including the 
conceiving and making of photographic works, textual study, historical reflection, 
performative passages, and interpretative analyses of photographs, films and 
artworks. 
 
 
The Photographs of Art History 
 
If we, arguably, succeed in turning Freud into a photographer, then we might also risk 
taking on a bigger case. Let us consider the topos of photography in art history – a 
topos where photography evidently features. Photographic images are, of course, not 
the exclusive issue of art history. They are relevant to most disciplines but art history, 
as a disciplinary discourse, concerns itself also with trying to understand their role in 
the wider circuits of cultural practices of representational forms – the role of the 
photograph in the histories of the visual arts just the most obvious one. Art history’s 
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case is particularly interesting because, as a discipline, it studies cultural artefacts and 
imageries, including selected photographic ones but, as has been acknowledged in art 
historiographical scholarship, also relies on photography itself to effectuate those 
studies.23 Gombrich, for instance, in conceiving The Story of Art imposed on himself 
the rule that he would not write about works he could not show in illustrations which, 
he admits, in turn also limited the scope of his Story to ‘the number of illustrations the 
book could hold.’24 Yet let us not forget that he must have had access to such 
illustrations in the first place, grounding his selection on works that could or were 
made to enter the circuits of photographic visibility.  
 
Yet while Gombrich is at least confident enough to let us know about the material 
pragmatics involved in art historical scholarship, we are pressed to ask whether one 
could give the technologies of documentation and reproduction a more uninhibited 
role in writing art’s histories instead of simply accepting the fact that these 
technologies are just at one’s disposal – an acceptance that becomes manifest when 
we consider how much we hang on to our cameras when doing research or how ready 
we are in ensuring that an image be taken of our object of study. As such, art history 
is heavily indebted to photographic technology to get its scholarship done and whose 
outputs can be understood, as Tagg suggests, as a disciplinary frame that secures the 
meaning of the objects it has studied. And in the case of studying photographs 
themselves, art history would equally come to function as this unique framing device 
that lays itself around our photographic artefacts. However, if we begin to look more 
genuinely at photography’s methodical place within art history, then the very 
disciplinary frame of art history, seeking to keep the photograph’s meaning in a 
certain place, must be recognized as being in itself photographically (co-)produced. 
 
Wölfflin owes his reputation as an original art historian not only to his solid 
formalism but also to his innovatory slide projections and the didactical techniques 
they could facilitate, further reflected in his short treatises on how to best photograph 
sculptures.25 There is also Warburg’s think tank of a ‘Mnemosyne Atlas,’ a sort of 
investigational and no less experimental atlas of (photographic) images of cultural 
motives and artefacts through which he tried to bring into critical oscillation the 
historico-philosophical and the iconological – a project that makes a generative use of 
photography which would be difficult conceive without.26 Malraux gave us the 
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concept of a ‘museum without walls,’ casting photography in the audacious role of 
making available an alternative, potentially circulatory, system that would create and 
display the canon of great works of art.27 Coming from a more institutionally critical 
angle, postmodern voices such as Crimp’s critiqued the conservative stance of 
museums in their venture to include the photographic in their collections and their 
inability to purge themselves from modernist conventions of nomination and display, 
forcing with their practices the photograph once more into the ‘precious’ site of the 
original and its ideological baggage.28 Finally, the ordinary academic of art history 
working at the beginning of the twenty-first century also deserves our attention: more 
than ever, art historical scholarship is conducted with photographic technology. A 
quick glance into a teaching session confirms this: what students are mostly given to 
see are photographic images so as to see art history’s artworks. Images scanned from 
printed photographic reproductions, personal photographic archives assembled over 
one’s research career, digital images downloaded from online image databanks, 
JPEGs (short for ‘Joint Photographic Experts Group’) cobbled together from the 
sources the Internet makes available – all of them brought together in the 
demonstrative moment of ‘PowerPoint’ teaching. 
 
However, this is not to assert that the photographic (in whatever material form it 
comes) deserves primacy over what it represent. And neither is it to assert that we can 
study the photographically represented thing only by taking a route through the 
phenomenological dimensions of the photograph. To restrict oneself to such 
orthodoxies would simply install yet another reductive move, in this case a move that 
leaves us devoid of the photograph’s best assets – its organizing principles of 
perceived transparency and the regularity of representation through which we are able 
to extrapolate the diverse phenomena we call ‘objectivity.’ But what we should 
become more assertive of is the involvement of photography in the processings of art 
historical research. And that this methodological involvement, be it for evidentiary, 
documentary, representationary or disseminatory reasons, cannot but leave its own 
imprints on the work of art history. Photography is so integral to the practice of art 
history, indeed, to the possibility of keeping the main stream of art history 
functionally going, that photography’s presence within it goes unquestioned at most 
times. Just as the photographic negative is foreclosed by photographic discourse, 
photography’s presence is occluded by art history’s discourse or, at least, taken for 
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granted. Art history does talk about categories of photography, of photographic art or 
of art in photography, or again of fine art photography, but it shows little interest in 
its own photographic practice. 
 
Thus, the call to remind art history of its own involvement in the (re)productive 
apparatus of photography by way of its research work is also a reminder of art 
history’s other work, that of maintaining the art historical categories it has established 
in research. And to effectuate this successfully, a considerable share of its 
professional endeavour is bound up with looking after the images it has produced. As 
such, art history’s work can be understood as being just as invested in documenting 
works photographically (to insert them into art history) as it is in keeping the gained 
photographs in systemic order (to protect the art historical canon). My somewhat 
mean-spirited confinement of art history as a causal effect of photographic doings is 
not so much to prove photography’s indispensability for art history as meant to raise 
the question of how one could imagine alternative models of art history. One, for 
example, that theorizes its own materiality more consciously; or one without 
photographic images. The latter is, admittedly, hard to imagine. It is hard to do so 
because it is beside the point and hence a contrived gesture. But, on the other hand, 
we could say that my proposition remains difficult to imagine precisely because 
photography has been absorbed in the methodological proceedings of art history – so 
much so that it has disappeared in it. Hence, to differently approach my 
problematization of photography’s relation to art history or vice versa, we could also 
say that the two of them have invisibly grown together. They cannot be thought as 
separate beings. Yet that should not exempt us from thinking what photography does 
to art history, how it co-produces its knowledge: not only how it represents its objects 
but also how it writes them.29 
 
 
Writing – Photographically and Academically 
 
The entwined path that I have drawn between photography and art history is not to 
find out who might be indebted to whom but to take seriously the writing utensils that 
either side provides to its other. This interlaced scenario between art history and 
photography, between a discourse on art (art history) and a technology of discourse 
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(photography) but also between a technology of art (art history) and a discourse on 
technology (photography) is significant because it highlights their mutual 
insufficiencies so as to be able to exist without the other. Photography writes art 
history and art history writes photography. The confidence of this statement is clearly 
indebted to the open-ended legacies of poststructuralism, in particular to the work of 
Jacques Derrida, which have left their clear mark on the ideas developed in this 
thesis. As such, one must also ask how one writes this text, how one writes 
academically, and how one writes about other works. This has been one of my 
concerns, especially since this thesis brings together words and images, or more 
oppressively expressed, ‘theory’ and ‘practice.’ Dissatisfied with the often clumsy 
and polarizing treatment that the institutional environment proffered in this regard, 
the arena of deconstruction and its attentiveness to textuality, the signifier and to the 
economies of signification as material practices has revealed itself as the arena where 
this thesis has found its critical place. 
 
In this dim light of textuality, then, the arguments in this thesis are also written with 
and from within the concepts it seeks to explore.  I have aimed at writing a text that, 
as Barthes says, is written intransitively. Writing, as he pointed out once, is an 
intransitive verb; it does not need to be about, against, on or for something.30 First and 
foremost, we need to recognize the space of writing (including photographic writing), 
the dimensions of the text upon which we also rely to convey arguments. This then 
also entails, as deconstruction continues to show us, that one cannot convey one’s 
arguments without a consideration of the otherness inside language – of its 
incompleteness but also of its openness. As such, it allows always for an/other, for a 
differing space inside the text. It allows for and ‘reckons with,’ as far as such a thing 
is possible, the poetic, the materiality of signifier, the obliqueness of the letter. It 
gives breathing space to the pause. At the same time, it brings us closer, through the 
space of textuality, to other practices, including practices that would have been 
thought as not compatible to the work of writing, calling thereby into question not 
only the burdensome traditions of the image/text opposition but also the labour of the 
critic versus the labour of the artist.31 Indeed, Derrida often pointed out that 
deconstruction is not a method but can only ever be a pathway or a practice.32 This is 
vital if we are not to fall back continually into a criticism as mastering discourse that 
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defines cultural practices from above or sets the agenda from a distanced outside, 
thereby running the risk of becoming a mere patronizing gesture.33 
 
Since we ‘know,’ quite paradoxically so, that language cannot be exacting, that it 
fails to deliver the ideationally transparent crystal of analysis in academic research, I 
believe any such hard-fought attempts remain simply hard-fought and are ultimately 
of a diminishing rather than developing quality. This poststructuralist insight is of 
significance for any subject of the humanities, I believe, if we want to avoid packing 
our work into the hard case of historical or encyclopaedic compilation – as ambitious 
as that might be. To act responsibly with the space of Theory so as to bring into relief 
its textual and performative matters, I have been keeping away from such an 
approach. An abundance of facts might not automatically lead to a more enlightened 
state, which is something that has also guided me in the shaping of this research: 
slightly less is more, I believe, if we are to trust the words and allow them to do their 
work. However, this is not to say that we are thereby evacuating our discussions from 
their specific contexts. The often-heard objection that deconstruction is of little worth 
politically is appropriate in so far as deconstruction makes the impossible step beyond 
the political. It is in engendering these impossible steps that an ethics of 
deconstruction is performed: by showing us what it cannot do that it wants to do. And 
to give space to rather than override this impossible doing. In other words, by 
showing the costs that any claim, intellectual or else, imposes on us, it also shows us 
what is at stake when we are asked to produce those claims. That is at least a start to 
begin thinking it otherwise. 
 
 
Intentionalities, or some Notes on Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis 
 
For this reason I also embrace the relative spaces that deconstruction continues to 
open while also allowing itself to not hang on to them intractably. Those who do not 
share my faith in poststructuralist thought may or may not be convinced of its critical 
endeavours, the common denominator of disassociation towards its work thereby 
mostly being that of a perceived lack of political effectiveness. Yet what 
deconstruction is keen to reveal as undecidable and thus politically ineffective is not 
necessarily unintelligible.34 Rather, to partake in deconstructive practices is always a 
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matter of engaging considerately with the space of writing which entails an 
acceptance of the limiting and structuring work of the letter, an understanding that 
attests to deconstruction’s immediacy to psychoanalysis – and the methodological 
concentration of psychoanalytic theory on the spaces of the signifier and their 
importance for psychic realties. 
 
Psychoanalysis, thus, is the other significant body of theory with which this thesis 
entertains its discussions. And ‘to introduce psychoanalytic theory is to complicate 
things,’ as Parveen Adams underscores, ‘because we have to make room for one more 
reality, this time psychical reality.’35 It is psychoanalysis that has taught us to take 
seriously the space of the signifier. This respectful compliance with the signifier – 
one of the gifts of psychoanalysis – could be described as the ‘attraction of the 
signifier.’ On the one side, this would point us towards the signifier’s relation to 
others and therefore to the dependence of its performance to further signifiers which 
it is required to attract: within the chains of signification, signifiers are always 
somehow cross-polluting each other. They are in need of each other. On the other 
side, this ‘attraction’ would also describe one’s own attraction towards the signifier, 
of being attracted to and possibly inhabited by the signifier. Thus, what is potentially 
revealed as an autonomous and trans-historical systemic field of signifiers becomes 
an arena of interference where desired signifiers are ‘acted out.’ At the same time, the 
self-referential sufficiency of symbolizing systems (that is, language in the terms of 
structuralism) is thereby also brought into relief – despite the signifiers’ self-
enclosure – as irreducibly tied to historical conditions. One is given a name. And one 
is asked to answer to that name.  
 
What is brought into relief in this attraction is ultimately an intentionality, a 
historically-specific positionality of embodied subjectivity – which is to say that 
psychoanalysis is not ahistorical just as deconstruction is not indefinite. 
Psychoanalysis, regardless of its status as theory or clinical practice, can only work 
with and is conditioned by the signifiers of a given moment, which is to say it works 
with certain material forms (including our fleshy bodies) and their histories. Equally, 
deconstruction would remind us that its performance is always caught (up) in the 
signs whose semiotic outlines it seeks to grasp and possibly perforate. It is not 
indefinite because it cannot but start with a sign already defined by a definite context, 
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even if a deconstructive practice of reading and writing – of making marks – makes 
sure that it unsettles that context, and even if that sign carries the signified of 
something as weighty as ‘history.’ Hence, neither in psychoanalysis nor in 
deconstruction is history excluded or is thinking historically made impossible. Rather, 
both bodies of knowledge – psychoanalysis thinking the formations of embodied and 
sexed subjectivity, and deconstruction thinking the instabilities of the sign and the 
efforts made in shoring up the meaning it is supposed to carry, are linked to historical 
conditions – operating with and within history. Thus, we are dealing with the 
production of history itself as a mediated and conditioned construct within its own 
historical parameters – including modernity’s ‘scientific’ venture of a History of a 
historicizing kind which continues to haunt us, shaping our views of the worlds we 
believe to inhabit. 
 
While all this might appear as apparent anyway – materials being specific to history – 
deconstruction complicates things insofar as it allows itself to accept the structuring 
space of the signifier, a space that is limited by what it can or cannot do in a given 
context. Thus, while deconstruction revels in the instability and incompleteness of 
signifying chains, it cannot simply do whatever it likes to do. That would be a crude 
way of cutting through the complexly layered efforts that deconstruction is attempting 
to bring together in its work: a work of the relative but whose relativity constitutes 
itself uniquely in the context of an irreplaceably configured event – a concept that is 
often thought to be reflected in the spatiotemporal logics of the photograph.36 What 
follows then is that not anything goes, or at least what goes can only go so far as the 
sign in its context is able to go. Writing is always an act of pointing, of attracting 
signifiers, as Derrida would remind us – of directing a camera, of holding a pencil, of 
managing a keyboard. It is thereby also an embodied practice. Or as Foucault puts it: 
‘A sentence cannot be non-significant; it refers to something, by virtue of the fact that 
it is a statement.’37 
 
This stating by pointing is what resonates in Freud’s deuten so well: both an 
interpretation of something (an analysis) and a hinting at something (an act). Hence, 
what deconstruction is able to bring into critical attention is the unavoidable readiness 
of systemic structures of symbolization into which we are subsumed (Lacan’s 
structuralist work making the most unforgiving case for this theoretical vision) and in 
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which the varying layers of a subjectivity can constitute themselves; yet, at the same 
time, the inexorability of these structures which open us up to the dimensions of 
representation, is rendered permeable in the very work of carrying out the duties of 
representation. Thus, while deconstruction’s concession to the signifier will always 
remind us that we can never escape its attraction, it brings into view the incidental but 
historical nature of representational systems and their puncturing in the event of 
enunciation – an event that is differential in its corporeal and historical origins. What 
Lacan’s lalangue comes to ‘articulate’ in written representation as the sphere of 
speech is inversely represented by Derrida’s différance in writing to thereby give 
writing its own indeterminable ‘independence’ over the sphere of speech. What both 
iconic signifiers represent in their own unique genealogies is the complex relation 
between what we are able to theorize as systemic ordering of a representing structure 
and its always potentially disordering spaces that remain beyond our rationalizing 
sense. 
 
Photographic representation partakes in this dynamic as Barthes announces in the 
epigraph to this introduction: the photograph is understood to be split between a thing 
and an anything, between a document that can be known and worked with and an 
image that is potentially too immediate, attesting to something originary that cannot 
be contained, evading attempts that would seek its regulation. Barthes has worked 
this tension convincingly into his paradigm of the studium/punctum – the 
discrepancies between the connotative and the denotative level, both conjoined in the 
space of the photograph. That the photograph must compete between the objective 
and the subjective, or even finds itself glaringly wedged between science and art, is a 
strand ingrained in its modern history. However, we might just bring photography 
much closer to a ‘technology’ of writing, a writing of pointing as conceived by 
Derridian deconstruction – photography’s systematicity coming to share thereby the 
spaces of syntagmatic ordering while its spatio-temporal uniqueness of inscription 
remains outside that ordering. 
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Apparatuses, Visibilities, Spectators 
 
Declining Images is, ultimately, nothing else than a repeated attempt of such hopeful 
pointing – through and at words, photographs, signs – spurred on by an intention to 
explore differing photographic spaces and the subjective positions they might give 
rise to – the spaces of spectatorship. However, I do not put forward a consistent 
model of spectatorship that would formulate a particular type of spectator vis-à-vis 
certain imaging technologies or that would capture a spectator through a categorical 
framing of art practices or otherwise. And neither do I put forward a theory of 
spectatorship in general.38 While the thesis engages with all these aspects to some 
degree, spectatorship is brought to bear implicitly in my discussions of latency, 
inversion, sublation and their respective images and materials – three modalities that 
give rise to particular spectatorial encounters, but equally three modalities that 
provide the tools for a conceptual framing of the spectator’s encounter with them. It is 
within the appreciation of such a dialectical movement that Declining Images wishes 
to operate.  
 
Each chapter is best understood as a performance of such a dialectics – of an image 
that looks at us and of us looking at the image.39 The thesis does so by following the 
technical development of the photographic image, which is reflected in the thematic 
order of the chapters: from the moment of the photograph’s inscription and capture 
(latency), we move on to the photograph’s appearance in the negative (inversion) and 
finally consider its status as fully developed but archived image (sublation). At the 
same time, a trajectory of the photograph’s visibility is charted. Beginning in latency, 
the photograph is not yet developed and its image remains invisible to the spectator. 
Once developed into a photographic negative, the image achieves visibility but of the 
peculiar, semi-visible kind of inversion. And lastly, reaching its full visibility in the 
photographic print legitimized for presentation, the photograph falls also into the 
preserving hands of the archive whose operations ‘sublate’ the image’s visibility into 
uncertain status. Each chapter is further paired with a photographic work that I 
conceived around one of the three modalities: 444 Archives (latency), Facing Lacan 
(inversion), Fields (sublation). Their presentation (technical data, conceptual outline, 
visual documentation) as well as the language employed in presenting them is distinct 
within the thesis so as to emphasize, again, the possibility for a dialectical play 
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between, and what I must call heavy-handedly, the synthetic and analytic – between 
the bringing together and the taking apart of meaning. Yet while the projects are 
aimed at articulating the three modalities – and they so in overlapping ways – they are 
neither an illustration nor a solution but should be seen as another (photographic) 
problematization of the issues raised around latency, inversion and sublation – topical 
nodal points from where we can start again.40 
 
‘Images of Latency’ (chapter I) considers the figure of photographer caught in 
moments of latency – when dealing with undeveloped images or when the 
photographs might not appear at all, thereby destabilizing the teleological narrative of 
photographic development. Mainly working through Freudian themes and the major 
psychoanalytic concept of Nachträglichkeit, the chapter explores latent images and 
the photographer’s subjective responses to them – responses that bring out the 
photographer’s libidinal and economic attachment to the visible image. ‘Images of 
Inversion’ (chapter II) engages with the photographic negative, a material specific to 
photography yet one that has been largely overlooked in the theories of photography. 
Teasing out its peculiar phenomenal traits, the chapter explores its uses in 
representation and the highly ambiguous meanings that arise from its inversion – 
ambiguities that are further given space by engaging with the dynamics of inversion 
played out in Lacan’s model of subjectivization. Finally, ‘Images of Sublation’ 
(chapter III) thinks through the implications of archivization and the epistemological 
shifts that occur when a photograph is declared to be an archival document or, indeed, 
to be archiving in itself. The chapter does so by thinking the archival mode through 
the philosophical lens of sublation and its Hegelian precursor of Aufhebung that 
performs preservation and alteration at once. By tracing the genealogies of sublation, 
the chapter brings into focus the contradictions inherent in the logics of the 
photograph’s archival space: it seeks to preserve but it cannot do so without also 
engendering another differentiation. 
 
The latent photograph, the photographic negative and the archived picture are of an 
uncertain kind – their statuses within the photographic act and the manufacturing 
processes of the photograph ambiguous, their visibilities weak. Yet it is this weakness 
of the image that drives this thesis so as to explore why and how we come to 
understand them as weak – or, to paraphrase once more Tagg: what frames them into 
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this weakness? If the latent image is of little concern to us, then how does this relate 
to established ideas underpinning photography and our expectations of its roles? If 
the photographer regards the photographic negative to be visually illegible or 
aesthetically inappropriate, then why is this so? And if the photograph can be 
considered as an archival document, how does that status impact on the photograph 
itself – what happens to the photograph’s meanings once inserted into the archival 
space? Declining Images pursues these questions by considering how we, as makers 
of these images in our roles as spectators, photographers, consumers, theorists, etc., 
cast them into their specific shapes. At the same time, the images themselves are 
explored in their material and phenomenal dimensions so as to think about the 
responses they might solicit in us – how they might cast the spectator. 
 
This is the double act staked out in declining images: images of declining visibility 
and images declined in their visibility. 
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1980). The three books and their precursive and associated articles published 
elsewhere by their respective authors have gained historical significance for 
establishing interdisciplinary approaches to the critical study of photography within 
sociological, psychoanalytic and semiotic frameworks – extending thereby the scope 
of Bourdieu’s rather strict, if not moralizing, sociological study of photographic 
practice in Photography: A Middle-brow Art [1965], ed. Pierre Bourdieu et al. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). Of further importance are special 
journal issues dedicated for the first time to photography and its historical study as 
well as its increasing significance in postwar art practices. They include: Studio 
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Photography Issue (September 1976); October, Photography: A Special Issue (1975). 
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Desire: The Conception of Photography (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999), 
particularly pp.3-20; David Campany’s introductory survey to the anthology Art and 
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dedicated to photography: David Campany, ‘Survey’, in Art and Photography 
(London and New York: Phaidon, 2003), pp.12-45. 
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include: Beaumont Newhall, The History of Photography from 1839 to the present 
day [1937] (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1964); Helmut and Alison 
Gernsheim, The History of Photography: From the Camera Obscura to the Beginning 
of the Modern Era [1955] (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969). Those with a 
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trans. Edward Epstean (New York: Dover, 1932); Helmut Gernsheim, The Origins of 
Photography (London: Thames and Hudson, 1982). Those with a focus on the 
relation between photography and art: Aaron Scharf, Art and Photography (London: 
Penguin, 1968); Peter Galassi, Before Photography: Painting and the Invention of 
Photography (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1981). For a sociological 
history, see Jean-Claude Lemagny and André Rouillé, eds., A History of Photography 
[1986] trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
14 Even though Stieglitz and Szarkowski could not be more antagonistic towards each 
other’s strategic goals (one may note that Stieglitz is not included in Szarkowski’s 
catalogue The Photographer’s Eye) they nonetheless work towards establishing 
distinguishable photographic aesthetics. As Szarkowski states in the introduction to 
his exhibition catalogue: ‘The pictures reproduced in this book were made over 
almost a century and a quarter. […] They have in fact little in common except their 
success, and a shared vocabulary: these pictures are unmistakably photographs. The 
vision they share belongs to photography itself. The character of this vision was 
discovered by photographers at work, as their awareness of photography’s potentials 
grew. If it is true, it should be possible to consider the history of the medium in terms 
of photographers’ progressive awareness of characteristics and problems that have 
seemed inherent in the medium.’ Stieglitz, in emphasizing what he designates as the 
‘plastic nature’ of photography also seeks to ascertain photography for itself so as to 
rescue its expressive properties from the indifferent realm of mechanical production. 
On the printing process he writes, for example, that ‘the turning out of prints […] is a 
plastic and not a mechanical process. It is true that it can be made mechanical by the 
craftsman, just as the brush becomes a mechanical agent in the hands of the mere 
copyist who turns out hundreds of paint-covered canvases without being entitled to be 
ranked as an artist; but in proper hand print-making is essentially plastic in nature.’ 
John Szarkovski, The Photographer’s Eye [1966] (New York: The Museum of 
Modern Art, 2007), n.p; Alfred Stieglitz, ‘Pictorial Photography’ [1899], in Classic 
Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (New Haven: Leete’s Island Books, 
1980), pp.115-23 (p.119). 
15 For instance, Baudelaire ruminates: ‘More and more, as each day goes by, art is 
losing in self-respect, is prostrating itself before external reality, and the painter is 
becoming more and more inclined to paint, not what he dreams, but what he sees. 
And yet it is a happiness to dream, and it used to be an honour to express what one 
 32 
                                                        
dreamed; but can one believe that the painter still knows that happiness? Will the 
honest observer declare that the invasion of photography and the great industrial 
madness of today are wholly innocent of this deplorable result?’ Charles Baudelaire, 
‘The Modern Public and Photography’ [1859], trans. Jonathan Mayne, in Classic 
Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (New Haven: Leete’s Island Books, 
1980), pp.83-89 (pp.88-9). 
16 Moholy-Nagy reminds us that ‘the fact of photography does not grow or diminish 
in value according to whether it is classified as a method of recording reality or as a 
medium of scientific investigation or as a way of preserving vanished events, or as a 
basis for the process of reproduction, or as “art.” The photographic process has not 
precedent among the previously known visual media. And when photography relies 
on its own possibilities, its results, too, are without precedent. Just one of its features 
– the range of infinitely subtle gradations of light and dark that capture the 
phenomenon of light in what seems to be an almost immaterial radiance – would 
suffice to establish a new kind of seeing, a new kind of visual power. […] In today’s 
photographic work, the first and foremost issue is to develop an integrally 
photographic approach that is derived purely from the means of photography itself 
[…].’ László Moholy-Nagy, ‘Unprecedented Photography’ [1927], trans. Joel Agee, 
in Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings, 
1913-1940, ed. Christopher Phillips (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of 
Art/Aperture, 1989), pp.83-5 (pp.83-4). 
17 Recognizing the political potentials of photographic reproduction, Benjamin’s 
incisive remarks on photography and the artwork and the dialectics engendered 
between ritual and show, cult and exhibition value, the original and reproduction, etc., 
do not indulge in sentimentality of ‘lost’ values but call for a political engagement 
with this new mass medium. ‘An analysis of art in the age of mechanical reproduction 
must do justice to these relationships, for they lead us to an all-important insight: for 
the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art 
from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To an ever greater degree the work of art 
reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility. From a 
photographic negative one can make any number of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ 
print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be 
applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being 
based on ritual, it begins to be based on another practice – politics.’ Walter Benjamin, 
‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ [1936], trans. Harry Zorn, 
in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (London: Pimlico, 1999), pp.211-44 (p.218). 
18 For Bazin, photography and film have given us the means to satisfy our desire for 
realism. He sees the triumph of photography not so much grounded in the medium’s 
perfecting physical process; rather ‘does it lie in a psychological fact, to wit, in 
completely satisfying our appetite for illusion by a mechanical reproduction in the 
making of which man plays no part.’ André Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the 
Photographic Image’ [1945], in What is Cinema, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Hugh Gray 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp.9-16 (p.12). 
19 Kracauer locates photography’s, and by way of extension, film’s purposeful task in 
capturing the ephemeral – in short, in showing us what the human eye could never 
see. His study Theory of Film is firmly grounded in a material study of photography 
to which he dedicates the opening chapter ‘Photography’ (p.3-23). ‘Films come into 
their own when they record and reveal physical reality. Now this reality includes 
many phenomena which would hardly be perceived were it not for the motion picture 
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before our eyes.’ Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical 
Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p.ix. 
20 In his essay ‘“Marks of Indifference”’ of 1995, Wall charts his own little history of 
photography alongside the historical trajectories of art, concluding with the argument 
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Modern Art, 2007), pp.143-68 (p.167). 
21 On the dialectics of photography and painting, see, for example, Peter Osborne, 
‘Painting Negation: Gerhard Richter’s Negatives’, October 62 (autumn 1992), 
pp.102-13. 
22 Sigmund Freud, ‘A Note on the Unconscious’ [1913], trans. James Strachey, in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XII, 
ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Vintage and The Hogarth Press, 2001), 
pp.257-66 (p.264). 
23 A number of publications have explored art history’s techno-histories, mostly 
assessing the methodological and historiographical impact of reproductive imaging 
technologies on what is known and taught as ‘art history’: Helene Roberts, ed., Art 
History Through the Camera’s Lens (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1995); 
Frederick N. Bohrer, ‘Photographic Perspectives: Photography and the Institutional 
Formation of Art History’, in Art History and its Institutions: Foundations of a 
Discipline, ed. Elizabeth Mansfield (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 
pp.246-59; Anthony J. Hamber, ‘A Higher Branch of the Art:’ Photographing the 
Fine Arts in England, 1839-1880 (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach, 1996). 
24 E. H. Gombrich, The Story of Art [1950] (London: Phaidon Press, 1967), p.1. 
25 Wölfflin’s treatises are in themselves highly interesting in that his 
recommendations of how to ideally display and illuminate artwork should be 
analyzed for his notion of art, that is, the resulting photographs should be read for 
their effectiveness of engendering the art he wants us to see. Heinrich Wölfflin, ‘Wie 
man Skulpturen aufnehmen soll’, published in three parts in Zeitschrift für bildende 
Kunst (1896/1897/1915), pp.224-28, pp.237-44, pp.294-97. For a facsimile of his 
publications on the best practices of photographing sculptural works, see Jean-Claude 
Chirollet, ed. and intr., Heinrich Wölfflin: Comment photographier les sculptures 
1896, 1897, 1915 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008). For the relations between photography 
and sculpture, see: Rainer Michael Mason, Hélène Pinet, Heinrich Wölfflin, 
Pygmalion Photographie: La sculpture devant la caméra 1844-1936 (Geneva: Musée 
d’art et d’histoire, 1985); Geraldine A. Johnson, ed., Sculpture and Photography: 
Envisioning the Third Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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words, ‘a symphony of images, part interpretation of history, part auto-biographic 
meditation.’ Warburg himself used the metaphor of a pendulum’s swing 
[Pendelgang] to describe these wanderings between the analytical attempts of 
historical (re)construction and the psychological impacts of personal interpretation. 
Warburg’s idea of the Mnemosyne Atlas was transmitted into his 
Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek and its changing constellations that would mark 
the creative spirit of his vision of Kulturwissenschaft. For a cursory outline of this 
undertaking, see Aby M. Warburg, ‘Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg: 
Vor dem Kuratorium’ [1929], in Aby M. Warburg: Ausgewählte Schriften und 
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the Classical Tradition’, in E. H. Gombrich, Tributes: Interpreters Of Our Cultural 
Tradition (Oxford: Phaidon, 1984), pp.117-37 (p.135). 
27 André Malraux, The Psychology of Art: The Museum without Walls, trans. Stuart 
Gilbert (New York: Pantheon Books, 1949-50). 
28 This thesis shares much of Crimp’s intellectual framing of postmodernism, 
photography and the institution of ‘art.’ Crimp gives an outline of the assimilation of 
photography as the museum’s ‘new’ art in the 1980s – made possible by the earlier 
assembling of photographic canons and formal approaches to photography: ‘As 
formalist theory took greater hold, however, it was not photography’s imitation of 
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discovered, discovered to have been art all the while.’ Douglas Crimp, On the 
Museum’s Ruins (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1993), p.16. 
29 While art history’s historical linkages with photography have been given some 
historiographical and methodological attention, little is done, I believe, in thinking up 
more fluid models of art scholarship that actually move beyond the critical 
acknowledgment of photography in the writing of art’s histories and which, 
notwithstanding the efforts, still attests to a privileging of the ideas promoted in one’s 
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history. Lev Manovich’s project of ‘Cultural Analytics’ is an interesting example in 
this respect by expanding the uses of digital imagery. Drawing on the metadata that 
become available in the ongoing digitization of the canonical works of art (the digital 
formats of paintings or films), he uses those data for computationally analyzing 
formal qualities (e.g. tonal ranges) or historical figures (e.g. geographical 
dissemination) of these works. The resulting patterns and statistical graphs bring 
thereby into relief, in an almost allegorical way, the connoisseurial and institutional 
encryptions of art history. While this project is utterly limited in its empirical 
essentialism, it still provides for our present moment in time a worthwhile critique of 
art history by means of its own technology – the ongoing digitization of artworks is 
strongly driven by art history and the institutions close to it so as to build up an ever 
greater archive of digital imagery but that imagery is mostly used to worship their 
referents, that is, the artworks they represent, without reflecting on the wider 
epistemological implications for art history which such a technological shift might 
entail. ‘Cultural Analytics’ is available online on <http://lab.softwarestudies.com> 
[13/05/2009]. 
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concern in most of Derrida’s writings – and often paralleled by a notion of ‘pathway’ 
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same time (whether wittingly or not) remaining implicated in and complicit with its 
opposite. […] None of the binary oppositions structuring logocentric and 
phallocentric thought can simply be avoided, and no compromise between them is 
possible. One must accept the tangible and singular irresolvability of oppositions in 
their concrete contexts, and in contexts to come.’ See Elizabeth Grosz’s section 
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35 Parveen Adams, The Emptiness of the Image: Psychoanalysis and Sexual 
Differences [1996] (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p.27. 
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creating – and possibly traumatic – ‘event,’ embodies this conjuncture of the 
irreducible and reproducible. On this topic, see Régis Durand, ‘Event, Trace, 
Intensity’, trans. Lynne Kirby, Discourse 16 (1993), pp.118-26. 
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MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002); Griselda Pollock, Vision and 
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(London: Vintage, 1998); Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996). 
39 Psychoanalysis (particularly the notorious Lacanian ‘sardine can’ moment) and 
Merleau-Pontian phenomenology have made it clear that our subjectivities are 
configured between desired and desiring objects: we desire objects but the object, too, 
desires. Georges Didi-Huberman has dedicated a book to this dialectical play between 
spectator and gazing object. See Georges Didi-Huberman, Ce que nous voyons, ce qui 
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The photographer always acts with the desire 
 of ‘creating’ an image that did not exist beforehand.  
That desire is the generator of hope and fear:  
‘will my photograph[y] be a success?’, one always asks. 
Serge Tisseron1 
 
Indeed, the term latent image […] has no significance 
except for the implied intention – or at least the possibility – 
of photographic development. 
The Theory of the Photographic Process2 
  
A trick of vocabulary: we say ‘to develop a photograph’; but what the 
chemical action develops is undevelopable, an essence (of a wound), 
what cannot be transformed but only repeated under the instances of 
insistence (of the insistent gaze). 
Roland Barthes3 
 
 
 
Apertures: Weakening Images 
 
 
  
 Figure 1. Alain Fleischer, Le regard des morts. 
 
 
To open this text, and to leave it open, we begin with an image. The above 
photographic image traces more photographic images. Scores of photographic images 
float in those trays that remind one of those typically used in darkrooms to process 
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the prints according to the principles of classic photographic craft: three ‘baths’ turn a 
latent impression into a visible photograph – develop, stop, fix. The image has 
appeared. Photographic education, particularly the one that is keen to attribute to 
itself the conceited label of ‘fine art,’ still likes to anchor students in this three-step 
operation, even though since the digitization of photography in the 1980s ‘darkroom 
photography’ has become rather a rarity.4 Technological nostalgia might be one way 
of explaining the photographer’s fixation on processes that have hardly any techno-
economic validity and/or practicality in today’s terms. At the same time, this allows 
the photographer to ground the ‘fine art’ photograph in a technological particularity 
through which the photographer can set herself romantically apart from the ‘banality’ 
of the undifferentiated mass production of images; or even worse, confuse 
conveniently technological exception with ‘artistic’ originality. 
 
The survival – however marginal – of the ‘redundant’ analogue process as beneficial 
to a photographic pedagogy is often explained in terms of ‘knowing the basics,’ 
because this type of hand-crafted photograph allows more easily the comprehension 
of the developmental stages of the photograph. Digitized photographic technologies, 
on the other hand, have compressed the course of the image’s emergence into an 
instance of a few seconds or less, making it more difficult to understand how an 
image is formed photographically within the apparatus. Or indeed, thanks to real-time 
rendering, the taking of the photograph is based itself on an already displayed image, 
presenting the image to be taken as image. Moreover, the didactic emphasis of 
developing your own photograph in the ‘old-fashioned’ way could be seen as giving 
cause to an initiation rite of the photographer. I have always had doubts whether one 
would count as a ‘photographer’ without an introductory course in ‘darkroom 
photography,’ without having assisted in the emergence of the image. Then again, I 
do not want to place an argument for an artificial excavation of technologies past. 
Neither do I want to disguise the photographic image in a technological retro-look for 
the sake of it. Yet, there is something of interest for us in sticking to photographic 
tradition, at least momentarily, that is beyond historical nostalgia and the ideals of 
pedagogy: that is how the prolonged processual stages of image development can 
help us think how the photographer is invested – economically and libidinally – in the 
emergence of the image. The drawn out stage of developing the image, with its 
ritualistic bathings, builds up a momentum of expectancy that indexes the 
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photographer’s desire to see the desired image. Images feed our scopic drive. But, 
psychically, we are equally already fed by the idea of a potential image, in particular 
if we can avail ourselves of its making. However, the position that the photographer 
takes up during the latent stages of the image is not a win-all situation. It also remains 
uncomfortable, as one cannot yet know whether the image will meet the 
photographer’s expectations. At the same time, it can also be one of bliss as one can 
idealize the image to come and take part in the image’s gradual appearance. 
 
This chapter explores the space of an image whose appearance can be neither 
guaranteed nor predicted. This image, if it is an image at all, resides in the space-time 
between image capture and its appearance. We wish to explore the temporalities 
between ‘impression’ and ‘expression,’ two theoretical terms that resonate equally 
well in psychoanalysis and in photography. While we might not be able to ‘focus’ on 
this image, we might be able to encircle topologies of its space-time. Reflecting on 
this intermediary stage (‘taken but not developed’) of the photographic image – 
known in photographic circles as the latent image – is useful, because it can reveal 
how we, as photographers and spectators, are dedicated to its emergence. As the 
latent image withholds the image its visibility to the photographer (who is nonetheless 
already consciously working towards the emergence of this image), it can enable us to 
question, through its uncompleted status and on the grounds of its ‘absence,’ not only 
what drives us to the image but also what we expect of it. 
  
If we have put into words so far some of the changing technological facets of 
photographic image productions and their technological effects as affects for the 
photographer/spectator, then it is an apt moment to return to our image. (Figure 1) 
What has been printed on this page could be seen as a typical example of the 
increased hybridity of photo-technological images of our times, bringing about not 
just a blurring of various image categories into each other but also a converging of the 
technologies and managements of image and information.5 Our image, for example, is 
the printed result of a digitally made screen capture of a short clip on a DVD 
documenting the work’s many black-and-white photographs that are photographic 
enlargements of photographic images of faces. Their eyes stare at us. Their gazes still 
reach us, permeating the multiple photo-reproductive layers that are accumulated in 
the image. Each tray holds one image and, at the same time, gives it a frame around 
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it. Tray after tray is lined up repetitiously on the floor so as to form a vast 
monotonous grid composed of 480 cells. In each cell, there swims a photograph in a 
transparent liquid, suggesting the development is not yet finished or it might just have 
been completed. We do not know. 
 
The laboratory aesthetics of this installation by Alain Fleischer, titled Le regard des 
morts, leave us uncertain as with regards to the state of these images, even though the 
supplementary work of documentation makes certain that the faces we see on these 
photographic prints are established as those of soldiers of WWI – photographic prints, 
however, we are informed, that have not been chemically fixed.6 We imagine how the 
soldiers’ faces might slowly loose the recognizability in the eye of the spectator. They 
might disintegrate, thus not only qualifying the work for the formal language of 
contemporary art through which it can be understand as an ‘installation’ on the 
grounds of being temporarily installed but also because the images’ permanence is 
temporarily limited. As such, the work does not need to be dated. An art historical 
dating procedure would do just more violence to the individual images by not 
respecting their mobility and fluid dis/appearances. Like memory, these images flash 
up briefly but cannot be kept forever. The photographer has not fixed the images so as 
to let them move. What appears at first as a photograph that has come out of its 
latency, falls yet back again into a provisional state. Not being fixed, the photographs 
cannot survive in visibility. Developed, the images have seen the light but were not 
strong enough to withstand it. Fleischer’s images are situated at the threshold between 
appearance and disappearance. Phenomenologically – and contrary to the teleological 
techno-logics of established models of photographic practice – the images might as 
well be about to appear as they are to disappear. In these trays, photography shows us 
a face that is not just a representation engendered through fixing (the ‘capture’) or 
through the fixed (the ‘image’) but is also a face that shows its own instability by 
giving what we will be calling ‘the latent’ a tangible form.7 The photographic image – 
though having come out of its ‘period of latency’ – becomes once more undetectable 
for us who wish/ed for it. 
 
Fleischer’s photographs bring the image into movement, a movement that has been 
stabilized by the long awaited innovation of chemical fixation. The history of 
photography, so duly for a history, begins only with the fixing of the photograph. 
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Joseph Nicéphore Niépce who, we are told, was the first one to do so in 1837 and, 
thus, finds himself also thereby inscribed in the opening sections of most photo-
historical accounts. Anything before that truly history-writing moment, when images 
suddenly began to write themselves, could be considered through the photographic 
lens of pre-history. The photographs of this pre-history are still very weak materials, 
fragile beings that could only tolerate weak candlelight. In ‘Early Researches in 
Photography,’ Henry Fox Talbot, the other famous apprentice of early photography, 
is still puzzled by this instability: ‘Thus I expected that a kind of image or picture 
would be produced, resembling to a certain degree the object from which it was 
derived. I expected, however, also that it would be necessary to preserve such images 
in a portfolio, and to view them only by candlelight; because if by daylight, the same 
natural process which formed the images would destroy them, by blackening the rest 
of the paper.’8 The unfixed photograph is weak; it fades quickly. My opening 
photograph has put an end to Fleischer’s weakening images. Fixed again, it has 
preserved a trace. As such, my ‘illustration’ can be read as symptomatic of my own 
insecurity to bypass the image. I could not abstain from it. As if I would suggest: 
better an image than none; better an image of latency than one in latency. Wishful 
images. 
 
 
Appeals of the Latent 
 
I cannot recall when it was that the latent revealed itself to me. But how could it 
reveal itself? If we were to make a case for its ontology, then we could describe it as 
something that exists yet is outside a marked or identifiable representation. On the 
one hand, the latent is hidden within a manifest structure and remains invisible. It 
deceives any straightforward attempts of interpretation and can only be accessed 
indirectly or via a translation – such as the latent content of dreams. On the other 
hand, the latent may well be dormant and escape apparent representation – remaining 
therefore visually indeterminate – but its temporal dimension remains one of 
uncertainty too. It could surface at any moment, yet that moment might not be 
predictable, like a body that has been infected yet shows no detectable symptoms of 
the illness. Thus, we can already begin to ‘see’ how the latent, as it flashes up in the 
theoretical bodies of psychoanalysis, photography and medical science, for instance, 
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makes us go searching for it. Since sometimes there is something somewhere hidden 
– in a state of latency – it may also posit something incalculable sometimes 
somewhere. It remains outside our immediate, conscious understanding and therefore 
outside our control. We feel therefore, one could say, provoked to look for the latent. 
And yet, the few lines I have produced here to open this chapter, attempting to 
circumscribe a space about its traits, clearly show that the latent has already led us by 
the nose. There is an appeal that emanates from the latent. It is an appeal that calls us, 
but does not lead us. It is a vague call, without clear directions. It is also an appeal 
that seduces us, that appeals to us precisely because, being seduced, we give up our 
wilfully chosen directions.9 Let us, then, take up this uncertain invitation. 
 
Things that lie in latency are dormant and hidden. As such, they might awake one day 
and become recognizable. Not recognizable in themselves perhaps; rather, they 
become recognizable through the logics of the symptomatic. Indirect, the 
symptomatic points us to something that we could not retrieve otherwise. The 
production of the photographic image, as is well known, also begins with a latent 
image after an exposure has been made.10 ‘The impression is latent and invisible,’ 
comments Talbot, ‘and its existence would not be suspected by any one who was not 
forewarned of it by previous experiment.’11 Talbot’s reflection on the latent image is 
an indication of how the latent itself, recognized as latent, depends on a 
methodological approach that constricts the latent as invisible/undetectable but 
existent. The spectator is (made) aware of this potential image-to-come – or at least 
so is the claim made for it. A ‘forewarning’ is issued to the spectator to mark the 
space of this image resting in latency to therefore prepare the grounds for the 
possibility of an emergence of something visible. Do not overlook this (invisible) 
image, the photographer might say. Just because it has not appeared yet does not 
mean it is not already an image. Of course, to make this statement we are detaching 
the image from its allegiance to the visible.12 In the ‘image’ marked as latent, we 
could see the invisible.  
 
Following these preliminary thoughts, we can suspend the photographer’s work 
between two poles. On the one hand, the photographer is an impression-maker, 
responding to impressions he receives. Beeindruckt, the photographer triggers the 
release button and creates in turn another impression in the form of a new 
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photographic image. ‘The photographic process is recapitulation of a process in the 
mind of the photographer,’ Hollis Frampton testifies, ‘which must have been carried 
through to an end before the shutter is released. We say among ourselves of a 
photograph that it is “well seen.”’13 And, on the other hand, the photographer is 
transforming the impression into a visible image by developing it. For photographers 
not to render visible the impressions would be a non-sense. ‘Accepting impressions 
without visibly expressing them?’, so could the photographer’s paradox be 
formulated as a question. The latent image poses a threat to the self-understanding of 
the photographer. Without the successive development that makes the impression 
visible, that rescues the latent image from its latency as it were, the photographer’s 
sense of self is undercut. Psychoanalytically speaking, we could apply the term 
castration. The photographer’s self-image is thrown into crisis: no image, no 
photographer. 
 
The photographer, therefore, is advised to develop the image if he is to escape the 
‘castrating’ threat of this lacking image. In his efforts to secure the image visibly, the 
photographer acts as a guardian of the visible, protecting it from the corroding 
weakness of the latent image. In reading photo-manuals, one can observe how vital 
this aspect of ‘rescue’ is to the logics of photographic development and the 
photographer’s affinity for perfectibility. ‘The development of this latent image by 
means of the developer is one of the most important and interesting of all 
photographic processes, and upon its successful operation depends in very large 
measure the nature of the end product, that is, the finished photograph, which is our 
goal.’14 We can take the ‘developer’ not just as the substance enabling the 
development but also as the acting agent driving such a need for development. It is 
the photographer’s ambition, his drive, to bring the image out of the indistinct spheres 
of latency. In what follows, we want to reflect upon the implications of this obvious 
‘development’ that is so ingrained in the practice of photography. Does 
photographing necessarily imply development? Is the photographer ‘obliged’ to 
produce images as to be recognized as a photographer? Could we envisage a 
photography without photographs, these images that inscribe themselves in and as the 
visible? Or in other words, is there an identity – a self-image – of photography that 
could tolerate the uncertain otherness of the latent image? 
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Interpreting the Latent 
 
Let us take up again the lead proposed by the latent to find out about its image. 
Sigmund Freud, of course, our interpreter of dreams, had a lot to say about the 
materials relating to all things latent. Indeed, latency, as a concept, is central to 
Freudian theories if one is to ‘grasp’ the work of the unconscious and the belatedness 
of symptoms: ‘beside an emotion expressed, behind a symptom manifested, there 
lurks a contrary, repressed emotion. Yet this censored emotion erupts whenever 
repression momentarily relaxes its grip.’15 Hence, dreams, Freud is confident, ‘may 
appear strange and senseless; but, if we examine them by a technique which differs 
little from the free association used in psychoanalysis, we are led from their manifest 
content to a secret meaning, to the latent dream-thought.’16 Thus, there is more than 
meets the eye. Invisible secrets. Analysis of the manifest dream-content brings into 
relief the latent dream-thought. Inside the image, another image: dreaming brings 
about the appearing of images within which other images have disappeared. 
 
The psychoanalyst is comparable to a translator, or more precisely, an interpreter. 
One interprets dreams.17 Both are required to transform the ‘foreign,’ the radical 
otherness claimed by the unconscious, into something recognizable. Their space is the 
threshold where they bring that ‘thing’ into a recognizable relief by attributing 
signification to it. They also guard this threshold and therefore mediate between the 
spaces that it separates. At first sight, translation’s work is like ‘a mechanical game of 
correspondences.’18 The translator’s task is that of a match-maker, working towards 
that ‘appropriate’ space where Freud’s German Traum can meet his English dream. 
(And we are reminded here that the photographer’s work, too, is often that of a 
match-maker: it is expected that one’s image taken will match with one’s self-image. 
In being photographed, Barthes asks: ‘an image – my image – will be generated: will 
I be born from an antipathetic individual or from a “good sort”?’19) At the threshold, 
and thanks to the translator’s soothing work, the sign’s contours appear to soften so 
that it can slip into a new shape without much effort. But that is of course our 
illusionary dream of the work of the translator/analyst as patching up the cracks that 
the work of translation or analysis causes. Thus, as so many translators restlessly 
speak of their precarious position in the forewords of their translated publications, 
 46 
‘the translator should never be really there’ as her presence indicates precisely the 
impossibility of leaving things the same as it were.20  
 
And the analyst? Her presence is similarly declared dubious. There and not there. The 
analyst effaces herself during the analytic session to do the work of interpretation. ‘It 
is interesting,’ the psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas observes about the tricks of his 
trade, ‘that psychoanalysis, which would have us look truth in the eye, also makes use 
of the most powerful illusion we generate: that we convey ourselves to other 
people.’21 The analyst conveys himself by rendering his presence into an illusion of 
absence so as to ‘listen out’ for the invisible signs that might reside in the latent 
‘image’ that the analysand brings to the session in the face of the analyst’s mute 
performance. We need to slow down the impact of this image by putting it between 
quotation marks (a trick to which we are indebted to Derrida), because, given its 
latency, it remains an unattainable one: if it is brought into light by the analyst’s 
work, to employ a typically used metaphor, then we might well ‘see’ something but, 
at the same time, what is happening to this latent image as image? Conceptually more 
adequate, Freud does not speak of a latent image. Instead, he refers to the latent 
‘stuff’ in dreams as ‘dream-thoughts.’ This deprives the latent of more obvious visual 
connotations. It is the so-called manifest content that is asked to stand in for what 
cannot be directly expressed, for what has to respect moral inhibitions and therefore 
has to undergo the distortions of censorship.22 Following Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory, the repressive predisposition of the psychic apparatus bars that which cannot 
find expression – that which ought to be repressed – into what forms the 
psychological topos of the unconscious.23 The dream-work is considered to transport 
the lingering latent into the representational, attributing visual and verbal imageries 
for example. The unthinkably formless is given form. The various narrative pieces of 
the dream’s manifest content act like remote representatives of the latent. Thus, Freud 
can say that the latent and the manifest ‘are presented to us like two versions of the 
same subject-matter in two different languages, or, more properly, the dream-content 
seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose 
characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original 
and the translation.’24 
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Irrational Kernels 
 
In many ways the latent constitutes one of the basic theoretical materials of 
psychoanalysis. The latent is the theoretical substance around which psychoanalysis 
organizes its disciplinary discourses. Regardless of whether one’s relation to 
psychoanalysis is of a loving or loathing kind, the latent is always a primer for the 
psychoanalytically (and we might add in our context also ‘photographically’) 
informed person, framing as it does the spatiotemporal qualities of the unconscious. 
Regardless of whether one believes in the psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious 
or not, the most fantastic thing remains (in) the heart of psychoanalysis: the 
possibility of not knowing – and of not knowing oneself. Indeed, a disbelief in the 
claims of psychoanalysis tends just to enforce them. Not believing the message of 
psychoanalysis is a tending of its beliefs. That is the more conventional wisdom of 
streetwise defendants and detractors of psychoanalysis alike. In this situation, either 
side simply confirms its own opposing position. What is far more interesting is to 
approach this dividing line as a mutual and thus, shared, impasse for either side, an 
impasse where both sides are bound together by their very difference. In this joint 
space then, psychoanalysis comes to figure itself also without itself, without the 
possibility of taking recourse to its own, self-legitimized self – a self that is also 
posited as irreducibly exclusive by the other who does not belief in it. ‘Who would 
believe in its tools anyway?’ Psychoanalysis, therefore, can also not validate itself 
anymore with the conceptual tools that it has worked on for a century or so to be at its 
disposal for to defend its territory. 
 
Given this exposure of psychoanalysis to its without, might this bring psychoanalysis 
to silence? Not really. Psychoanalysis, the talking cure, continues talking. Speech is 
the medium in which it lives. And as such, in letting it continue its discourse in open 
light and with its detractors, psychoanalysis might appear even more irrational. Not 
only assuming a groundless kernel as its primary material of investigation that it 
struggles to defend to those who distrust its theoretical claims, but seen from without 
it also appears as a disciplinary discourse gone irrational. What, after all, could it say 
to those who do not believe in it? Perhaps something that can only be discounted as 
nothing. That makes psychoanalysis outlandish. But that is its point, a significant 
point. The very possibility of there being such a discursive formation is extraordinary, 
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that is to say a discourse that allows itself the possible appearance of not knowing 
what it is talking about. In this regard it is fitting to paraphrase Lacan’s unmistakable 
words that simply placed the field of psychoanalysis as the displaced discourse of the 
hysteric.25 That is, unmistakably, a very Lacanian thing to say (Lacan affirming 
thereby his own theoretical position of a psychoanalysis underpinned by structuralist 
linguistics) but it is also to the point in that it is a discourse that is not afraid of its 
excess of unaccountability, be this of a scientific, epistemological or methodological 
nature. The possibility of a disciplinary space of the irrational in an analytically hard-
edged age of scientification is the ethical space of psychoanalysis. Thus, to not 
believe in the theoretical claims posited by psychoanalysis but still to take a 
considerate look at it brings into relief even more drastically its significance vis-à-vis 
the non-signifying. That significance is enacted through the talking work done in the 
analytic session where the analysand can potentially accede into the ‘relief of 
signification.’26 At the same time, in psychoanalysis’s ever growing expoundings on 
the work of the unconscious and its theoretical significance, psychoanalysis takes also 
away, every time anew, a little bit of its absolute secret by giving it some 
signification. It finds constantly new signifiers, terms and spaces to which it can 
attach itself in a meaningful way while holding out or on to its ‘unconscious,’ which 
it must claim as unclaimable. As such, psychoanalysis’s every explanatory attempt in 
the face of its disbelievers deflates its most radical assertion of a methodological 
practice of the unaccountable by being forced to give an account of it. This can never 
be a direct account if psychoanalysis is to keep its own belief in the inexplicable; not 
a ‘snapshot’ of it, but only a description of topologies across psychic operations and 
their latent phases. And yet, in this defensive situation, psychoanalysis is also opened 
up anew to itself by the other, by its other who might simply not believe in it, thereby 
re-inscribing irrationality into the body of this ‘hysteric discipline.’27 
 
As might have become clear by now, I have chosen to defend both the defendants and 
detractors of psychoanalysis. I do so because I believe the reciprocal aversion of each 
other’s position, as I have pointedly delineated their interplay for my own purpose 
here, can be of good use in bringing out the radical place of psychoanalysis, a place 
which becomes even more radical if we take the gamble in voicing our doubts about 
it while simultaneously making use of its professed insights. By allowing oneself to 
be situated in the space of courteous opposition, one must also court what one might 
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otherwise outright oppose. Thus, in defending both defendants and detractors of 
psychoanalysis I hope to avoid getting stuck between immobile fronts. At the same 
time, I do not only want to disarm the detractors of psychoanalysis of their resistance 
whenever I make use in my work of the insights proffered by psychoanalysis but I 
also want thereby to disarm myself of the risk of running into the closing ranks of 
overdetermination of the kind of psychoanalytically argued critique that can only 
affirm itself in turn.28 What remains to be said, then, we can say with Paul de Man 
who makes a case – via psychoanalysis – for a dialectic of understanding as ‘as a 
complex interplay between knowing and not-knowing’ which he recognizes as being 
at work in the processes of his own research field, literary theory. As such, the 
situation becomes comparable to the psychoanalytical session where neither party 
fully needs to know what the other is talking about it. ‘But,’ as he writes, ‘this 
difficulty does not prevent a dialogical discourse of at least some interpretative value 
from taking place. The two “horizons,” that of individual experience and that of 
methodical understanding, can engage each other and they will undergo modifications 
in the process, though none of the experiences may ever become fully explicit.’29 And 
this is what psychoanalysis, despite itself, can enable us to see. 
 
It is the analyst/interpreter who seeks to lead us beyond the cover of conscious 
language. And yet, even though psychoanalytic theory has made us knowledgeable on 
how to interpret dreams by introducing the latent as what Freud called once ‘a new 
class of psychical material,’ the latent remains nevertheless of an elusive nature.30 As 
the latent does not ‘illustrate’ the dream and thus cannot make visible its own features 
in immediate fashion, we also do not have direct access to it, that is to say we need to 
rely on deductive methods. This is of course the discovery attributed to Freud and his 
patients, but Freud became also aware of the ‘limits’ of interpretative work. It is the 
analyst/interpreter’s task ‘of investigating the relations between the manifest content 
of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts, and of tracing out the process by which the 
latter have been changed into the former.’31 This ‘disentangling’ is made possible 
through recognizing the operations of condensation and displacement in the dream-
work. Yet, at the same time, condensation and displacement can hinder an ultimate 
exposure of what may rest in latency. 
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Images, Verdichtend and Derealizing 
 
A dream’s manifest motives behave like ‘“nodal points” upon which a great number 
of the dream-thoughts’ can converge.32 Unravelling these nodal points can give us the 
leads to find out about what there might be (hidden) in latency. But the latent may, 
ultimately, evade us. Because ‘each of the elements of the dream’s content turns out 
to be have been “overdetermined” – to have been represented in the dream-thoughts 
many times over,’ the leads we were following may return us to where we started.33 
Instead of facing a latent image, we may have to bypass it; or, we may have already 
bypassed it. Who knows? Indeed, who could know? Standing at a crossroads that is 
crisscrossed by an indefinite number of routes, how could one decide to choose one 
over the other? Yet, we do not find ourselves in a ‘senseless’ situation in the sense of 
losing one’s senses. Rather, it is the ‘rational’ in which we would like to ground our 
decisions, that is asked to succumb to its own determinedness and from where it aims 
at establishing a decision that should ultimately confirm itself as the decision.  
 
The decision that Freud took was that ‘the dream-thoughts to which we are led by 
interpretation cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite endings; they are 
bound to branch out in every direction into the intricate network of our world of 
thought.’34 In branching out, we may well encounter new associatively related ‘nodal 
points’ at the crossroads of the wishful paths drawn by the unconscious. Yet, 
considering the un(ac)countability of this situation – indefinite number of endings – 
how could one ever come face to face with the latent in which our dream-thoughts are 
suspended? Perhaps we cannot arrest the latent like the development of the 
photographic image would do. And perhaps we are also always already too late for 
such an encounter that would make such a framing as image possible. The latent, it 
has been said, makes its presence felt belatedly. When tracing it back to where it 
might have come from, displaced as it were, we will stumble upon crossroads built on 
the condensing effects of the dream-work. Yet while condensation makes an image 
possible, the same image seems to acquire an indefinite depth brought about by 
multiple layers of dream-thoughts.35 Thus, through analysis, this manifest(ed) image 
will disintegrate into several abstract dream-thoughts that are withdrawn from the 
concreteness of (visual) representation.36 The ground of the image recedes, removing 
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thereby the image itself of its appearance. Groundless, the image slips out of its 
manifestation. It derealizes.37 
 
We can recognize the metaphorical tone of my previous paragraph. Such is the 
difficulty of carrying across the latent into the firm grip of representing signs – to 
produce a text that renders the latent legible – that we need the support of metaphors, 
or rather, that the metaphorical makes itself thereby felt. The above text has 
engendered thus an appropriate context for us to remind ourselves of what Lacan had 
to say about condensation and its relation to the work of metaphor. He writes: 
‘Verdichtung, “condensation,” is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which 
metaphor find its field; its name, condensing in itself the word Dichtung, shows the 
mechanism’s connaturality with poetry, to the extent that it envelops poetry’s own 
properly traditional function.’38 What is interesting, in Lacan’s account, is the 
stressing that the ‘metaphorical effect’ does not necessarily arise from a neat 
comparison between two (conceptual) images. As he writes, ‘metaphor’s creative 
spark does not spring forth from the juxtaposition of the image, that is, of two equally 
actualized signifiers.’39 We should note Lacan’s emphasis on the discrepancy 
between the statuses of the two signifiers through which the metaphor is supposed to 
constitute itself. They form an unlike pair: not two equally fully formed signifiers as 
it would be the case when comparing two images. Instead, one of the two signifiers is 
not yet ‘there’ in its full shape. Or in other words: one of them is yet to be realized. 
 
It is commonly assumed that we use metaphors to ‘say something new – or to “say 
the unsayable”’ to thereby create some kind of productive ‘excess’ based on a process 
of substituting one term for another.40 Yet, we should also bear in mind, alongside 
Lacan, that this metaphorical process of substitution is not such a straightforward act 
if we recall Saussure’s linguistic model of signification based on negative 
differentiation.41 ‘Whence,’ Lacan writes, ‘we can say it is in the chain of the signifier 
that meaning insists, but that none of the chain’s elements consist in the signification 
it can provide at that very moment.’42 Thus, the element of signification (the sign) can 
only be ‘of meaning’ if it remains in the chain. Only when circulating in an economy 
of signifiers, the signifieds (meaning) can be maintained. Therefore, it is not absurd to 
say, with Lacan, that ‘metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is 
produced in nonmeaning.’43 What I want to hint at, with the help of Lacan’s ‘yet to be 
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actualized signifier,’ is a link to a latent, not yet formed, ‘image’ that lingers in the 
unconscious as ‘a colourless and abstract expression.’44 It is here that the 
photographer steps in. The photographer wants to develop the image she has taken to 
heave it out of its indeterminable latency; the photographer wants to overcome the 
latent stage of the image that, through photographic eyes, is merely seen as an 
inevitable part of the image’s development into an actualized image. In that sense, by 
claiming a fully working signifier, the photographer masters the image, ensuring that 
the invisible and temporally unreliable latent form of expression is, like in the dream-
work, ‘exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one.’45 As Freud assumes: ‘The 
advantage, and accordingly the purpose, of such a change jumps to the eyes.’46 
 
 
Photography Without Photographs 
 
There is a breaking moment in Hervé Guibert’s book L’image fantôme  (1982) where 
what we might call ‘the photographer’s dream’ of a fecund field of photography and 
of a virile photographer who looks after that field, is unexpectedly interrupted.47 The 
plot is spun within an Oedipal triangle; mother, father and their son/photographer. 
Indeed, the triangle is so sharply defined that one wonders to what extent Guibert has 
elongated it on purpose. The short story, told from the perspective of the son, centres 
on his venture to take a photograph – apparently his first ever – of his mother. As his 
father used to take ‘the picture against her will while pretending to adjust the camera, 
so that she had no control over the image,’ before even beginning with the photo-
session, he preventatively removes his father from the room where the photographs 
would be taken.48 After trying out several dresses and undoing her hairdo with her, 
mother and son set up in the living room that was to provide the backdrop for the 
photograph. And then, the photographic moment unfolds: 
 
I took her picture. At that moment, she was at the height of her beauty, her face 
completely smooth and relaxed. […] I believe that at moment she was happy with the 
image that I, her son, allowed her to have and that I was capturing without my 
father’s knowledge. In fact, it’s that: the image of a woman who has always been 
criticized by her husband, enjoying what she could never have, a forbidden image, 
and the pleasure between us was even greater as the forbidden burst into pieces.49 
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Having taken (secretly) the images, the father is allowed to return. Father and son 
proceed now together to develop the images. The technology of representation of 
woman is a men’s business. Incidentally, the camera that the son used to capture his 
mother is his father’s, ‘and it was the first time I had used it.’50 They ‘decided to 
process the film right away, and the time it took to process it corresponded to the time 
it took my mother to remove the powder from her face, dry her hair, and restore her 
earlier image.’51 The developing of the film, however, brings the son’s idealized 
image of his mother and of himself as son/photographer to an abrupt end. ‘Looking 
through the film against the bluish light of the bathroom, we saw that the entire roll of 
film was unexposed, blank from one end to another.’52 Since the son had not attached 
well the film in the camera, he had photographed, it turns out, ‘nothing’: 
 
Blank, the essential moment lost, sacrificed. It was the opposite of awakening from a 
nightmare: the development of the film was like awakening from a dream-session, 
which, instead of being wiped away at once, becomes, with the reality of the absence 
of an image, a nightmare-session rather than a dream-session.53 
 
Photographers do not want to lose their images. In the photographer’s dream-image 
of photography, the photographer is assured the circumvention of such a loss. As long 
as the developing of the image continues, the photographer can dream of all the 
images-to-come. He can still dream of all the images he has conceived or might wish 
to conceive. The photographic apparatus guarantees the image; not only in the actual 
sense that it can produce a real photograph, but also in the symbolic sense of 
confirming the photographer as such. In clear psychoanalytic words: the camera 
promises the phallus to the photographer. Yet, Guibert’s photographer has been 
‘castrated’ for his incestuous photo-session. The camera did not yield him the 
anticipated images – not even one. The much expected ‘becoming-visible’ of the 
image of which the photographer is in charge by commanding the photographic 
apparatus, is aborted. The fruits of his labour lost, it seems. We can take Guibert’s 
‘blank moment’ as indicative of the photographer’s obsession with delivering images 
– with showing off. After all, without an image, what is there left for the 
photographer to show? And how would he show off himself as photographer? 
 
The ‘blank’ is dissatisfactory for the photographer. It is distressing not because of its 
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formal aesthetic properties but because of its symbolic meaning – not the blankness 
of an underexposed photograph but the blankness of possible nothingness. Following 
Freud, it scares because it attests to the threat of castration, that is to say, it attests to 
‘the misadventures of a fantasy, that of separation.’54 That is also the lesson of 
Guibert’s telling tale – itself incorporating key Freudian themes which inform the 
story. But the photographer has the ability to fill the blank – to cover it with an image 
– so as to avoid, in Guibert’s words, the nightmare of the ‘reality of the absence of an 
image.’ The promise of a successfully developed image is such that its visibility will 
fill the void that stares out of the blank. Its promise is that of the fetish. For Freud, the 
fetish forms a workable compromise under the influence of the unconscious forms of 
law and is called forth by the dynamics of an ‘unwelcome perception and the force of 
his counter-wish,’ upon the (male) child’s confrontation with the reality of the 
mother’s genital difference.55 
 
By taking images, the photographer can avail himself of the opportunity of creating 
the material that will fill the gaps. Yet this is not just a matter of availing oneself of 
the actual photograph that, as ‘a frozen moment, is a detachable object which 
acknowledges and disavows the difference between itself and what it represents, just 
as fetishism disavows the consequences of sexual difference.’56 Rather, already the 
idea itself of having a tool at one’s disposal that has the potentiality of generating 
visibility is fetishistic. This is not a mere fetishism of equipment that underpins the 
photographers’ showing off – ‘do you want to see mine? – with the aid of their 
‘things.’ The fascination is not just grounded in the fact that the photographer 
believes to have mastering control over the tool that he possesses. The photographer 
also draws vigour from the way he is implicated in the photographic apparatus, that is 
to say, that the photographer can always have hope in the apparatus so as to achieve 
an image in which visibility is made to appear. Conversely, the photographer has to 
accept the fears that arise from failing to produce this visibility, that is to say, from 
being let down by the apparatus. Thus, the camera is not only a tool that makes 
images but it is also a symbolic shelter to which we can retreat to seek protection 
from the fear of the absence of the image because it promises the substrate of 
visibility. 
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Such is the despair of Guibert’s photographer that he believes that he ‘had 
photographed nothing.’57 But he forgets (or ignores?) that he had actually 
photographed something. He did take images of his mother – they just did not get 
fixed, leaving the film untouched. Just because one does not bring a photograph to 
completion does not mean that one has not actually photographed. But photographers 
assume otherwise. They have no choice. After all, one is paid for the photograph and 
not for a nothing. Guibert’s photographer practises, against his conscious will, a 
photography without visible images. But that does not undo him as photographer. 
And yet, the plotting of Ghost Image’s narrative is based exactly on the presumption 
that the photographer’s foremost aim is to gain the image. Everything/body 
anticipates the image: the simple story line flows towards that much awaited moment 
when the image should realize to thereby redeem the son/photographer with the 
photograph of his mother, the one not yet seen before. The image remains, however, 
unattainable. A latent impression without its manifest counterpart. Colourless blanks. 
In the blank film, we cannot see the photographed subject but we can see in it the 
material trace of the photographic event. The ‘blank’ in which the story finds its 
climax reveals itself as a shock moment for the photographer precisely because the 
photographer singles out the event of image-capture as a privileged one, disregarding 
thereby other aspects that also make up the practising of photography. Guibert’s story 
falls prey to such ‘photographic’ thinking that desires to zoom in on the subject to-be-
photographed. At the same time, this confirms the photographer – not only as the 
creator of the image but also as the director of it. As Serge Tisseron notes, ‘[t]he 
photographing [prise de vue] has only contributed to itself to confer upon the event an 
exceptional character and to the one who has photographed a privileged place in the 
heart of the event.’58 
 
In the one-eyed vision of the photographer, it is the photograph and the event from 
which it originates and to which it simultaneously attests that counts. Aetiologically, 
this allows the photographer to put himself as a definite part of the centre of 
photographic practice while simultaneously also defining a concept of photographic 
practice as one in which the photographer is visibly implicated. This is not to say that 
behind every camera there has to stand a photographer. CCTV indicates otherwise. 
Rather, it is to say that when someone decides to take part in photography under the 
name ‘photographer,’ then the same name calls forth – it interpellates – a particular 
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role in which he is cast.59 It is obvious that the photographer’s goal is the developed, 
appeared image, the photograph. But this fact appears so obvious to us because it 
derives its obviousness from accepting the photographer-photograph route as the 
paradigmatic one. Of course, we can say that the apparatus leads the photographer 
onto this route; after all, the photographic apparatus is designed to generate images. 
But that would also imply forgetting that the apparatus is structured around our 
desires that invest libidinally in its design so as to produce the desired image. Or, as 
Lacan would dare to say: ‘The essence of the image is to be invested by the libido.’60 
And an image-generating apparatus such as a camera provides a fine vehicle to move 
us towards that goal.  
  
‘I decided to take a picture of my mother,’ declares the photographer in the opening 
paragraph of Ghost Image, and its closing paragraph returns to that same image, 
albeit it did not materialize as photograph.61 The route of a photographer and his 
image. While this text allows us to glimpse another photograph, one that did not need 
to materialize in the end but to which the printed letters of the text nevertheless give 
testimony, it pleases itself by narrating a story that follows the route of a 
photographer and his image. The structure that lies in the narrative overlays itself 
with the one that lies etymologically in apparatus: ‘to make ready for.’ ‘The 
photographic apparatus lies in wait for photography.’62 It makes an image ready for 
viewing. And it makes us ready for the image. In a similar way, one can argue, 
Guibert’s narrative is as much about the anticipated photograph as it is about the work 
needed to make oneself ready for the image. The story pulls the reader up to its anti-
climactic peak through the preparatory scenes that the desired image demands for its 
realization. 
 
 
Stories of/in Nachträglichkeit 
  
Another story. In his essay ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’ of 
1914, Freud reflects on the development of psychoanalysis. In the section where 
Freud recounts the first institutional reception of his work, notably the start of the 
collaboration with the scholars from Zurich at about 1907, he also remarks that the 
wider institutional reception remained restrained, and produced initially ‘nothing but 
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a very emphatic repudiation.’63 In a typically Freudian move, he does not discount the 
negative reception and sees in it nonetheless the work of psychoanalysis 
substantiated: ‘What had happened was that the latency period had expired and 
everywhere psychoanalysis was becoming the object of increasing interest.’64 
Psychoanalysis broke through its own latency period and began to shape itself as a 
self-conscious disciplinary field. We can imagine a spark of self-irony flaring up in 
Freud when he wrote this passage as he turned one of psychoanalysis’s concepts onto 
the psychoanalytic movement to narrate a history of it. We recall that psychoanalysis 
understands the latency period to be ushered in by the dissolution of the Oedipus 
complex and is being characterized as a momentary ‘pause’ of sexual development 
before puberty begins. In forming a loop, this suspension is tied to a blanking out of 
what brought us into the suspension: amnesia erases the early Oedipal struggles and 
the urges of infantile sexuality.65 In latency, the past is not remembered anymore. 
Heaved into latency, the past expires from our consciousness. 
 
And latency, too, expires. It has a temporal dimension and is not solely a 
phenomenon that hides inside ‘distortions,’ rendering thereby itself seemingly 
undetectable. It is in retrospection that Freud can ascribe a latency period to his 
psychoanalytic project. We can think this problem as a question: would he have 
recognized the latent constitution of his own work at a time when his work was still in 
a period of latency so to speak? Only in hindsight can he make out that there was 
something constituting itself in latency. One realizes simply later, that there was 
indeed something because that ‘something’ revealed itself only after it has come out 
of its latent form. Nachträglich, Freud can write an account of the evolution of 
psychoanalysis. In so doing, he catches up with what he only recognizes belatedly. In 
the mode of the postscript, he pins down the latent. Before that moment, it remained 
undetectable, either because it escapes our attention or because it cannot be detected. 
It is the work of latency to effect missed encounters. Whatever is latent makes its 
existence felt belatedly. We could say that we cannot but fall short of attending to an 
encounter with the latent. The photographer, on the other hand, can issue us with a 
forewarning that an image has inscribed itself on the camera’s memory device. But 
without the photographer’s forewarning we could not grasp this ‘image’ because we 
would not know anything about it – we could not detect it otherwise. In this instance, 
the photographer can elucidate the spectator about the latent because, as the maker of 
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the impression, she is knowledgeable about its presence. Similarly, the analyst has the 
methodological tools to bring out latent signifying structures from the manifest 
images of the analysand’s dreams. The photographer looks after latent impressions. 
The analyst watches over latent meanings. What they share, one might say, is an 
investment, or indeed a belief, in the latent, which forms a critical part of their work 
processes.  
 
We do not notice the image on a photograph that is undeveloped. Only when it is 
developed, we will see it. But then again, it lost already the quality of its latency. 
Photo-scientists trying to track down the characteristics of latent image formations 
know this all too well, because ‘development is the only method of detecting the 
latent image, and in the process the change represented by the latent image in the 
individual emulsion grain is lost.’66 Hence, in testing the latent image, they too, like 
the analyst, need to rely on deductive methods so as to find out about their subject. 
Yet what forms the subject of their work disappears in the very process of the work. 
Too late, again. Thus, we recognize the effects of Nachträglichkeit and the double 
movement inherent in its concept: when that which is latent appears to us, it ceases to 
be latent because it has appeared. The developed image gives up its latent form. And 
we, who only detect it once it has appeared, can only take ourselves after it by finding 
its space-time retrospectively.67 Thus, what is latent qua latent cannot represent itself 
to us. It avoids us. Always circumscribing itself through something else, we are 
displaced spatially and temporally from it. Every time too late. Every time too little. 
 
While we are considering the latent here, we can identify its operations and think 
about it by way of deducing from its veiled manifestations. We can produce 
metaphors, creates images of the latent and give accounts of it. We can put a frame 
around it so as to give a rendition of it. Yet, like the unconscious, its actual present 
workings in this present moment remain oblique. We do not know what there might 
be in latency here and now. Is this the ‘repression of the latent?’ In the genitival 
ambiguity of this formulation the latent is proposed as an agent of repressive force but 
also as that in which the latent finds itself repressed to. Could we think of a work, a 
text, an image, that is not of but in latency without declaring any cautionary or 
forecasting assertions? How could we look at it? How could we read it? How could 
we avoid missing it, given that the latent makes itself always missing? These 
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questions run against an impossible uncovering of the latent per se: its work is 
erasing. And what is erasing, leaves a trace. It would be Derrida to put us on his path 
of the trace so as to tell us that if the alterity of the unconscious as envisaged by Freud 
stems from a temporalization in latency, then the unconscious has no self-presence as 
such. It cannot be made present but neither is it hidden. It can only ever be followed 
in tracing. Hence, what the ‘unconscious’ is, is never just present – which is precisely 
the force of its alterity.68 
 
 
Speaking the Unspeakable 
 
The latent, then, resists us as much as it insists on us. We can call the latent but our 
call’s echo will not reach us. At least not immediately. But at some point in time it 
will catch up and surprise us. Perhaps. It was these phenomena that prompted Freud 
to write that ‘we give the name of traumas to those impressions, experienced early 
and later forgotten.’69 The invisible scar of the traumatic impression that we could 
never see, makes itself manifest in symptomatic form. Disguised, unintelligible, 
pointless – it befalls us but we cannot make sense of it. And yet, the ‘belated effect of 
the trauma’ agitates our conscious surface.70 Passing through the latency period, we 
have forgotten what it is that remains in latency. That which has been exposed but 
could not be developed – remaining in latency – makes its appearance in 
indecipherable form to us. Unlike the photographer who can expect that, after 
exposure, there will be a photographic impression waiting for development, the image 
of the traumatic impression remains concealed behind the erasing effects of the 
latency period. Still, once the photographer has taken an image but not yet developed 
it, the latent makes its affects felt.71 The image is exposed and concealed. The 
photographer has to negotiate psychically this situation, accepting that the image she 
has taken is not yet there visibly. If the latent appears to make the image precarious, if 
that is its affect on us, then, conversely, that also highlights the photographer’s 
holding on to the image. Thus, what would it mean for the photographer to expose but 
not develop? 
 
Exposed. What has been exposed but what does not show us its exposure, needs to be 
marked so as to be recognized as exposed. A film that carries latent images is marked 
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as ‘exposed’ so as to protect this vulnerable material, and one might say, protect the 
photographer from his vulnerability during this period. There is a scene in Atom 
Egoyan’s film Ararat (2002) where we stumble upon this mark that will prompt us to 
look at that which cannot be seen. (Figures 2, 3, 4) The warning comes in bold letters. 
EXPOSED FILM EXPOSED FILM EXPOSED FILM EXPOSED FILM EXPOSED 
Printed repetitively on the white tape that wraps itself around the edge of film cans, 
the red letters stop us from seeing beyond them. The bar shaped by these warning 
letters is resonated by another bar, which provides the spatial setting for the scene: 
airport customs. The scene unfolds at a North American airport. It follows the 
internationalized protocols of border security of the twenty-first century. Against the 
cool backdrop of stainless steel fixtures, screening equipment and the silence of 
interrogation offices, we watch an everyday encounter between a customs officer and 
a young traveller returning to his country of residence. The etiquette of composed 
anonymity prevails. Questions are asked, bags are searched. The officer stumbles 
upon the film cans: 
 
What are these? It’s film. It’s motion picture film. It’s for a movie. […] It’s very 
valuable footage. Can you open it? Well, no. It’s exposed film, it’ll destroy it. How? 
It’s for a movie that’s being shot here in Canada. I had to go to Turkey to get some 
process shots. Process shots? Shots that’ll be used for digital effects … I don’t 
understand.72 
 
The film cans become the catalytic obstacle upon which a complexly layered story 
begins to unfold. It is woven into the wider plot of Egoyan’s film whose multiple 
narrative lines of urban lives in the early 2000s are touched by the work of memory 
and the politics of history in the shadow of the traumatic events of the Armenian 
genocide of around 1915. The examination, pursued by the experienced customs 
officer with laconic politeness, forces the held up cinematographer to reveal his 
motives for the journey to Turkey. By having to give cause to his trip abroad, he is 
forced, involuntarily, not only to reflect upon his own motivations and desires to 
reconnect to the country of his ancestors but also to experience immediately the limits 
of his endeavour in the face of history’s relentless passing. This face is personified by 
the blank face of the customs officer who remains seemingly unimpressed in spite of 
the cinematographer’s arguments made with the eager passions of youth. The 
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 Figures 2, 3, 4. Atom Egoyan, film stills from Ararat (2002). 
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stoicism performed by the officer becomes the screen onto which the held-up 
cinematographer has to project. It is the indifferent screen of the bureaucratic systems 
responsible for the records of history’s archives. Yet, it is also a screen of the here 
and now, of a contemporary citizen who responds in the framework of his own 
historical knowledge to the ‘facts’ reported to him. Both customs officer and the 
impromptu cinematographer hold on to the four enigmatic film rolls. Their 
professional and personal interests intersect in this object incongruously. It is the 
customs officer’s duty to inspect them, to check out the contents inside. And it is the 
cinematographer’s duty to protect the images, to keep the latent imagery sealed so as 
to bring ‘home’ the valuable footage he declares are inside the cans. Moreover, we 
who watch this scene are given in the iconic image of the film cans a representation 
of the very material through which our spectatorial participation in it becomes 
possible. The film cans become an allegorical cipher for the vocation of 
photographing. Allegorical, because the cans do not show us anything – and we 
cannot look into them. They are blunt signs – in them, we (literally) cannot find an 
image. Yet they can also be seen as an allegory of the work of trauma: not being 
developed, they resist photographic signification, thus linking up with the notion that 
‘[…] the trauma pertaining to an event is less an inherent aspect of the event itself 
than it is an effect pertaining to the impossibility of integrating the event into a 
knowledgeable network.’73 Instead, we stare at, and with, the photographer staring at 
them. And yet, we do not know what we are staring at. Film cans, yes. But their 
content is obscured. 
 
How does one speak the unspeakable? This not just a rhetorical question here. It is 
also a question of belief in that which has no voice, in that which cannot be seen but 
is nevertheless with us. But the question that the cinematographer is asked to answer 
– even in the acerbic face of border control bureaucracy – is an opportunity to 
recognize that my ‘I’ cannot just map itself out in a narration of a self-same ‘I,’ thus 
opening out a space of ethics in relation to the other. I am never just my ‘I’ because, 
as Judith Butler argues in Giving an Account of Oneself, ‘the narrative “I” is 
reconstituted at every moment it is invoked in the narrative itself.’74 ‘This invocation 
is, paradoxically, a performative and non-narrative act, even as it functions as the 
fulcrum for narrative itself. I am, in other words, doing something with that “I” – 
elaborating and positing it in relation to a real or imagined audience – which is 
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something other than telling a story about it, even though “telling remains part of 
what I do.’75 
 
In this sense, the photographer is put to test by the customs officer. Not unlike by an 
analyst. However, as photographer, he cannot rely on his primary means of 
legitimization – photographic images. If photographers prove themselves through the 
images they produce thereby to attain credibility as photographers, then the 
photographer in this scene is symbolically disabled by the latent constitution of the 
film stock. The images cannot be seen but we need to believe in them nevertheless. 
The photographer has to convince the officer that he has indeed shot scenes in Turkey 
to get through customs. It is convincing without evidence. This is a promise too weak 
to be successful in a border politics of evidence and data retrieval. In his attempt to 
convince the officer of the legality of his film material, the photographer rescues 
himself to images that he can actually show: footage on a digital camera comes to his 
aid to produce the visual evidence that his latent film stock cannot. This creates an 
intra-narrative within the film in the style of a self-reflective video-diary of his 
voyage just as it should produce the images the ‘hidden’ film cannot produce. At the 
same time, the ‘lack’ in the form of what cannot be shown becomes even more 
marked. In its fragility, the undeveloped imagery keeps us at bay. In withholding its 
visible images, we stand beside it, watching supplementary images instead. The film 
cans seem to hold an irrecuperable past, a space not reachable but present 
nonetheless. In Ararat, the latent finds itself represented – but encrypted – in the 
metallic film cans, provoking a dialogue about its own condition. As in dreams, it is 
hidden inside other images. It will not show us its own face. Our search for latent 
impressions, long forgotten but nevertheless always in and with us, starts with images 
and demands walking through even more images. In the threshold space of airport 
customs, more thresholds are negotiated. For the customs officer, the film cans are his 
bait, yet the cinematographer must forbid him to do his examining job. The latent 
stretches itself between the two. How does one carry it across the threshold? How to 
make sense of one’s past in the present? And how to present one’s past? 
 
In the uncertain light of the latent, the discussed scene of Ararat begins to reveal itself 
as my own ‘nodal point,’ its side-effects engendering the condensation of several 
motives. In the customs officer we recognize the figure of the translator who, equally, 
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has to guard what is and what is not allowed to enter a language sphere, or more 
subtly, under what conditions it might enter. And the figure of the analyst, too, 
appears again with his interpreting work. In the fabrication of my own ‘nodal point’ 
we can make out my struggle to ‘prove’ something, to make a grounded claim. If this 
has turned out to be my discursive ‘constriction’ of the latent so as to unbind the 
photographer from the visible image, then this has become my double bind. As 
Derrida writes, ‘one can only unbind one of its knots by pulling on the other to make 
it tighter […].’76 What has become so tight in the end, speaks of my 
overdetermination in its attempt to develop an image of the latent so as to produce an 
account of it. But in the overdetermination we are also left with new multiple points 
of departure. Indeed, which one we decide to take, then, is another question. 
 
Customs officer, translator, interpreter, analyst. In thinking about the latent, and the 
photographer through the latent, we have passed through their professional hands. It 
is through thinking through their work, situated in spaces of thresholds – linguistic, 
psychic, territorial – that the photographer can insert himself less implicitly in the 
logics of the apparatus, to find differing ways of entering it so as to recognize, as 
Barthes writes, ‘what is undevelopable’ – what we have to leave behind when we 
cross the threshold. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 ‘Le photograph agit toujours avec le désir de “créer” une image qui, auparavant, 
n’existait pas. Ce désir est générateur d’espoir and d’angoisse: “Ma photographie 
sera-t-elle reussie?” se demande-t-il toujours.’ Serge Tisseron, Le mystère de la 
chambre claire: Photographie et inconscient (Paris: Champs-Flammarion, 1996), 
p.15. 
2 J. F. Hamilton and F. Urbach, ‘The Mechanism of the Formation of the Latent 
Image’, in The Theory of the Photographic Process, ed. C. E. Kenneth Mees (New 
York: Macmillan, 1971), pp.87-119 (p.87). 
3 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography [1980], trans. Richard 
Howard (London: Vintage, 2000), p.49. 
4 I use the term ‘digitization’ in relation to what is more commonly known as ‘digital 
photography.’ I do so to show, on the one hand, a certain historico-technological 
layering of photography, and on the other hand to emphasize the digitizing work in 
itself that writes and displays images in/through the binary logic of figures. The Focal 
Encyclopedia of Photography dates the appearance of digitized photography with 
1981: ‘Electronic still photography began with the introduction of the Sony video still 
camera called MAVICA, an acronym for magnetic video camera. Announced on 
August 24, 1981, it was to be several years before Sony delivered a professional 
camera called the ProMavica.’ See The Focal Encyclopedia of Photography, ed. 
Leslie Stroebel and Richard Zakia (Boston and London: Focal Press, 1995), p.243.  
5 What is at stake in the so-called shift from analogue to digital is not so much the 
issue of production (from the chemical to the computational) but, as Peter Lunenfeld 
helps us to see more clearly, ‘the composition of the output, which has shifted from 
the discrete photograph to the essentially unbound graphic. It is here that the 
“revolutionary” shift can be located. The “unique” is not forced to merge, even 
submerge, into the overall graphic environment. There formerly discrete photographic 
elements blend even further into the computer’s digital soup of letters, numbers, 
motion graphics and sound files: what is crucial is that all of these and more are 
simply different manifestations of the data maintained in binary form.’ Peter 
Lunenfeld, ‘Digital Photography: The Dubitative Image’, in Snap to Grid: A User’s 
Guide to Digital Arts, Media, and Cultures (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 
pp.55-69 (p.59). 
6 See Alain Fleischer, La vitesse d’évasion, exhibition catalogue (Paris: Léo 
Scheer/Centre Georges Pompidou/La Maison Européenne de la Photographie, 2003). 
7 I employ the term ‘latent’ so as to circumscribe more generously various criteria 
associated with latent phenomena at the same time as keeping distinct differently 
theorized manifestations such as the psychoanalytic concept of the latency period or 
the latent photographic impression. 
8 Henry Fox Talbot, ‘Early Researches in Photography [1877], in Henry Fox Talbot: 
Selected Texts and Bibliography, ed. Mike Weaver (Oxford: Clio Press, 1992), pp.45-
55 (p.46). Talbot recounts some of the technological vicissitudes in relation to the 
fixing of the image in The Pencil of Nature. ‘The process of fixation was a simple 
one, and it was sometimes very successful. The disadvantages to which it was liable 
did not manifest themselves until a later period, and arose from a new and unexpected 
cause, namely, that when a picture is so treated, although it is permanently secured 
against the darkening effect of solar rays, yet it is exposed to a contrary or whitening 
effect from them; so that after the lapse of some days the dark parts of the picture 
begin to fade, and gradually the whole picture becomes obliterated, and is reduced to 
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the appearance of a uniform pale yellow sheet of paper. A good many pictures, no 
doubt, escape this fate, but as they all seem liable to it, the fixing process by iodine 
must be considered as not sufficiently certain to be retained in use as a photographic 
process […].’ See The Pencil of Nature [1846], in Henry Fox Talbot: Selected Texts 
and Bibliography, pp.75-103 (p.81). 
9 I allow myself the help of etymology to support my argument about the seducing 
and ‘calling’ effect of the latent: ‘seduce’ entails to ‘persuade someone to abandon 
their duty’; from Latin seducere, from se- ‘away, apart’ + ducere ‘to lead.’  
10 Photo-technologists are keen to stress the differences between the digital and 
chemical photograph. While the ‘digital’ truly revolutionized the taking, circulation 
and storage of images, I am less interested in exploring this historical break than in 
seeking to conceptualize the photographic image in its ongoing development. The 
production of a digitized image has, just as the chemical one, within itself a ‘latent’ 
component, confined not only between the moments of photographic exposure and 
visualization but also between the photograph’s digital storage and its visualization. 
As such, latency plays an even more prominent role in digital imaging. 
11 Henry Fox Talbot, quoted in Beaumont Newhall, The Latent Image: The Discovery 
of Photography (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1967), p.116. 
12 ‘Impression,’ with its connotations beyond the visible, including morphological, 
acoustic, temporal and psychical aspects, is a more elastic term to describe the traces 
left on some thing/body. Hence, it seems appropriate that in the cited quote Talbot 
speaks of ‘impression’ to describe the latent photograph. The reader will have noted 
that I use ‘image’ to probe the possibility of extending the notion of the latent (as an 
invisible impression) to the image itself. 
13 Carl Andre and Hollis Frampton, ‘On Forty Photographs and Consecutive Matters’ 
[1963], in 12 Dialogues 1962-1963, ed. Benjamin H. D. Buchloh (Halifax: Press of 
the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, 1980), pp.69-74 (p.70). 
14 ‘Development: What it is and what it does’, in C. I. Jacobson and R. E. Jacobson, 
Developing: The Negative Technique [1940] (London: Focal Press: 1978), p.21. For a 
photo-scientific theory of the latent image, see Tadaaki Tani, ‘Mechanism of Latent 
Image Formation’, in Photographic Sensitivity: Theory and Mechanisms (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.81-110. 
15 Nicholas T. Rand, ‘Introduction: Renewals of Psychoanalysis’, in Nicolas Abraham 
and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel [1987], vol. I, ed. and trans. Nicholas T. 
Rand (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp.1-22 (p.18). 
16 Sigmund Freud, ‘A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis’ [1928], trans. James 
Strachey, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. XIX, ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Vintage and The 
Hogarth Press, 2001), pp.190-209 (p.199). Thereafter Standard Edition. 
17 ‘Interpretation,’ itself the official translation of Freud’s Deutung, is quite distinctly 
removed in its meaning from the original German term. ‘Interpretation’ is, however, 
an apt term to use in this context because it has connotations of ‘translating’ as well 
as ‘explaining.’ The German Deutung, as used by Freud, is closer to ‘explaining,’ 
‘indicating,’ or indeed ‘giving directions’ and implies that analysis of the dream’s 
manifest content cannot really be understood in the terms of translation – a point 
discussed at length by Derrida who elaborates his deconstructive critique of 
translation’s metaphysical groundings in the context of his readings of Freud’s 
outlines of ‘Traumdeutung’: ‘The materiality of a word cannot be translated or carried 
over into another language. Materiality is precisely that which translation 
 67 
                                                
relinquishes. To relinquish materiality: such is the driving force of translation. And 
when that materiality is reinstated, translation becomes poetry. In this sense, since the 
materiality of the signifier constitutes the idiom of very dream scene, dreams are 
untranslatable […].’ Jacques Derrida, ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ [1966], trans. 
Alan Bass, in Writing and Difference [1967] (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), pp.196-231 (p.210). 
18 Eric Prenowitz, ‘Right on [à même]’, in Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A 
Freudian Impression [1994], trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp.105-11 (p.106). For a wider discussion of the 
ideal of the invisible translator within the professional circuits of translation work and 
the ‘violence’ of translation, see the chapter ‘Invisibility’ by Lawrence Venuti, The 
Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation [1995] (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2008), pp.1-34. 
19 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, p.11. 
20 Eric Prenowitz, ‘Right on [à même]’, pp.105-11 (p.105). 
21 Christopher Bollas, Cracking Up: The Work of Unconscious Experience [1995] 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p.19. 
22 Laplanche and Pontalis go even further, making a terminologically problematic 
claim that privileges the latent content as the ‘correct’ version of the dream. ‘The 
manifest content […] is as it were the abridged version, while the latent content […] 
which is revealed by analysis is the correct version.’ Surely, if we theorize the 
psychoanalytic structures with Freud, both latent and manifest content are entangled 
into each other and so ‘make up’ the dream. The ‘correct’ speaks here of an 
ideological overinvestment of the analyst vis-à-vis the latent content of the dream 
which, at the same time, might also provide a platform of self-justification for the 
analyst’s work of interpretation – what would the analyst do without the incorrect 
version? While Freud attests that the work of primary processes arises prior to the 
work of the secondary processes, he does not elevate per se one side of the dream 
over the other. Instead, he stresses the chronological logic in the subject’s psychic 
development whereby the secondary processes superimpose themselves over the 
primary ones: ‘It is true that, so far as we know, no psychical apparatus exists which 
possess a primary process only and that such an apparatus is to that extent a 
theoretical fiction. But this much is a fact: the primary processes are present in the 
mental apparatus from the first, while it is only during the course of life that the 
secondary processes unfold, and come to inhibit and overlay the primary ones; […] In 
consequence of the belated appearance of the secondary processes, the core of our 
being, consisting of unconscious wishful impulses, remains inaccessible to the 
understanding and inhibition of the preconscious; the part played by the latter is 
restricted once and for all to directing along the most expedient paths the wishful 
impulses that arise from the unconscious.’ Sigmund Freud, ‘The Psychology of the 
Dream-processes’ [1900], trans. James Strachey, in Standard Edition, vol. V, pp.509-
622 (p.603). 
See ‘Latent Content’, in Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, The Language of 
Psychoanalysis [1967], trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: Karnac Books, 
2006), p.235. 
23 The work of repression, according to Freud, is needed to avoid the unpleasing 
effects created by the wishful impulses of the primary processes, contradicting the 
secondary, ‘purposeful’ thinking: ‘Among these wishful impulses derived from 
infancy, which can neither be destroyed nor inhibited, there are some whose 
 68 
                                                
fulfilment would be a contradiction of the purposive ideas of secondary thinking. The 
fulfilment of these wishes would no longer generate an affect of pleasure but of 
unpleasure; and it is precisely this transformation of affect which constitutes the 
essence of what we term “repression.”’ Sigmund Freud, ‘The Psychology of the 
Dream-processes’, p.604. 
24 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’ [1900], trans. James Strachey, in Standard 
Edition, vol. IV, pp.277-310 (p.277). 
25 David Macey, Lacan in Contexts (London and New York: Verso, 1988), pp.121-76. 
26 I borrow this apt term from Griselda Pollock. Note that ‘relief of signification’ is 
both a psychosomatic relief (like a ‘sigh’) of being able to articulate and put into 
words what found itself in repression but that such a relief can only come about 
through the actual material relief of the signifier within an economy of the spoken 
word. Griselda Pollock, ‘Art/Trauma/Representation’, parallax 15:1 (2009), pp.40-54 
(p.41). 
27 We cannot ignore to take the hysteric also by its ancient Greek meaning that 
designates the space of the ‘womb’ which is, however, not say that it should be seen 
as a discourse of or for the female (hysterics) around which psychoanalysis found its 
foundational bearings in the late nineteenth century. Rather, in the ‘hysteric’ the 
womb resurfaces as an enclosed space, the subject’s space of pre-birth (the state of 
pregnancy itself often described along the terms of latency) hemmed in by it while at 
the same time protected by it. This space is thus also never of an absolute closure and 
leaves its marks on the subject who cannot yet cognize the symbolic orders (e.g. 
language) while already being immersed in it. This complex and asymmetrical 
‘structuring’ space – one does not master language yet but is already mastered by its 
structure – is variously theorized. In a sweeping move, we can mention, while 
granting large discrepancies between their conceptual outlooks, Kristeva’s chora, 
Ettinger’s matrix and Abraham/Torok’s crypt. 
28 For an astute critique – emphasizing Derridian deconstruction – of the ‘application’ 
of psychoanalysis in literary criticism as psychoanalysis’s own righteous 
reaffirmation, see Spivak’s ‘The Letter as Cutting Edge’ where she suggests, as a way 
beyond, that ‘[t]he Derridian move, when written into critical practice, would mean, 
not equating or making analogical the psychoanalytic and literary-critical situation, or 
the situation of the book and its reader, but a perpetual deconstruction (reversal and 
displacement) of the distinction between the two.’ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘The 
Letter as Cutting Edge’, in In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1988), pp.3-14 (p.13). 
29 Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory [1986] (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p.59. 
30 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.277. 
31 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.277. 
32 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.283. 
33 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.283. 
34 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Psychology of the Dream-processes’, p.525. 
35 On the work of condensation, Freud writes: ‘Even if the solution seems satisfactory 
and without gaps, the possibility always remains that the dream may have yet another 
meaning. Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to determine the amount of 
condensation.’ Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.279. 
36 And for the sake of clarity, I shall add here the point made by Laplanche and 
Pontalis that the work of ‘condensation’ should not be confused with a mere 
 69 
                                                
‘summarization.’ ‘Condensation should not, however, be looked upon as a summary: 
although each manifest element is determined by several latent meanings, each one of 
these, inversely, may be identified in several elements; what is more, manifest 
elements to not stand in the same relationship to each of the meanings from which 
they derive, and so they do not subsume them after the fashion of a concept.’ See Jean 
Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, ‘Condensation’, in The Language of 
Psychoanalysis, pp. 82-83 (p.82). 
37 This is Kaja Silverman’s term to describe the work of the analytic process, turning 
the manifest content into the more abstract dream-thoughts. See Kaja Silverman, 
‘Apparatus for the Production of an Image’, parallax 6:3 (2000), pp.12-28 (p.12). 
38 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’ [1957], trans. Bruce 
Fink, in Écrits [1966] (New York and London: Norten & Company, 2006), pp.412-41 
(p.425). 
39 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’ (p.422) [My 
emphasis]. 
40 Mieke Bal, ‘Scared to Death’, in The Point of Theory: Practices of Cultural 
Analysis, ed. Mieke Bal and Inge E. Boer (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp.32-47 
(p.32). On the work of metaphor, see Jonathan Culler, ‘The Turns of Metaphor’, in 
The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1981), pp.188-209. 
41 I can give a personal anecdote here to illuminate Saussure’s claim of negative 
differentiation. Being able to practise the English tongue for just over a decade, I 
would often encounter in writing the situation where I would suddenly remember a 
word (maybe overheard or read in the past), ‘knowing’ that it would fit exactly into 
the syntax of my textual construction but the meaning of which I would not 
necessarily have to know. Saussure would describe this with the following words: 
‘Instead of pre-existing ideas, then, we find […] values emanating from the system. 
When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the concepts are 
purely differential and defined not by their positive content but negatively by their 
relations with the other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristics is in 
being what the others are not.’ Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics 
[1915], ed. Charles Bally and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New York and 
Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p.117. 
42 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’, p.419. 
43 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious’, p.423. 
44 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, in Standard Edition, vol. V, pp.339-508 
(p.339). 
45 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.339. 
46 Sigmund Freud, ‘The Dream-work’, p.339 [My emphasis]. 
47 Hervé Guibert’s L’image fantôme (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1982); Ghost 
Image [1982], trans. Robert Bononno (Copenhagen and Los Angeles: Green Integer 
Books, 1998). 
48 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.9. 
49 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.13. 
50 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.13. 
51 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, pp.13-14. 
52 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.14. 
53 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.14. 
 70 
                                                
54 Jean Laplanche, The Unconscious and the Id [1981], trans. Luke Thurston and 
Lindsay Watson (London: Rebus Press, 1999), p.15. 
55 From a contemporary perspective, the Freudian formulations of the ‘fetish,’ with its 
male-affirming and woman-as-lack underpinnings, are problematic in their 
essentializing tendency. While I cannot contribute to this debate here, I want to avoid 
sexist undertones and, at the same time, base my argument on the contradicting 
double-movement of the fetish – its disavowing force. This explains my choice of 
citation. Sigmund Freud, ‘Fetishism’ [1927], trans. Joan Riviere, in Standard Edition, 
vol. XXI, pp.152-57 (p.154). 
56 Oliver Richon, ‘Looking and Incorporating’, Camera Austria International 37 
(1991), pp.32-33 (p.33). 
57 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.14. 
58 ‘La prise de vue a contribué à elle seule à donner à l’événement un caractère 
d’exception et à celui qui a photographié une place privilégiée au sein de 
l’événement.’ Serge Tisseron, Le mystère de la chambre claire, p.14. 
59 The material practice of photography is a subjectivizing one, if we follow 
Althusser’s insisting words: ‘I shall therefore say that, where only a single subject 
(such and such an individual) is concerned, the existence of the ideas of his belief is 
material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices 
governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological 
apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject. Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)’ [1969], in Lenin and 
Philosophy and other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1971), pp.121-73 
(p.158). 
60 Jacques Lacan, ‘Ego-ideal and ideal ego’ [1954], in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book I [1975], ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York and 
London: Norten and Company, 1991), pp.129-42 (p.141). 
61 Hervé Guibert, Ghost Image, p.8. 
62 Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography [1983], trans. Anthony 
Mathews (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), p.21. 
63 Sigmund Freud, ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’ [1914], trans. 
Joan Riviere, in Standard Edition, vol. XIV, pp.7-66 (pp.26-27). 
64 Sigmund Freud, ‘On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’, p.27 [My 
emphasis]. 
65 See Sigmund Freud, ‘Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’ [1924], trans. Joan 
Riviere, in Standard Edition, vol. XIX, pp.172-79. Towards the end of the essay, 
Freud considers the chronology of latency, speculating on the possibility of other 
temporal routes: ‘I have no doubt that the chronological order and causal relations 
described here between the Oedipus complex, sexual intimidations (the threat of 
castration), the formation of the super-ego and the beginning of the latency period are 
of a typical kind; but I do not wish to assert that this type is the only possible one.’ 
(p.179). 
66 W. F. Berg, ‘Analytical Notes on Latent Image Theories’, in Photographic Science, 
ed. W. F. Berg (London and New York: Focal Press, 1961), p.28. 
67 Laplanche coined the English neologism of ‘afterwardsness’ (après coup in French) 
to render more clearly the various meanings inherent in the semantics of 
Nachträglichkeit which can be divided into three groups: 1) ‘further,’ ‘secondary,’ or 
‘added later’; 2) a temporal forward-movement from the past to the future; 3) a 
temporal retro-movement from the present to the past. See Jean Laplanche, ‘Notes on 
 71 
                                                
Afterwardsness’ [1992], in Essays on Otherness, ed. John Fletcher (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), pp.260-65. 
68 Derrida writes: ‘The alterity of the “unconscious” makes us concerned not with 
horizons of modified – past or future – presents, but with a “past” that has never been 
present, and which never will be, whose future to come will never be a production or 
a reproduction in the form of presence.’ Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’ [1968], trans. 
Alan Bass, in Margins of Philosophy [1972] (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1978), pp.1-27 (p.21). 
69 Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism [1934-48], trans. James Strachey, in 
Standard Edition, vol. XXIII, pp.3-140 (p.72) [Emphasis added]. 
70 On the belated effect of childhood trauma, Freud writes: ‘A trauma in childhood 
may be followed immediately by a neurotic outbreak, an infantile neurosis, with an 
abundance of efforts at defence, and accompanied by the information of symptoms. 
This neurosis may last a considerable time and cause marked disturbances, but it may 
also run a latent course and be overlooked. As a rule, defence retains the upper hand 
in it. In any case, alterations of the ego, comparable to scars, are left behind. It is only 
rarely that an infantile neurosis continues without interruption into an adult one. Far 
more often it is succeeded by a period of apparently undisturbed development – a 
course of things which is supported or made possible by the intervention of the 
physiological period of latency. Not until later does the change take place with which 
the definite neurosis becomes manifest as a belated effect of the trauma.’ Sigmund 
Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.77. 
71 The photographer, working along in latency, that is to say, the period after the 
image’s exposure and before its appearance, could be considered to be in an 
‘incubation period’ in reference to Freud’s own formulation of the temporality of 
trauma, even though, of course, the photographer remains in command of the length 
of this period. Freud’s passage reads: ‘It may happen that a man who has experienced 
some frightful accident – a railways collision, for example – leaves the scene of the 
event apparently uninjured. In the course of the next few weeks, however, he 
develops a number of severe psychical and motor symptoms which can only be traced 
to his shock, the concussion or whatever else it was. He now has a ‘traumatic 
neurosis.’ It is a quite unintelligible – that is to say, a new – fact. The time that has 
passed between the accident and the first appearance of the symptoms is described as 
the ‘incubation period,’ in a clear allusion to the pathology of infectious diseases.’ 
Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p.67. 
72 Ararat, dir. Atom Egoyan (Momentumpictures, 2002), DVD: 2003. Text 
transcribed from DVD, scene four. 
73 Linda Belau, ‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working Through: Trauma and the 
Limit of Knowledge’, in Topologies of Trauma: Essays on the Limit of Knowledge 
and Memory, ed. Linda Belau and Petar Ramadanovic (New York: Other Press, 
2002), pp.xiii-xxvii (p.xvi). The impossibility of integrating the event into the 
signifying work is what the topology of trauma shares with the photograph and its 
paradoxical temporalities. For a discussion, see Ulrich Baer, Spectral Evidence: The 
Photography of Trauma [2002] (London and Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005). 
74 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005), p.66. 
75 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, p.66. 
 72 
                                                
76 Jacques Derrida, Resistances of Psychoanalysis [1996], trans. Peggy Kamuf, 
Pascale-Anne Brault, Michael Naas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
p.36. 
 
 
 
 
 73 
 
444 Archives 
 
 
 
2008 
Archival boxes, gelatin silver paper, masking tape,  
self-adhesive labels, metal shelving units 
Dimensions variable  
 
 
444 Archives is an archive itself. It is an archive of archives. It explores 
the constitution of the concept ʻarchiveʼ and our drive for archival 
preservation in the context of the photographic document. As a 
collection, it brings together 444 photographic records of 444 public 
archives in the Greater London area, thereby drawing attention to 
London as archive. 
 
Common to all these archives is the fact that they are registered as 
public repositories in the United Kingdom and that they are located within 
the administrative space of Greater London. They comprise an eclectic 
mix of archives of varying sizes. They include art collections, libraries, 
public record offices, local study centres, community archives, museums, 
image libraries and corporate archives to name but a few. 
 
444 Archives transforms archival collections into archival records 
themselves. By doing so, the artwork becomes a meta-archive that aims 
at classifying other archives. It introduces its own system of 
classification. It superimposes itself on the existing taxonomies inherent 
in Londonʼs archives and engenders yet another layer of classification. 
 
The work explores the archive as being both a system of classification 
and a physical site for classified documents. Being an archive in its own 
right, 444 Archives simultaneously images archives and archives images. 
 
 
Imaging Archives  
 
444 Archives is an installation based on photographic artwork. As the 
title of the work indicates, 444 Archives is a collection of 444 
photographs of 444 publicly registered archives in the Greater London 
area. Each photograph is stored in one of the 444 archival boxes that 
make up the work. However, the grey cardboard archival boxes, so 
typical of the visual language of the archive, act in this work not solely as 
a protecting case for the archived record but also as a pinhole camera. 
 
Each box contains a single, signed sheet of photographic paper. A small 
hole, working as an aperture, turns the box into a pinhole camera. The 
box/camera has two functions: it is the creator of the photographic record 
of the public archive (camera function); and it is the repository of the 
resulting image (archival function). Using the box/camera, photographic 
images were taken of each building housing one of the 444 public 
archives, thereby building up a collection of 444 photographic records.  
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Archiving Images 
 
Once an archive has been photographed, the box/camera is permanently 
sealed. The captured image is thereby ʻcondemnedʼ to the space of the 
archive. A label on each box classifies the archival record that it contains 
by showing the archiveʼs name, its location and the date of exposure. 
The archival box that has previously functioned as a camera, providing 
the ʻblack boxʼ necessary for creating the photographic image, becomes 
the imageʼs ʻtombʼ.  
 
The photographic image becomes archived in its latent stage inside the 
box. The image is preserved inside the box and is thereby kept ʻaliveʼ for 
the future. At the same time, it is also negated in its visibility both as 
image and photographic artefact. As image, it remains undeveloped and 
therefore in the invisible realm of latency. As photographic artefact, it 
remains trapped inside the box and cannot be accessed as archival 
document. 
 
444 Archives turns the archival principle of conservation against itself. 
While it draws up a taxonomic system like any conventional archive – the 
collation of 444 public London archives in the form of photographic 
records – it becomes subsequently the ʻtrapʼ of these newly gained 
photographs. 444 Archives arrests the photographic records. It keeps 
them forever inside itself. Perpetually conserved. 
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Chapter II 
Images of Inversion 
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It is obvious that the invention of photography has  
considerably heightened  the world’s ‘visibility’ in the medium  
of the image, or indeed, has just actually brought it out.  
This gain, of course, could only take place via a detour  
through the negativity of the image, through an artefact  
that was beforehand not even imaginable […]. 
Michel Frizot1  
 
The negative is in itself invisible, because when I look at it, 
 it is already a photograph that I look at […]. 
François Soulages2 
 
The reproduction of the photograph, like the reproduction of  
sexual difference, takes two and makes one. That one is 
the impression left on the photographic surface; the one left 
unmarked/undeveloped is the negative image. 
Peggy Phelan3 
 
 
 
In the Beginning, the Negative 
 
The technological rise of photography has brought something with it that was, let us 
speculate, not intended at first by its creators. Indeed, this thing is conventionally 
meant to remain out of sight: it is the photographic negative. Usually hidden in 
photographic archives, it hardly ever features in more prominent spots of our cultures 
of display. It is treated as a means to an end: the photographic negative forms the 
material bridge between the photographic exposure and the final photographic image. 
It often provides the first surface for the image’s inscription and passes the same then 
on to its successor image, the positive. Ascribed mainly to the name of Henry Fox 
Talbot, one of the now almost mythic gentlemen of photography’s more official 
beginning in the early nineteenth century, it formed a compromise in the search for 
perfecting the techniques of photographic representation.4 The negative presented not 
really the photographer’s desired goal of the perfect likeness – the alluring mirror 
with a memory – but was nonetheless unavoidable. A by-product, the result of 
technological and economic pragmatics, one could say. Its role might be that of a 
photographic Interlingua that continues to linger behind more ‘official’ image 
syntaxes. As such, it is delegated to the shady backyards of photography, in the 
spaces of archives, between the pages of albums, in drawers and boxes or in the 
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photographic lab where it might reappear briefly in dimmed light just to be 
‘translated’ again into another positive image by the photographer. The negative, it 
seems, could not make itself understood, it could not communicate its image to the 
spectator directly. The negative needed translation. 
 
In what has become known colloquially as the negative-positive process, the 
‘negative’ can be read as being supplanted by the ‘positive.’5 The negative finds itself 
hyphenated, thereby also attesting to the partial nature of its role within the 
procedures of photographic development – it takes two and makes one. We should 
consider these procedures not merely as a matter of technological concerns such as 
finding a way for making the negative photographically effective, that is, our striving 
for the striking qualities of photographic representation, its legendary transparency 
and optical accuracy. We should also consider these procedures in the light of the 
historical development of photography and the aesthetical and ideological formations 
that continue to shape our practical and theoretical dealings with photography. 
Textual documentations of early sightings of the photographic negative let it appear 
as a hurdle, an unexpected stumbling block that got in the way of photography’s 
aesthetic ideals. Thus, what was needed was an elegant leap over the negative.6 
 
In the hasty search (or, at least, what photo-historical accounts always like to convey 
rhetorically as a sort of eagerly contested ‘rush’ towards the ‘birth’ of photography) 
for ‘the’ photograph during the first few decades of the nineteenth century of a 
progressively industrializing Europe, the negative presented itself as something of a 
deviation on the pioneering road to photography. Photographic images rendered in 
negative were sometimes seen as unintelligible, as an annoying supplement to what 
could have been an otherwise straightforward photographic process.7 The negative 
does not fulfil the mimetic qualities, which photographic techno-scientists were and 
are still aiming for because the logics of inversion do their altering work to the image. 
The photographic negative embodies the form of inversion in a two-fold way: on the 
level of its spatial organization as well as on the level of the visual rendering of the 
image. The spatial ‘disarray’ is the consequence of the camera obscura principle that 
turns the projected image in its interior upside down. Caught in camera, I appear to 
myself suddenly upside down.8 Yet upon leaving the camera’s space and being 
developed into a visible image, the negative-positive process will turn my image once 
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more, that is at the level of the image’s tonal and colour organization. Following the 
photo-grapher’s eyes, it is a sciagraphy – shadows falling where the drawing force of 
light is meant to prevail. White is drawn as black – hardly a mimetic outcome. Thus, 
what is required is another ‘developmental’ leap by the photographer – a ‘re-reversal’ 
– so as to undo the inverting turbulences of the negative. Having followed the rules, 
having made the image to leap out of its inverted state, ‘proper’ manners are brought 
back to it.9 My image will now stand side by side to my self, seemingly mirroring me. 
 
It is the ontological fate, more conceptually speaking, of the ‘negative’ to remain in 
the background of things. The same, one could say, applies also to the material form 
of the photographic negative and its technological paraphernalia. The negative is the 
silent assistant of the photograph, passing on the captured image but without claiming 
the prominence of a representational role. It finds itself most of the time in the 
shadow of the (positive) photograph. Indeed, through the photographic negative, as a 
specific material form, we can bear witness to what in more generous 
psychoanalytical terms would be called a process of Besetzung: the negative, as a 
photographic manifestation of the inverted, has become invested with a particular 
meaning within the wider economy of representational forms. Or rather, one is 
tempted to say, this particular nightshade fruit of the field of photography appears to 
grow out of our psychic and ideological (dis-)investments in it. 
 
The photographic negative could well join the ambivalent ranks of other ‘inverts’ as 
they came to light in the psycho-sexual discourses by nineteenth century sexologists 
and their struggle to define the sexual invert’s exact ‘pathological’ outlines. In 
charting a genealogy of its epistemological traits, the ‘inverted’ is positioned as the 
abnormal, wrong-sided, out-of-order. But, as Michel Foucault has insistently shown 
us, the discursive positioning of the ‘invert’ as a sexually aberrant being served to 
establish a normative axis or ordering principle. ‘The nineteenth-century homosexual 
became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a 
type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a 
mysterious physiology.’10 What is termed as disorder can only be understood in its 
relation to what is regarded as ‘order,’ which in turn works a referential, normative 
axis that allows the ‘measuring’ of all the forms that deviate from it. As such, (sexual) 
inversion is epistemologically paradoxical because it was seen as being contrary to a 
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norm that was declared ‘natural’ while, at the same time, it also had to be of an order 
of some sort so that it could be rationalized and studied – inversion as a ‘natural order 
of disorder.’11 
 
The photographic negative is no stranger to this discourse. Like Foucault’s invert, the 
photographic negative is a complex material ‘being.’ The photographic image, that 
other great invention of the nineteenth century, could claim the ideological credits of 
‘objective’ representation. However, its photographic negative could do less so. It 
lacks the representing powers of the ‘positive’ photograph, which has become 
photography’s normative axis. As such, it hardly ever entered the official circuits of 
visual representation but found nonetheless occasional roles in other discourses such 
as psychoanalysis and ideology critique where its very presence and actuality as an 
object has left peculiar imprints on their discursive tropes.12 It was Freud who found 
in it the humble material to help us figure out how we could think of the topological 
relation between conscious and unconscious activity: ‘A rough but not inadequate 
analogy to this supposed relation […] might be drawn from the field of ordinary 
photography. The first phase is the “negative”: every photographic picture has to pass 
through the “negative process”: and some of these negatives which have held good in 
examination are admitted to the “positive process” ending in the picture.’13 Freud, 
though warning us not to take this as a literal analogy, seemingly found in the 
negative nevertheless a productive material that could help him communicate the 
invisible – in this case, censuring – processes of our psychic apparatus. 
 
The Freudian analogy took advantage of the negative’s mediating function, hanging 
as it does between the invisible and the visible, between the latent photographic 
impression and the positive photographic print. At this point we should add the 
obvious: that the photographic negative not only works as a technical mediator of the 
photographic image, doubling precariously between the finished and the unfinished, 
but that it also has its own visibility – it is also a visible image in itself that 
photographers like to scrutinize a great deal. But the negative’s spectatorial potential 
is mostly limited to specialist inspection (as in Freud’s analogy) with a view to bring 
forth an ideational, ‘perfect’ copy. ‘Will it yield a good enough image?’, is the 
question that frames the negative’s field of signification, echoing thereby the question 
that is brought to bear phallically on the field of Woman within the triangulating 
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Oedipal dynamics. ‘Is “she” good enough an image?’ is the repetitively imposed 
frame of phallic ordering through which woman is required to appear as Beauty, if 
she can appear at all.14 In exploiting rather than opposing this conceptual alliance of 
Woman and the photographic negative, Peggy Phelan has argued that ‘[e]xposing the 
negative has more than a technological application for photography.’15 ‘Always 
already linked to a reproductive body, the ontologies of women and photographs are 
profoundly matched. […] Founded upon the terrain of the negative, both reproduce 
the visible.’16 Phelan’s ethics of representation circumscribe a space of plurality, of 
copies, of reproductivity – without phallically claiming the primacy of the visible. It 
is in uncovering the work of the photographic negative behind the visible picture that 
such an ethical space can be asserted by recognizing the reproductive openness of 
photographic imaging while at the same time resisting the claim to a single visibility. 
The configuration of the photographic apparatus allows for such a potential if we are 
to allow it. While photography in general, as Phelan suggests, can be seen as a 
feminized art form because it withstands the (masculinist) myth of the ‘original,’ such 
an ethical space must be continually reclaimed if photographic representation is not to 
be drowned in its own mythical singularity, especially as it emerges within the 
economically signifying confines of ‘fine art’: signatures, limited editions, vintage 
prints, etc., bring with them the grand values that will leave their unique stamp of 
exceptionality on the photograph’s surface and with that, accede in calculable form to 
a capitalist exchange system of intellectual and artistic property.17  
 
Phelan’s ethics-through-photography entrust themselves to the conceptual realm of 
the photographic negative and its theoretical positioning within the systems of 
photographic representation. As such, the call to ‘expose the negative’ cannot be 
taken literally, that is to say, photographically, if we are to avoid reinstating it as 
phallic image. Rather, it is in thinking beyond the photograph’s surface that we may 
begin to realize what brought us to that surface. Behind the photograph, the negative 
must do its work for the photograph to emerge into visibility – which brings us to the 
issue of the negative’s own visibility. In photography, the materials of the negative 
and the positive form an unlike couple the difference of which originates not 
exclusively in their visual disparity – both are, after all, images if one begins to look 
at them – but in the circulation of their materials. In the aftermath of the capture and 
subsequent development of the image, the negative fulfils a specific function, which 
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also defines the limits of its circulation: not the presentation of an image but the back-
up storage of that image. In other words, the negative has mainly an archival function. 
And it leaves the spaces of the archive very rarely. Or yet again, only when it can 
come in the guise of a positive such as was the exceptional case with ‘Ambrotypes,’ a 
material of the experimentally diverse infancy of photography. ‘Ambrotypes,’ as 
glass negatives also sometimes seen as ancestors to photographic slides, combined 
the unique properties of being de facto a photographic negative in the way the image 
inscribed itself on the surface but appeared to the eye as a positive image when placed 
against a dark background.18 Materially a negative, phenomenally a positive: 
ambrotypes write the image negatively but can give the same away positively. In 
Portrait of an Unidentified Couple, Mathew B. Brady lets the positively rendering 
ground slip, visually divesting the seated woman of her positive appearance, yet 
thereby also revealing the image’s overall negative mode of inscription.19 (Figure 5) 
The man and the woman, who pose formally in nineteenth century bourgeois fashion 
with its material insignia, become at the visual level encoded differently even though 
they share the same photographic writing mode. The work could be a textbook 
illustration of a society’s patriarchal structuring, attributing to the female side of this 
couple the image-bearing qualities of the negative (it is the negative that has captured 
the image and through which more copies of that image can be given out) but keeping 
her separate from the male side which appears photographically as positive. To the 
photo-normative eye, only the man would be (in) the image of signifying completion. 
Sexual difference runs through Brady’s photograph in a fine but defining line. 
 
While Brady allows the negative to come to the fore, its oppositional pairing with a 
positive brings us back to our obstinate eyes, struggling as they do to engage with a 
negative image. After Derrida, we could call this a phallo-photocentrism. However, 
Brady’s Portrait reveals a certain material truthfulness by exposing the negative 
inscription of this image. Brady’s work shows the work of material layering 
necessary to achieve this image in what could have been otherwise hidden by 
rendering everything in the positive; or, as in other photographic processes where 
negative and positive have become separate material entities, what could have been 
completely kept out of representing frameworks altogether and shut instead into the 
archive. Few photographic negatives come to light outside their dedicated archival 
spaces. Most of them remain unidentified as pictures. Negatives are studied, 
 86 
retouched, archived. For the photographically trained eye, there is little visual 
pleasure in them. They remain at odds with the positive photograph. It should not 
come as a surprise then that the photographic negative has also been largely 
overlooked in the scholarly discourses of art and photographic history and visual 
culture.20 What stands in the way for the spectator, we could say, is precisely the 
negative’s inverted state: neither a fully photographically legitimated image (the 
photographic print) nor a completely undetectable image (the latent photograph). The 
negative image, offsetting itself from the mirroring plenitude of the positive print, but 
at the same time also not of a completely invisible kind, negotiates through its 
aesthetics a complex phenomenological space. This chapter explores this space. 
 
 
  
 Figure 5. Mathew B. Brady, Portrait of an Unidentified Couple (1860). 
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History in the Aftermath of the Negative 
 
We can interpret the beginning of photographic history also as a problem of the 
negative, this moment when an image began to split itself into two halves. Not 
content with the visual language of the inverted that the negatives had to offer, the 
photographers moved on with their converting work ‘in order to bring them back into 
their proper positions,’ as Talbot would describe it.21 The properly turned image, 
then, returns in ‘proper’ form to the photographer-spectator. Thus, a specific modus 
operandi began to inscribe itself in the empirically tailored work processes of the 
photographer. Because of the aesthetic ‘limitations’ that the photographic materials of 
the negative-positive processes imposed on the photographer, one of the jobs of the 
photographer was now to undo the ‘negative’ in the photograph. The various steps of 
photographic labour inherent in the production of the photograph, this more or less 
prescriptive trajectory from ‘taking’ to ‘making’ to which photographers are 
supposed to adhere, came thus to entail another step: reversal. 
 
After all, there has also been the breakthrough innovation of the photographic process 
that carries the same name, bringing about to our contemporary ears still familiar 
sounding materials such as Kodachrome, which is part of a group of films 
intriguingly classified as ‘non-substantive.’22 It does the reversing work apparently all 
on its own; and moreover, it leaves of the negative seemingly no trace, that is after its 
complex has been chemically ‘washed’ out in a bleaching process. Similar formations 
have also been hailed as a ‘direct positive.’23 This self- or auto-reversing 
photographic image allowed the photographer, one could say, a more immediate 
access to the image. The negative no longer materializes distinctively. It is no longer 
required that the photographer turn his face to the negative, let alone dedicate his 
scientific-creative attention to it.24 And, finally, the emergence of digital protocols in 
photography in the late twentieth century has brought about, for some, an age of post-
photography. Styled as a techno-historical caesura, its arising discourses and claims 
made for it like to cut deep into the historiographical flesh of the ‘field’ of 
photography. However, it is not one of my intentions here to carry out more of these 
often all too hastily made cuts so as to write, one might say, a history that could 
thereby also promote itself as being more incisive than others.25 With the apple’s fall 
being constrained by the crown of its tree – to tweak a common saying – we should 
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remind ourselves also of the potential risks of such post-operative undertakings. 
Technologies such as photography help us in writing and representing our histories. 
Yet, these histories need also to be understood in the materials in which they were not 
only written but through which their actualities have also been shaped.  
 
And although finding oneself in the aftermath of a ‘photography after photography’ 
might one help to see photography anew, that is through the lens of the ‘after,’ we 
should remain alerted enough so as to avoid making an easily credible prey for it.26 It 
might appear that digitization has taken the stilus out of photography’s working 
hands. No more holding the writing tools of a celluloid film, a metal plate or a silver 
gelatin sheet, the digits of this photography do not appear to hold any writing utensils 
anymore. Digitized photography writes with its digits – directly; and as most of us 
know, its digits are quick at pointing out the image in digits. The deconstructive 
slipping – digits shaping digits – that becomes apparent here shall help us in 
stimulating some further reflection. On the one hand, digitization has worked on 
shortening the material, temporal and spatial gaps that the image has to pass through 
between capture and display, that is to say, between the photographer’s authoritative 
‘click’ and the image’s appearance and successive release in its envisaged form. The 
processing of the image has become easier, more immediate. On the other hand, of 
course, the writing digits persist precisely in the digits upon which the formation of 
the image depends, that is, the digital architecture of zeros and ones that build this 
new binary coded space of photography and its technological derivatives. 
 
By entering this photography-in-digitization, the technological apparatus of 
photography has shed some of its material layers while acquiring other ones. Its digits 
joining forces, it economizes by compressing previously discrete layers of production 
and labour processes. The structural techno-logics of image display and capture 
converge thereby, while the mediating and storing role of (negative) film, for 
example, has been stripped of its functional relevance. As common marketing speech 
would state, digitized photography speeds up the ‘workflow.’ It brings the work to 
flow. We can take this claim in its literal sense. It is not only the workflow that is 
increased, that is to say, the work being processed more quickly and efficiently by the 
photographer. It is also the work itself that flows with ease in and out of, and what we 
must describe here simply for the lack of a less abstract term, as different 
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technological topoi. Thanks to its structural compatibility, the image, once captured, 
remains in flow. A true work-in-process, it makes itself visible to us wherever and 
whenever we can avail ourselves of the visualizing interfaces that usher us – working 
screen technology permitting – through the everyday. 
 
And in returning to the realities of our own ‘everyday’ lives and to the fact that I look 
at yet another screen so as to produce visually these letters, we are given a plain but 
firm reminder of technology’s grip on shaping, if not determining, the actualities of 
our modes of representation. In doing so, these realities continue to produce intricate 
layers, in which histories and technologies inscribe themselves interdependently just 
to be historically re-layered through yet another technological re-inscription, such as 
we have seen not so long ago in the introduction of the digitally versatile disc, or for 
short, DVD. This brilliant all-rounder of a disc has modified the way in which we 
access, distribute and watch our films as well as facilitating the possibility of ‘in-
house’ productions for the individual consumer. But equally significant is the impact 
that this new piece of technology has had on remodelling the arena of ‘filmic’ 
representation, its established modes of spectatorship and their spaces. What, from a 
media-logical point of view, can be distilled as process of (self-)mediation, that is one 
medium mediating another medium, has manifold implications on the ‘matter’ that is 
mediated as well as on the theoretical belief-systems that have attached themselves 
over time to individual forms of media.27 Films that used to have their base in 
celluloid, their images conditioned by the material limitations and the technical 
abilities of the cinematic apparatus, have had their base relocated by being digitized. 
Here, the phenomenality of film reaches us through, and is altered by, the digital 
protocols, allowing for slow-downs and narratives to be stilled. For example, this has 
challenged any ordering approach of earlier film and photographic theories that have 
had faith in the influential Peircean semiotic principle of the ‘index’ and the claims of 
its temporal/spatial epistemologies made for it.28 The complexity lies in the hybrid 
nature of this film-on-DVD by offering us images that still speak aesthetically of an 
indexical causation but need not be, or are only partially so. As Laura Mulvey has 
argued in her re-evaluation of the temporal and narrative structuring of film in 
relation to its digitization, ‘[t]he index can now be valued in its relation to time and as 
a record of a fragment of inscribed reality that may be meaningless or 
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indecipherable.’29 As the work of the index shifts, our theoretical conceptions of 
temporality and spatiality are required to shift too. 
 
The foray we took into the changing status of the index and its visual manifestations 
accentuates just some of the epistemological complexities that are at stake in the 
historical faultings of media technology – the representations that it produces and the 
production of its representations. Thus, we cannot fail to ignore the imprints left on 
the politics of representation, that is, the ways in which we must continue to rethink 
our ethical and legal frameworks of viewing, both through the (image-taking) 
apparatus and the (image-rendering) screens. And as the photographic negative 
becomes increasingly defunct as an active bearer of images, as fewer and fewer of us 
transfer their photographic images through the ‘negative,’ we can begin to see, like in 
the case of celluloid film overtaken by digital means, how particular histories have 
been encapsulated visually by it. While the negative has shaped the photographer’s 
work and the spaces of photographic production and archivization, it has also 
provided a peculiar working ground for our individual and collective memories and 
fantasies. 
 
And yet, while the production of photographic images via the material realm of the 
negative is about to lose its industrial and socio-economic relevance, its mode has 
already left its unique traces elsewhere. The negative’s mode of rendering things, 
substituting ‘everywhere light for shade, and vice versa’ in representation, has 
sedimented itself as a standard visual effect in the software repertoire of the likes of 
Photoshop & co.30 ‘I’ stands there for ‘Invert.’ The command effectuates the required 
algorithm that will turn your image into its negative twin and, if needed, back again. 
Reversing the colours and tones of an image into their complementaries, ‘command 
“I”’ offers us the phenomenon of the negative as we have come to know it through 
the photographic negative. Here, the negative restores itself right in front of your 
eyes. Back it is again. But like any work of restoration, we need to be careful to 
consider what lies behind its restored façade. Could there be more to it than just a 
‘surface effect’? We can argue that what we ‘see’ in the surface of this negatively 
rendered image does not escape our still tangible knowledge of the photographic 
negative. Indeed, we might say that its employment, as a visual tool, is motivated not 
just because it makes things differently legible to the eye. It continues to live on as a 
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critically useful iconographic effect, one might say, also because it calls up a 
historical aesthetics of photography (a more mainstream example of such a ‘historical 
aesthetic’ is the simple employment of black-and-white photography – or to 
deliberately turn colour photographs into black-and-white ones – to conjure up 
notions of sentimentality or pastness; another one would be the use of deliberately 
faded images) one that is tied to historical material conditions in which the 
photographic negative found itself to be a part of it. And thus, sometimes, we might 
see these conditions more forcefully in the light of the negative. 
 
 
Photography and the Colouring of Race 
 
This historical force of the photographic negative and the polarizing aspects of its 
phenomenality come out most dramatically in Gavin Jantjes’ work A South African 
Colouring Book.31 Consisting of a collection of modest A4 sheets originally based on 
silkscreen prints, the ephemeral character of the material gives an even stronger 
ground to the political messages embedded in its text-image space. What we see on 
one of these sheets, titled ‘COLOUR THESE BLACKS WHITE,’ comes to us in the 
negative: inverted images that attest to the paranoid state of Apartheid in the South 
Africa of the twentieth century. (Figure 6) What appears to be photographic 
documentations of occasional gatherings of celebration and entertainment of 
unnamed people of black skin, takes a brisk turn through Jantjes’ own intervention in 
the categorically racialized politics of colour. Indeed, his turning is towards inversion, 
which, we can say, goes beyond the ‘gesture of subversion’ of much recent visual art 
as we have come to know it again and again as a standard vehicle of mere flippant 
artistic commentary with its hollow political echo.32 Jantjes’ inversion does not turn 
things around as it were. It does not repair. Things do not open themselves up nor do 
they add up. And we get trapped with them. Stuck we are. 
 
This is so because the aesthetics of Jantjes’ negative images wedge us into the power 
structures of racial separation and their political ambitions as they are barefacedly 
actualized in Apartheid’s state apparatus.33 Emulating the naïve form of a colouring 
book for children, Jantjes asks us to negotiate the colours of this world kept so apart. 
Instructing us to ‘colour these blacks white,’ with arrows identifying them 
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additionally within the image, we cannot fail to recognize that the images are already 
inverted, photographically turning ‘blacks’ into ‘whites.’34 Must we do more 
colouring work on them? Are they not already white? My questions are innocent 
indeed, their innocence in play with the design purpose of a colouring book: to allow 
us to (re-)imagine the world by giving colours to its images – any colour we long for. 
Yet, this particular page of the colouring book orders us to apply more ‘white’ on its 
already whitening images. Never quite white enough for the ideologically invested 
whiteness of racism’s colour scheme. And never quite white enough is this ‘white’ on 
the photograph either. The intersecting semantics of text and image of Jantjes’ sheet 
work like a locking device that holds us back, keeping us in its grip. In contradiction 
to the playful form of the colouring book, the inversion of the photographic images 
does not offer us the potentiality of symmetrical play so often associated with its 
modality. There is little scope left for switching imaginatively between negative and 
positive, inside-out and outside-in, black and white. While those people of black skin 
who appear in the photographs find themselves representationally turned ‘white’ by 
the artist so as bitterly to satisfy the eye of racism and to show its ideological demand 
of a ‘never white enough,’ the very same people will hardly fail to notice how 
photography fails them representationally too. Disallowed photography’s most 
intrinsic asset, its mimetic ability, they have become a ‘remarkable,’ inverted image: 
images to be (re)marked on, bodies to be highlighted. 
 
If racism cannot look into the other’s eye, if it keeps the other outside of its own 
representational field, as the politically and historically framed negative does in this 
context, then, crucially, its gambit of exclusive purism contradicts itself in Jantjes’ 
photographic work. As we shall see, Jantjes’ sheet gives a representational framework 
to these contradictory forces, tying the spectator into their cracks. Here, the 
photographic negative renders the black body as the ‘other,’ staying outside the 
customary photographic image. Indeed, within the wider system of photographic 
representation I would argue that the negative comes to signify photography’s own 
‘other.’ Lacking the intelligibility of perceived immediacy and transparency, as a 
‘conventional’ photograph can lay claim to thanks to its analogical fitness, the 
negative image remains an alien organ within the body of photography. The negative 
is not fit enough to fit our idealizations of photography and the idealizations of our 
selves expected in its images. As such, Jantjes’ negative reinforces the politico-
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cultural construction of the subjects’ otherness and, at the same time, renders them 
photographically unrecognizable. Aptly, a scrap of paper with a textual fragment by 
Frantz Fanon hangs into the photographic image, the text ending with ‘the oppressed 
flings himself upon the imposed culture with the desperation of a drowning men.’35 
Not everybody is granted equal access to the mirror and its gift of identificatory 
reflection, as Kaja Silverman would remind us in psychoanalytically extrapolating 
from Fanon’s work, and ‘only certain subjects have access to a flattering image of 
self, and […] others have imposed upon them an image so deidealizing that no one 
would willingly identify with it.’36  
 
 
  
 Figure 6. Gavin Jantjes, sheet from A South African Colouring Book (1978). 
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Alienation. ‘The black subject described by Fanon is not only in “combat” with the 
image through which he is “photographed” by the seemingly white gaze, but is also 
irresistibly drawn to the “mirror” of an ideal “whiteness.”’37 While we must keep 
Fanon’s account of alienation within the historical context of colonialism and the 
specifics of its geo-political landscapes, his words reverberate with Jantjes’ 
photographic negative insofar as its inversion expresses a specific conditioning of 
estrangement. The negative bears a resemblance of strangeness that gives those in it 
their symbolic ‘mask’ of the white gaze, at the same time as imprinting, 
photographically, an alienating effect that speaks of the incommensurable loss of 
their cultural identity.38 The negative’s inversion of the black body, its turning ‘white’ 
in representation, takes issue with the forces that structure the subject’s psychic work 
of identification. Let us briefly call to mind that the process of identification, as it has 
been largely theorized in psychoanalysis, does indeed rely on a differential space, 
which it seeks to overcome. ‘The one with whom I identify is not me, and that “not 
being me” is the condition of the identification.’39 ‘This difference internal to 
identification is crucial,’ as Judith Butler emphasizes, ‘and, in a way, it shows us that 
disidentification is part of the common practice of identification itself.’40 Looking at a 
photographic image, for example, might just set us off in identifying with its referent. 
We want to become (or not) what we think the image stands for. Advertisement, of 
course, aims at generating just that, literally: advertere – turn towards to turn us on. 
Jantjes’ image in the negative, like any image, prompts us to identify or disidentify 
with it. (Just because it is a photographic negative does not automatically mean that 
the identificatory process it might trigger will follow a negative path.) However, 
while we might turn towards or away from it, its inversion speaks of a further turning 
played out in its framework of representation – identification becomes thereby 
imaged as a vexed double-act circumscribed by torsional forces that seek to constrain 
the subject on his path of dis/identification: the racist imperative that interpellates us 
to identify with an (impossible) ideal of ‘whiteness’ at the same time as making sure 
that it remains the exclusive space of some. And in Jantjes’ negative we find an echo 
of this identificatory torsion – white I might identify (with) but I am still not white 
enough. 
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White, by Default 
 
Still, if the photographic negative, structured by the historico-political context of 
Apartheid as it is, opens up, by way of its aesthetics, the difficult question of how to 
image one’s image within the fissures of the incommensurable demand of racism, 
then the negative itself and its representing graphics cannot escape this question 
either. By bringing into relief an image that speaks of the impossibility of imagining 
identity, that is, an image in which I cannot recognize myself according to 
photography’s imaging norms, the negative reveals also photography’s structural 
implication in articulating a racialist order, that is, its proclivity for a certain 
whiteness.41 From its beginning, the protocols of photography (instruction guides, 
lighting standards, exposure criteria, etc.) have ensured that white skin be represented 
to the ‘norm,’ having ‘naturalized’ this particular tone or better, taint, in the design of 
its apparatus by taking it as its preferred reflective base.42 It is from the surface of 
white skin that photographic imaging technology has received an ‘orientation’ of a 
Eurocentric kind. White skin has become photography’s guiding light from where all 
other colours seemingly emanate in an orderly fashion so as to assure a measured 
authenticity in the representation of colours and tones. Richard Dyer has called this a 
‘technicist ideology’ in relation to photographic imaging.43 Ideology is effectuated not 
just via technology and the representations that it produces but is also played out in 
and through the material sphere of technology and the laws that regulate it. An 
ideology by design so to speak. 
 
‘Whiteness,’ as the particular socio-historical construction that it is, can be presumed. 
It grants itself, as it were, to those who have the right taint. Just as I got away, 
‘unmarked,’ with not stating the protagonists’ skin colour in my discussion of the 
film Ararat in the previous chapter (which we can also take as an index of the 
identification of my white self with the white men in the film stills), it has the 
tendency to paint its own racial dimension invisible. Whiteness, still, hangs on to the 
field of the assumed. Not because of the fact that I did not show any visuals to 
support my discussion of the film’s scene, leaving the reader in the blank about its 
racial aspects; rather, precisely because I did show visuals of the protagonists it 
becomes apparent that I could do away with ever referring to their skin colour. I 
could begin from a point of presumption. Whiteness is a paradoxical ‘matter’; indeed, 
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in the image, it is supposed to appear as having no matter. Disembodied. That is its 
privileged position. And the historical conditioning of the photographic apparatus 
reflects this socially constructed ideal back to us, preferring to give white a 
representational lead so much so that ‘[w]ithin the aspirational structure of whiteness, 
photography’s translucence could differentiate between races and within the white 
race, and even show degrees of translucence within the individual white (usually 
white) subject.’44 
 
The negative, as a standardized photographic surface, no doubt, is a part of this 
ideological formation that lays a foundational claim to a representational immanence 
of whiteness. The negative, in line with the normatized architectures of the 
photographic apparatus, attests to this historical default position. Re-approaching 
Jantjes’ negative with this understanding twists the messages we were so far teasing 
out of his work. Colour these blacks white. In the negative, blacks have become white 
but are not white enough. White needs more white. White needs more white, not 
solely because it is an ideal that cannot be fulfilled in the never-white-enough vision 
of racism; white needs more white also because the white that appears on the 
photographic surface of the negative denotes, materially, the historical legacy of 
photography’s racialized design. The inversion of the image, while playing out on the 
iconographic level the consequences of an ideology by symbolically excluding those 
it appears to represent, curiously brings out, at the same time, another ideology 
hidden inside the photographic apparatus itself. The image in Jantjes’ Colouring Book 
instructs us to apply more white. In so doing, it parodies Apartheid’s segregational 
delusions. But the same instruction also brings our attention to the very surface of this 
image in the negative. Being inverted, its whites indeed might need more white. 
Speaking from photography’s normative axis, it is fair to doubt the excellence of the 
negative’s whites – they really might not be white enough. Here, the imperative of 
never-white-enough spills into actual matters of representation. The disembodied 
ideal of ‘whiteness’ that bears on the conception of photography and its histories is 
reproduced in the negative, revealing through its very own representation of ‘white’ 
the insufficiency of rendering people whose skin colour might be outside 
photography’s ideological spectrum.45 There is an ironic layer in Jantjes’ negative in 
that it brings into the image the racially exclusive ordering of Apartheid’s whiteness, 
that is, it actually executes racism’s ideal, but to do so, it cannot avoid unearthing 
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simultaneously another kind of historically structuring ‘order’ inside photographic 
imaging. In Jantjes’ work the entwinement of the representation of politics and the 
politics of representation finds itself played out at its best. White vs. white. 
 
‘Where to go out from this?’ is the question arising out of Jantjes’ negative and the 
contradictory forces that it inflicts to our sense of identity. Here, the negative, we 
might say, gives form to this identitarian tension of not knowing where to turn next 
yet it does so without offering an apparent escape route. Keeping the subject 
representationally disjointed between the political imperative of whiteness and the 
photographic impossibility to be represented as such, it rather helps us to 
acknowledge the psychic losses incurred by giving us its own reflective space without 
replicating the demand of mirroring completion. At this point, the differential gap that 
underlies the process of identification and its work of reshaping our subjective 
outlines is not covered over by the image. If what Butler has phrased as the 
‘triumphalist image [that] can communicate an impossible overcoming of this 
difference,’ then, a more cautious image might ‘not only fail to capture its referent, 
but show this failing.’46 And thus, we can begin to see, as unsettling as it might be, 
rather than to disavow the ongoing struggle for calling forth the positionalities of 
identity. Not an image that utilizes its aesthetic space as cover to conceal thereby its 
own failings in what it seeks to represent but an image that acknowledges through its 
aesthetics the limitations of its frameworks of representation. 
 
 
Looking into the Spectacle of the Inverting Mirrors 
 
The subject’s course of identification is not as straight as it might appear, and Jantjes’ 
negative makes us aware – in spite of its own formal structures – that is not always a 
clear-cut matter of black and white. What we believe to recognize in the image might 
not turn out to be as such. Nonetheless, identification continues to propel us towards 
more images. And it is around the figure of identity that we might come to stay for a 
little while in its sheltering space. In a Lacanian scheme of things, it would be the 
mirror image that stabilizes the not-yet-subject. Identification, Lacan has theorized, 
can be grasped ‘as the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes 
an image.’47 It is the assumption of an image that enables the infant to benefit from a 
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sense of an increasingly coherent psychosomatic self. Or rather, not the mirror image 
per se but the fact that the emerging ‘I’ appears to recognize itself in the specular 
image and subsequently attributes that image to itself in what Lacan has made famous 
as the concept of méconnaissance. Our subjective scope, we might say in rephrasing 
Lacan’s proposition of the specular image as ‘the threshold of the visible,’ is 
circumscribed by images.48 Scopic beings. Yet, what is at stake for the subject vis-à-
vis the image is not simply an issue of taking issue with this image. It is not just a 
matter of (static) beholding, as a tradition of the connoisseurial spectator would like 
to think – however painstaking that endeavour might be. More is at stake, and, with 
Lacan, we can bring this to bear through revisiting another motif where inversion is at 
work – yet this time to produce the possibility of an image unframed by the dynamics 
of subjective vision: the experiment of the inverted bouquet. 
 
At large, the inverted bouquet (or vase) provides a model for ‘illustrating’ how the 
subject hangs in the sticky web woven from the threads of the Symbolic and 
Imaginary order.49 Sticky, because this web calls forth the complex psycho-
phenomenological realm of the visual in which the subject finds himself wrapped up 
against the non-signifying void of the Real. What the experiment shows, among other 
things, is the high degree of plasticity of this conceptual web: not a static maze 
through which the subject moves but an elastic labyrinth whose walls are formed 
interdependently with the subject – the ‘cloth’ of visuality, as theorized in this 
Lacanian model, must be thought of as always being in a relation to the subject’s 
psychic work, that is, his positioning in the Symbolic and Imaginary within the 
trinitarian structuring of Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory that has had such a 
widespread influence on the way we conceive of subjectivity and representation and 
hence also of the act of looking at something while finding oneself also being looked 
at. If Lacan and his post/structuralist fellows have contributed to the disciplinary 
uprising of a ‘visual turn’ in the humanities (coming out so prominently in 1970s film 
theory), then they have done so by providing the supplementary spaces needed for 
theorizing spectatorship beyond the studious act of looking at pictures, objects, bodies 
– beyond the learned vision of the ‘good eye.’50  
 
Yet, one should not confound the theoretical arena of ‘visuality’ as tackling all things 
visual or all things through the visual. Not quite so. Visuality, as it is framed here, 
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rather articulates a theoretical meeting point of the visible and the invisible, of the 
expressed and repressed, of the spectacle and the spectator, of a body of work and a 
body at work. The keyword pairings highlight an entwinement of object and 
(tendentiously self-effacing) subject so as to make legible the subject’s corporeal and 
psychic implication in the act of looking, and conversely, to understand how the 
object might condition the subject’s looking. It is mainly the crossing territories of 
psychoanalysis, phenomenology, semiotics and gender theories that have given us the 
tools to, if not to see beyond the confines of our eyeshot, then at least to better 
understand how those confines might be constructed and how we have come to be 
embedded within the worlds we envision to inhabit through our body/mind 
complex.51 And accordingly, we can also begin to grasp the plurality of our bodies 
and thus their irreducible differences (corporeal, racial, sexual, libidinal, generational) 
alongside the shifting material terrains of history. If I stay with Lacan’s inverting 
mirrors for a little longer, then this is not without purpose. I would like to avail 
myself of the opportunity of this inverting apparatus (which, in its printed form, has 
itself become a kind of exemplar of the genre of scientific illustrations) and its 
didactical metaphor so as to performatively play out in closer detail what is at stake 
for the ‘spectator’ in its space.52  Let’s play us out then. 
 
Lacan’s theoretical investment in the sciences of optics is well known. What we 
should stress in our context, once more, is his insight that optics is more than just a 
field that delivers the dissecting tools of ‘objective’ analysis – most strikingly evident 
in the form of the scientific camera as a prevailing trope of the production of 
objectivity. Lacan, instead, goes on to rescue optics from its own dissecting fate and 
draws attention to the synthesizing ability of the optical sphere.53 In ‘The Topic of the 
Imaginary’ of 1954 he points to the potentiality of the space of optics – not as 
something that is solely in the methodologically dissecting hands of science but as 
something that is also of a potentially synthesizing, imagistic force. And that brings 
with it the psychosomatic work of embodied subjects that contaminates the precinct 
of the ‘pure’ sciences. Put more dramatically, their pureness cannot be thought 
separately from our psychic projections and bodily desires, unique to each of us. 
While a photographic camera, as a highly sophisticated techno-optical tool developed 
and fine-tuned over quite a few centuries of research, helps us to analyze and classify 
phenomena by visualizing them in a scientific orderly fashion (an ‘anatomy’) in the 
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form of images, the very same images are also inscribed and structured by our 
desires, dreams and imaginations – matters to which psychoanalysis has given a 
theoretical shape. This is of course one of the great insights of the traditions of 
psychoanalytic thinking and not just Lacan’s merit. However, Lacan’s campaigning 
for the case of optics is significant in that he is able to demonstrate precisely through 
his fond use of established scientific models (such as the laws of optics) their own 
systematic porosity. Or, to consider this argument from its reverse side, the analyzing 
subject (say, spectator) cannot keep himself completely outside of the production of 
scientific analysis. Somehow I am also a feature in it. 
 
Lacan’s two-stage experiment of the inverted bouquet exemplifies this.54 (Figure 7) 
The hidden, inverted bouquet appears to the viewing subject as being placed rightly 
in the vase standing on top of the box.55 Keeping in mind that this in itself functions 
as an abstracting model, it allows us nonetheless a glimpse of how the subject is 
drawn into the experiment and, indeed, activates the production of its illusions.56 To 
refer to the French L’expérience du bouquet renversé is a useful detour in that it 
makes clear the ‘experience’ of the ‘experiment,’ a meaning rather buried in English. 
One experiences the experiment. What the experiment can show us is how the 
viewing subject becomes woven into the fabrication of his own doings. Indeed, the 
experiment, for to be effective or, let us say affective, requires the involvement of the 
spectator. Otherwise the experimental set-up would just remain an odd assembly of 
disparate things. Depending on the spectator’s position, the spherical mirror produces 
an appearance of the reflection that sits in correspondence with the physical space of 
the vase. This image is a real one, as Lacan stresses, reminding us thereby of the 
imaginary take-up of the specular (self-)image in the mirror stage. In the experiment, 
the vase and the image of the bouquet take on a forming unit, that is to say, for us (we 
who – granted that we see ourselves in Lacanian light – stepped already through the 
mirror image and into language) the experiment makes only sense because the 
inverted bouquet signifies something that is out of order and which comes to stand, 
metaphorically, for what is yet outside a signifying sphere. The upside-down bouquet 
has been corrected and put into a functioning order with the vase through the 
experiment’s illusions. What emerges is a sense of organizing coherence – a prospect 
of mastery and permanence. The Imaginary takes up its work: things fall into place 
and begin to take shape. We welcome the ideal ego. 
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  Figure 7. Jacques Lacan, ʻLʼexpérience du bouquet renverséʼ (1975). 
 
 
Gaining a hold in the mirror image – being nourished by the Imaginary – the world 
begins to differentiate in front of our eyes and we within. However, this image 
remains not as certain. It will overturn itself: ‘the ideal ego inverts to the ego-ideal.’ 
And now we must also welcome the ego-ideal. Indeed, the confusing slipperiness of 
ideal ego and ego-ideal (it clearly is slippery!) is at the core of identification. This is 
exemplified by the experiment’s second stage and Lacan’s introduction of an 
additional, and this time, planar mirror that engenders a secondary reflection of both 
vase and bouquet. (Figure 8) The structuring of the first spectatorial setting is thus 
partially turned round. Suddenly, the subject finds himself also as an image reflected 
to an outside from where an ‘other’ could always potentially look back. The 
imaginary plenitude of the ideal ego is exposed. It finds itself on a stage. It is the 
‘moment’ when to ‘see’ means suddenly more than just that, when the look is 
discovered by the gaze – when, to underscore our argument, physical sight looks into 
subjective vision. Here, the ideal ego encounters the ego-ideal. (Or, at least within the 
psycho/analytical powers of our schematic theory, seeking artificially to disentangle 
through our words the nettings of subjectification.) If, at the outset, we have 
provisionally spoken of an initial identification as assuming an image, then the 
apparatus of the inverted bouquet images identification as a double assumption: first, 
the assumption of an image (‘imaginary identification’), followed by the assumption 
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of being imaged (‘symbolic identification’).57 Yet, crucially, the gaze emanating from 
the ego-ideal is evasive. We can’t locate but ‘imagine’ it. We see in its place. As if 
we were to leap from one stage to another while leaving an afterimage on each so that 
in turn we can see ourselves seeing ourselves.58 
 
 
 
  Figure 8. Jacques Lacan, ʻSchéma simplifié des deux miroirsʼ (1975). 
 
 
And it was in borrowing from the vocabulary of photography through which Lacan 
has constructed the powerful metaphor for the gaze: behind the ego-ideal, there 
stands, hypothetically, the photographer who gazes at me through the camera’s 
viewfinder but I can never know on what the photographer is focussing. The gaze 
remains obscure, impenetrable. I am framed as an image – yet the image that might 
come out of the photographer’s camera I cannot see. All I can is to assume that ‘I am 
photo-graphed,’ to repeat this Lacanian catchphrase.59 Note: photo-graphed. Indeed, 
not the photograph is of importance but that fact that I am graphed by some ‘thing.’ 
That thing is the gaze. I become marked, imprinted, stained. Indisputably, I slip into 
the I. The marking shows that the gaze is on the side of the Symbolic and the 
structuring side of the material signifier to which ‘I’ will have to accede, and indeed, 
of which ‘I’ become/s a part. No dispute around that. What is interesting, in tracing 
out the photographer’s doings in Lacan’s famous metaphor of the gaze is that our 
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photographer takes up a position of absence in all this. Indeed, Lacan does not talk of 
a photographer in ‘What is a Picture?’ to illustrate his exposition of the gaze. One is 
only ‘photo-graphed.’60 From the point of view of a textual analysis of this much-
cited essay, neither a camera nor an operator is delineated. For Lacan that would be of 
course a necessary precondition for the gaze. However, we can also remark upon 
another aspect with regards to the (missing) photographer in this configuration. 
Lacan’s metaphor is effective to his ends because a photographer can, in principle, 
vacate her working seat at any point yet the imaging can still be done. The 
photographer is not needed for the taking of the picture. One can walk away from the 
set/scene but also, potentially, return. The taking of an image can be programmed, 
pre-set, or simply done by a substitute. Here, photography would figure itself 
exclusively in its systematicity, as an idealized field of purely automated operations. 
It is just a click. And our speculatively inserted photographer would come out as a 
perfidious figure, sharing the drifting ability of the sign that Derrida has traced so 
intensely in his work. In short, the photographer would be a representative of the 
Symbolic machine. In this sense, there would be nothing ontologically intrinsic to the 
photographer as an individual agent and, by way of extension, point to the 
pointlessness of doing photography as an expressive or imaginative practice – an 
aspect of photography that has been around since its inception. Remember André 
Bazin claiming that photography would derive an advantage from the absence of the 
photographer?61 For some, photography, like the gaze, can do without. 
 
 
Identifying (with) Lacan 
 
Lacan did not refrain from emphasizing the obscurity of the gaze and its exteriority in 
many of his essays. ‘In our relation to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by 
way of vision, and ordered in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is 
transmitted, from stage to stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it – that is 
what we call the gaze.’62 As such, the gaze, like the signifier, precedes and exceeds 
me; in the optical model, something can always look into the scene via the planar 
mirror. That acknowledgement corresponds with the passing into the Symbolic, the 
world of opaque signifiers and the structuring of the Law. Like the imperceptible 
mirror plane that Lacan needed to introduce in the second stage of the experiment to 
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make his analogy plausible, the Law will intervene into the scene. What we can begin 
to see now is how our ‘subject’ would be spun across inside Lacan’s optical model. 
The inverting mirrors disperse us between an ideal ego and an ego-ideal – ‘the ideal 
ego corresponding to what “he himself was,” and the ego-ideal to what “he himself 
would like to be,” at the moment at which they can be identified as disjunct.’63 It is in 
the differential space that spans between them that ‘images’ of our selves fade in and 
out. And to do the job of identification would be to juggle either side. Inside, inside 
ourselves, we could remain straying spectators. 
 
I want us to pause briefly inside Lacan’s reflecting mirrors so as to allow ‘identity’ to 
fall back upon us; and to fall back upon our identities. I want us to reflect upon this 
‘I’ that has been reflected into Lacan’s optical model. I want to catch it in its 
immediacy to Lacan’s so as to consider the affective refractions left on it. If I come 
out as a lover of Lacan’s texts and his images, indeed, absorbed as I am in his 
theoretical universe, then this is also to give a critical space to ‘theory’ as something 
beyond procedural ‘information’ and to identify its performative and affective 
dimensions – a practising of theory beyond its mere factual execution. It might be just 
acceptable for professional critics working in the cultural arena to admit to a kind of 
partisan favouring of an artwork (or more optimistically seen, a politically necessary 
step of admission), but it is still less so vis-à-vis ‘theory’ and the body of its signs.64 
This reminds me also of the moment when this project was still in its infancy, when it 
could not speak itself yet; that tentative period that required putting some/thing into 
words so as to come out of the uncertainty of mere stumbling and to assert the 
demanding place of the logos. Here, I have articulated that. And in recollecting that 
time, there flares up in my memory an image featuring my self reading a book while 
travelling on a bus through London: it was Lacan’s The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psycho-analysis…  
 
Strangely, it was Lacan himself who engaged so passionately in the performative 
dimensions of teaching through his seminars, showing such a conscious awareness of 
it as a live event. The seminars speak of the significance of the experiential – his 
words in print have reached us rather belatedly. Instead, back then, one had to attend 
to listen to his spoken words and watch his gesticulating body. Yet he could not resist 
in the end the lure to search for more sophisticated signifiers, working on ever more 
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abstract topological schemata to prevent us from falling prey to the impressionistic 
potentialities of his illustrations. His many diagrams, formulae, graphs – and which 
culminated in his idiosyncratic mathèmes – attest to this attempt to avoid being led 
astray imaginatively like the optical model has made us.65 It is reported that Lacan 
remained sceptical of his experiment with the inverted bouquet because it was too 
literal a representation, too much of an object, in short, too much of a spectacle of 
mirrors. 
 
 
‘Framing’ the Photographic Negative 
 
Séminaires. Écrits. Télévisions. Lacan’s work is known by these titles, and as only 
Friedrich Kittler would be able to note, he ‘was the first (and last) writer whose book 
titles only described positions in the media system.’66 Lacan’s work speaks of this 
high moment of structuralist theory through the frivolity of a flower bouquet. If 
Lacan has unsettled our positions through which we think of the subject of the 
‘spectator,’ both as an embodied subject and a subject of study, and with it that of the 
photographer who is also always a spectator, then I want to turn us now back again to 
photographic negative and its spectatorial spaces. In coming out of Lacan’s inverting 
mirrors, we might ask on behalf of the photographic negative the following: ‘am I an 
image or am I imaged?’ To further open up, we could transmute the same question 
into a psychoanalytically accentuated doubt: ‘am I contained or am I containing?’ Or:  
‘am I signified or am I signifier?’ The polarizing proposition sounds hilarious, if not 
to say hysterical. But that is the question of the hysteric. And it seems this is also the 
question of the photographic negative. Which side it should take is not clear because 
it cannot commit itself to just one. Situated somewhere between a conveyor of 
‘content’ and an archival ‘container,’ the negative blurs the boundary of the image-
frame complex to which Derrida has sensitized us so strongly. Ergon or parergon? 
 
To the photographically marked spectator, the negative does not appear as an image 
because it is inverted. Its image does not signify enough, its inversion leaving a 
confounding impression on the spectator. The negative contains a photographic 
image, but that image is not quite there yet. Its ‘image’ remains ad interim, keeping 
through its own body the door open to let other photographs emerge. And yet, we 
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cannot deny that the negative is not also a photographic image. But we need to take 
care. If the photographic negative can tell us something, then it will remind us that we 
cannot understand it by simply isolating it from its surroundings, from that which it 
seems to oppose through its perceived mimetic otherness. That would just fix it as yet 
another image of the reifying kind of a Photoshop effect. On the one hand, the 
photographic negative speaks of the processual. Enabling a process, it is dedicated to 
its role as the means of transfer for the image from capture to official display. The 
negative does not feature in the ‘picture’ but it is nevertheless its discreet support. On 
the other hand, of course, the negative has provided the initial surface of the 
photograph’s inscription. I speak here in the past tense not to highlight its historicity 
as an artefact, but to be reminiscent that the negative will be usually superseded by 
another image in the form of a positive likeness. Embedded as it is in the rules of 
photographic technology, the negative retires quickly. To the photographer/spectator, 
its active lifespan, one might say, is of a limited period. Having brought forth the 
positive photograph(s), the negative is left to rest again for indefinite times.  
 
If the photographic negative appears to be superseded, to be left behind and to stay in 
the shadow of its positive counterpart, then it is a simple matter of fact of photo-
technological procedures. Business as usual: after the negative, there comes the 
positive. The ordinary photographic work cannot be created otherwise. But this 
approach also indicates our involvement in taking up a certain point of view within 
the organization of the photographic apparatus from where we can draw these 
conclusions. Of course, we cannot afford to ignore the pragmatic realities of 
photography and its accepted forms of photographic images upon which we also 
place our theoretical understanding of photography and the representations that it 
produces. However, such an approach would ignore the ideological realities of 
discourse that also shape the object that it attempts to study – remember the camera 
obscura of Marx and Engels?67 To view the negative image through the positive 
where an image’s developing journey ends at most times is reasonable but, arguably, 
also debatable. Any prior stage of the image’s release into public light is associated 
with developmental, experimental or editorial work – mere precursors of the ‘real’ 
thing. As such, the negative is considered to be unfinished; like a sketch, it promises 
more and bigger to come. And in many ways, it is a sketchy working ground for the 
photographer. Many of us will be familiar with the often anecdotal figure of the loyal 
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‘photographer’s assistant’ who prints off photographs from the negative working in 
the darkroom all day long. However, what is also needed is the photographer’s 
approval, her authorization of what can pass and what cannot, to make a photograph 
into a ‘work.’ And as we have seen in the previous chapter, the photographer’s 
identification with her own images will let her invest economically and libidinally in 
those images that represent the photographer’s work best. To this end, we look, with 
the photographer, towards her works, anticipating the images to come. And we come 
to realize that we have just left the negative behind. 
 
Ours is not a question of dragging the negative out of its dark rooms. Nor is it a 
question of the kind of discursive framing that would just place it as an image in its 
own right. Such attentive work can be done of course but would potentially foreclose 
us from what we can call the ‘processual work’ of the negative as a bearer of the 
image.68 Considering the photographic negative, the object that it is as well as the 
signifying ‘work’ that is performs, we should be aware of our approach. Surely, we 
can write a cultural or socio-technological history of the negative, engaging with its 
various formations and utilizations, and so on. We can write it as a philosophical 
history, reflecting on its phenomenologies and epistemic values. And no doubt, we 
can also write it as an art history, assembling and analyzing the work of artists and 
photographer who have employed imagery based on the negative and its procedures. 
And, while granting also all these disciplines inventiveness and sensitivities in 
conducting their explorations, I admit a certain deliberation in putting their 
methodological work in such basic terms so as to help us along with our own 
‘problem’: if we want to stay in tune with the processual and archival work that the 
photographic negative nourishes, how can we take account of it without simply 
banning it, let us say, to artistic, formal or social plains of investigation? 
 
 
The Photographic Negative as/in Reproduction 
 
If the idea of a catalogue raisonné of ‘the negative’ is rather off-putting, then this 
might have something to do with the photographic negative itself. Although 
producing such a thing is clearly achievable, it seems nevertheless at odds with some 
of the traits specific to the negative that we are exploring here. Imagine this 
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catalogue: maybe it centres on an artistic school or a single photographer, maybe it 
focuses on an archival collection. It would collate information of each negative and 
reproduce it in fine print. Flicking through this catalogue, we could appreciate the 
negatives for their informational content, the images that they convey despite their 
inverted mode. Its reproductions could also give us a sense of them as actual objects, 
their shapes and materialities. Yet, this imaginary catalogue brings also some of the 
challenges to the fore. Indeed, most obvious, it brings the negative itself to the fore. 
Put on display, it features in its own photo-book. This book could well read like a 
script to a politics of visibility, though at times inevitably needed to make oneself 
noticed, this visibility also comes at a price. And as we know from a lesson of 
psychoanalytic economy, gaining something entails giving up something else. 
 
We might say what this catalogue, contrary to its French name, struggles to explain 
through its form is the negative’s peculiar photographic work as a mediating conduit 
rather than, or better, beyond being just, a photographed ‘image’ in its own right – for 
an image we can recognize in it too, although the status of it remains an ambivalent 
one as we have seen. The photographic negative draws its ambivalence from 
facilitating a conduit, both literally and figuratively. Literally, it inscribes the 
photographed event to form an image but is structured to pass on the same 
subsequently. Figuratively, it forms an archive of back-up copies for (later) 
consultation but does not lend direct access to its images since they remain what they 
are: inverted. Not displaying the photographic image that the photographer envisions, 
that is, the photographer’s photographic vision of the photograph, the negative’s 
inversion demands to be inverted again. And so, it finds its place somewhere in the 
in-between, in the spaces of the archive, the albums, the boxes and envelopes. The 
negative likes to keep itself to itself. Discreet, it is, for sure. 
 
However, discretion does not render it useless. On the contrary, the negative remains 
of use precisely by being silently restful. As the prototype image, it provides the 
back-up copies for the photographer in case the representational ‘positive’ perishes.69 
Indeed, photographers have always taken great care to look after their negatives. 
They used to be, and to some extent still are, the photographer’s lifeblood. After all, 
the professional photographer’s livelihood, his oeuvre, depends on them. But also 
outside the professional circus of photography, the negative provides us with a sense 
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of security, of never really loosing the image one has taken. In the drawer, at home, 
somewhere, we believe the image to be safe. Yet the safety net that we seem to ‘see’ 
in the negative, as a holding device for a potentially lost image, is interesting in that it 
does not hold the image we want to see. Unlike other safety nets of image back-ups 
such as positive duplicates and digital storage devices, it holds instead, quite visibly 
so, its inverted twin. But this little difference is what makes the difference, thus let us 
dwell on it a bit more. 
 
The negative, conceived as an indefinite storage space, keeps the image in a form that 
does not correspond to what the spectator, conditioned by the logics of photography, 
would consider as its ‘given’ state. The inverted rendition of the image does not 
correspond. Again, it does not correspond: its phenomenality and spatial orientation 
do not correspond with what the photographer expected to represent 
photographically. And following on from this lack of correspondence we also come 
to apprehend that we find it difficult to correspond with this image in the negative. So 
clearly embedded it is in the photographic surface, and yet, our eyes struggle to ‘see’ 
it. As Michel Frizot, one of the few photography scholars who have engaged critically 
with the photographic negative, puts it: ‘Even though our brain might well understand 
negativity, our eyes can still not “see negatively.”’70 We might admit that it is quite 
difficult to establish a direct correspondence with it, since in our vision the ‘positive’ 
will (always) see it through for us – it will oversee the work of seeing as it were. As 
such, the space of the photographic negative evokes in the spectator an aesthetic 
paradox. The negative image is at once there and not there. It appears as removed, 
withdrawn, absent. But the image’s character of introversion is formed in 
counterdependence with our inclination to see it through its positive and what have 
called already in Derridian vein a phallo-photocentrism. And from this point of view, 
from within the brackets of our ‘positive vision,’ the image in the negative is also 
already there – the positive superimposing itself imaginatively on the negative. 
 
The photographic negative, then, inhabits a difficult space, phenomenally as well as 
materially. For the photographer/spectator, its inhabitation is circumscribed by a 
vacating vision since the negative’s space is created out of a giving-space to other 
images. In other words, the negative is brought into its specific relief only by 
supplanting it with further images: the positive, the print, the picture, etc. And it is 
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this image-laden space that gives the negative’s space its outline – an outline that 
closes the negative off, shutting it away behind another (desired) image. This 
dynamic that describes our approach to the photograph negative, that is, our making 
sense of it, resonates with the psychoanalytic concept of disavowal that works at 
overcoming the threat or imaginary sight of castration. As such, the image, in the 
photographically negative mode, must also always be overcome within the photo-
logics of the photographer to stay in line with the logistics of photography. The 
photographer relies on the negative but wrestles to legitimize it as a proper image. 
The negative appears again as an incomplete image to the photographer, potentially 
curtailing his identity as image-maker. And consequently, to say with André Green, 
‘disavowal comes into effect in order to ward off the danger of the loss of identity.’71 
 
Let us reiterate that our deduction of the photographer’s disavowing relation to the 
photographic negative should not be seen in separation from the difficulties that its 
space poses to the spectator. As such, a search for the ‘image’ in the photographic 
negative brings with it a disavowing dynamic if we are to make that search end 
positively. By setting out to produce a photographic image, the negative – although 
an integral part of the photograph’s overall production – cannot keep up with the 
photographer’s photographic imagination of mimetic perfectibility. Thence, the 
photographer is led to gloss over this ‘weak’ moment disavowingly. The lack of 
correspondence between the photographer’s vision of the image and the one in the 
negative is thereby bridged. Not yielding the representative image, the negative is 
perhaps not worth more than a superficial gloss. What is at stake, then, is the issue of 
how we might theorize otherwise our cognitive dimensions vis-à-vis the visual space 
of photographic negative. And to do so, we could dispose of trying to inscribe in it an 
‘image’ that would be intrinsic only to the negative. The photographic negative holds 
an image that continues to cling on to its positive twin and thus, we can barely 
recognize on its own. Indeed, we are about to discover that the negative itself, as soon 
as we look at it, displaces itself. It makes itself invisible. Or rather, our vision brings 
the photographic negative immediately back into a (positive) image, while the actual 
‘negative’ itself retreats once more further away from us.72 Every look another 
effacement – a thing impossible to behold. 
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While the spectator might well endeavour to step towards the photographic negative 
so as to see it, the negative itself moves, simultaneously, one step further away. This 
is the escaping force of the negative in the photographic. This is also why our 
catalogue raisonné cannot really do justice to the photographic negative. Indeed, it 
might just mislead us into believing that we have recuperated the photographic 
negative from its oblivion within the history of materials by re-presenting it while, in 
fact, we fail to realize that the negative continues to trick us phenomenally, both 
literally and figuratively: it slips away from where we wish it to appear. This makes 
the photographic negative a more complex phenomenon when compared, more 
generally, with that of the notion of negative space. Whereas it is perhaps easier to 
conceptually ‘grasp’ negative space as that of the spacing between signifiers, as the 
‘holes’ surrounding and structuring elements in space, the photographic negative, 
with its inverted character, can call itself already a negative but is not just so. The 
photographic negative appears to have the peculiar ability to make those holes into 
the positive, evacuating thereby the subject that is rendered in positive. But that does 
not mean that the photographic image is annihilated. Thus, we can say that the 
photographic negative, by itself, does not wipe out the image. The photographic 
negative also builds something: it puts forth another image that simultaneously fills 
the positive’s holes. Enigmatic to our eyes, for sure, the photographic negative is its 
own kind of image. More specifically, the photographic negative, although already 
declared a negative, remains what it is: an image with the particular quality of 
providing an inverted representation.  
 
But let us not conclude without the photographic possibility of a ‘negative’ image. 
Let us try to look at its space once more through Thomas F. Barrow’s work. Barrow 
has gathered a series of photographs under the heading Cancellations.73 Looking as if 
taken by accident, the photographs present us visions of American landscape 
sceneries of all kinds, open fields interspersed with traces of habitation, building 
structures, signs, roads, sheds, etc. (Figure 9) Yet each view, laid out as it is to our 
eyes through the toned photographic silver grain, is simultaneously disturbed by 
rough lines that run diagonally across the image’s surface. For instance, the 
photographed scene of an unspecified piece of grassland crisscrossed by electricity 
pylons is overlaid by rough lines that intervene in the image’s surface. Indeed, they 
intervene so strongly that the image comes to give away its own materiality: scraps 
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and holes appear on the image surface, interrupting its illusory plane. It is also from 
this hole where we can begin to unravel the conceptual layering of this work. What 
intervenes in the photograph’s surface is the materiality of the photographic negative. 
Barrow, in making this bare mark on the negative, renders it useless one could say. 
This, indeed, refers to a tradition inherent in the work of a next of kin of photography, 
namely printmaking.74 Printmakers used to ‘cancel out’ their plate after having 
printed off the required number of sheets. This would guarantee an edition and hem in 
at the same time the open-ended productivity of such technology. Barrow repeats this 
marking of the plate with the material of the negative but allows that mark to enter 
the representing image. Here, the mark makes the work, binding together negative 
and positive. 
 
 
 
 Figure 9. Thomas F. Barrow, Flight Field, from Cancellations (1974).  
 
 
It would be tempting to see the semantic unit of this image under the conceptual 
shadow of Derrida’s sous rature: the sign of a cross placed above another sign that, 
by falling under the cross, has also displaced itself thereby. It finds itself, literally, 
under erasure but that erasure is never totalizing, only displacing. Under erasure, the 
trace remains. Erasing can only ever be a tracing. As such, the cross in the image 
would neither be just negatory nor just affirmative. Yet we have reasons to doubt 
whether a photographic image behaves like a semantic sign at all. Roland Barthes 
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worked hard on trying to find out whether the photograph belongs to a semantic 
system. His formulation of the ‘photograph is a message without a code’ refers to this 
problematic.75 Granting for a moment the photograph its indexical link to space and 
time, then it will also fail to build a semantic system in the sense of Saussure’s 
langue. Each photograph would be an irreducible ‘thing,’ an unameable entity of utter 
analogy to the Real – a traumatic impression that remains outside representation. A 
nothing, and even less so. Lacking a code, it would be, unlike our notion of the sign, 
irreplaceable and thus not displaceable. Symbolically, the cross in Barrow’s 
photograph might resemble the work of a bar that displaces the sign-image. But if we 
approach the same problem from within the photograph’s material layers, a different 
reading becomes possible. Photography takes two and makes one we said at the 
beginning. What we see in a photograph is a positive image handed to us as an 
imprint of the negative. Indirectly always there, via inversion, the negative remains 
nonetheless completely invisible. Barrow’s scratching of the photographic negative 
intervenes in this erasing phenomenology. The scratch marks the negative’s surface; 
what falls into this scratching path leaves the image erased. Yet turned into a positive, 
the damages done to the negative appear as image: where the photographed image 
has been erased, the materiality of the photographic negative shines through.76  
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Notes                                                         
1 ‘Es ist offensichtlich, daß die Erfindung der Fotografie die “Sichtbarkeit” der Welt 
im Medium des Bildes in beachtlichem Maße erhöht bzw. diese sogar erst 
hervorgebracht hat. Dieser Gewinn konnte freilich nur auf dem Umweg über die 
Negativität des Bildes erfolgen, über ein Artefakt, das zuvor gar nicht vorstellbar war 
[…].’ Michel Frizot, ‘Negative Ikonozität: Das Paradigma der Umkehrung’, in 
Ordnungen der Sichtbarkeit: Fotografie in Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technologie, ed. 
and trans. Peter Geimer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), pp.413-33 (p.415). 
2 ‘Le négatif est en lui-même invisible, car quand je le regarde, c’est déjà une photo 
que je regarde […].’ François Soulages, Esthétique de la Photographie: La perte et le 
reste [1998] (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), p.122. 
3 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (Routledge: New York and 
London, 1993), p.66. 
4 In Talbot’s canonical photo-book The Pencil of Nature [1846], he outlines the 
negative-positive process with a photograph of lace and the following words: ‘As this 
is the first example of a negative image that has been introduced into this work, it 
may be necessary to explain, in a few words, what is meant by the expression, and 
wherein the difference consists. The ordinary effect of light upon white sensitive 
paper is to blacken it. If therefore any object, as a leaf for instance, be laid upon the 
paper, this, by intercepting the action of the light, preserves the whiteness of the paper 
beneath it, and accordingly when it is removed there appears the form and shadow of 
the leaf marked out in white upon the blackened paper; and since shadows are usually 
dark, and this is the reverse, it is called in the language of photography a negative 
image.’ The full text of Talbot’s The Pencil of Nature is rendered in Mike Weaver, 
ed., Henry Fox Talbot: Selected Texts and Bibliography (Oxford: Clio Press, 1992), 
pp.75-103 (pp.100-01). 
5 The terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ in relation to photographic discourse stem from 
the to historians of photography well-known English photo-scientist Sir John 
Frederick William Herschel. 
6 A good case in point is the catalogue of an exhibition dedicated to the first 
photographic negatives. While claiming to feature negatives, it actually contains only 
reproductions of positive prints. D. B. Thomas, The First Negatives (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1964). 
7 For example, Talbot writes: ‘In taking views of buildings, statues, portraits, &c. it is 
necessary to obtain a positive image, because the negative images of such objects are 
hardly intelligible, substituting light for shade, and vice versa. But in copying such 
things as lace or leaves of plants, a negative image is perfectly allowable, black lace 
being as familiar to the eye as white lace, and the object being only to exhibit the 
pattern with accuracy.’ Henry Fox Talbot, The Pencil of Nature, p.101. 
8 The term ‘in camera’ would deserve great attention, as it is a specialist term of legal 
theory to establish the right to secrecy within the public administrative. This can only 
remain a simple pointer to which I hope to return to in the future. There is no 
scholarship on the cross-disciplinary links between photography, aesthetics and law 
with regards to this term, except perhaps Kofman’s Camera Obscura touches upon 
some of the issues of this problematic. For a comparative study of ‘secrecy’ within 
the legal frameworks of France and Germany, see Hans von Egidy, Vorlagepflichten 
und Geheimhaltungsinteressen im Verwaltungsprozess in Deutschland und 
Frankreich (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). 
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9 ‘Proper’ refers to something that is of ‘one’s own,’ and by way of extension, 
something that is neat, tidy. It is worth keeping in mind that the French ‘propre,’ 
sharing the same etymological root, also signifies ‘clean’ to which my use alludes 
here. 
10 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge [1967], trans. 
Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1990), p.43. 
11 Foucault points out that, rather than excluding aberrant forms, medical/scientific 
discourse in the nineteenth century established principles that would allow the 
inclusion of these aberrant forms as a kind of ‘natural order of disorder’ so that they 
could be scrutinized and studies.’ Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p.44. 
12 The trope of inversion is widely employed in Marxian models of ideologies (not 
least because of the analogy of the inverting camera obscura by Marx and Engels as 
well as the ‘need’ to invert Hegel’s idealism), thereby drawing on inversion’s spatial 
overturnings to connote the ‘distortions’ of ideology. See, for example, Louis 
Althusser, For Marx [1965], trans. Ben Brewster (London and New York: Verso, 
2005). For a critique of the notion of ‘distortions of ideology’ I refer the reader to 
Stuart Hall’s essay ‘The Problem of Ideology’, in Marx: A Hundred Years On, ed. 
Betty Matthews (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), pp.57-85. The fact that 
inversion itself relies on a system of orientation ‘against’ which it can turn so as to 
effectuate its dis- or reorientations, is taken up by Sara Ahmed in her book Queer 
Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2006). For a genealogical discussion on ‘inversion’ and its largely negative 
connotations, see my ‘Envisioning Inversion’, parallax 14:2 (2008), pp.1-6. 
13 Sigmund Freud, ‘A Note on the Unconscious’ [1913], trans. James Strachey, in The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XII, 
ed. James Strachey and Anna Freud (London: Vintage, 2001), pp.257-66 (p.264). 
14 In articulating this problematic, Griselda Pollock writes: ‘Phallic masculine culture 
projects onto Woman-as-image its own fear of human singularity, which is nothing 
more than the dread of being cast adrift from the founding mother. Masculinity denies 
its own endemic lack vis-à-vis the cultural of both maternal and paternal authorities to 
which it must accede. What is most grotesque is that masculine culture then projects 
“Woman,” who as mother was one and two at once, as nothing at all, as void, lack, 
death-bringer, castrator, the negation of being, only imaginable in an idealized 
abstraction as Beauty or as abjection – the silenced and forever lost (read banished) 
Mother of Death, the end of being.’ Griselda Pollock, Looking Back to the Future: 
Essays on Art, Life and Death, intr. Penny Florence (Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 2001), 
pp.250-52. For an extended discussion of the attribution of female ‘beauty’ analyzed 
from within the theoretical frameworks of psychoanalysis, see Francette Pacteau, The 
Symptom of Beauty (London: Reaktion Books, 1994). 
15 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, p.28. 
16 Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, p.70. 
17 ‘Photography, insofar as it refuses to valorize the “one,” can be seen as a wedge 
into the system of representation which elevates the one (the original). This is 
partially why photography is still regarded as a degraded art form – which is to say, a 
feminine art form.’ Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, p.186. 
18 See Jens Ruchatz, ‘Fotografie und Projektion: Ein perfektes Paar’, Fotogeschichte 
19:4 (1999), pp.3-12 (p.12). 
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19 Mathew B. Brady (1823-1896) was an American photographer and his work is part 
of the historical canon of photography. Portrait of an Unidentified Couple dates from 
c.1860. 
20 There is very little scholarly reflection on the photographic negative and its 
epistemic values (its role in/as archive, as phenomenal image or as expressive form in 
visual culture) other than a historical charting of its various material forms. 
Exceptions to this scholarly silence include: Michel Frizot, ‘Negative Ikonozität: Das 
Paradigma der Umkehrung’, in Ordnungen der Sichtbarkeit: Fotografie in 
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technologie, ed. and trans. Peter Geimer (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), pp.413-33, as well as Frizot’s related article ‘L’image 
inverse: Le mode négatif et les principes d’inversion en photographie’, Études 
photographiques 5 (November 1998), pp.51-71; François Soulages, ‘L’objet 
photographique: la photographicité’, in Esthétique de la Photographie: La perte et le 
reste [1998] (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), pp.107-33; Peggy Phelan, ‘Developing the 
Negative’, in Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (Routledge: New York and 
London, 1993), pp.34-70. 
21 Henry Fox Talbot, ‘A Brief Description of the Photogenic Drawings Exhibited at 
the Meeting of the British Association at Birmingham in August, 1839’ [1839], in 
Mike Weaver, ed., Henry Fox Talbot: Selected Texts and Bibliography (Oxford: Clio 
Press, 1992), pp.57-58 (p.58). In the same text that accompanies this exhibition of 
Talbot’s work, he stresses in capital letters: ‘They required the action of light TWICE 
to be employed.’ 
22 The Collins Photography Workshop book on film tells us that unlike ordinary 
colour ‘reversal’ films, non-substantive materials do not use built-in colour couplers 
to form a colour image. Instead, non-substantive materials are constructed like black-
and-white film, with three colour-sensitized layers. The colours are then added later 
during a complex processing procedure. Thus, they can be seen as another step 
towards the progressive dematerialization of photographic processes – of making the 
image and its processing leaner. See Michael Freeman, Film [1988] (London: 
William Collins, 1990), p.108. 
23 ‘The reversal process produces a black-and-white positive by developing a negative 
image on exposed sensitized material, then removing the negative image and 
developing a positive one.’ The direct positive can also identify ‘a photographic 
process that yields a positive image directly from a positive original without the 
intermediate formation of a negative image,’ such as xerographic process for 
document copying. See ‘Reversal Process/Materials’ and ‘Direct Positive’ in The 
Focal Encyclopedia of Photography, ed. Leslie Stroebel and Richard Zakia (Boston 
and London: Focal Press, 1995), pp.699-700 and p.220. 
24 To photographic practitioners, Ansel Adam’s book The Negative is an iconic 
representative of a work wholly dedicated to giving creative advice on how to ‘treat’ 
the photographic negative successfully from a self-identified ‘straight’ 
photographer’s point of view. Ansel Adams, The Negative: Exposure and 
Development (Boston: New York Graphic Society, 1948). 
25 Placing things all to quickly into the theoretical frame of the ‘post’ risks either an 
illusion of exactitude, or, as Griselda Pollock underscores, a zone of intellectual 
comfort: ‘Terms such as “post” (post-Feminism, post-Modernism, post-Industrial) 
can easily lull us into a false sense of historical advance, when no change has 
fundamentally taken place, and the dominant systems have merely adapted faster than 
we have to the ever-shifting plays of power and resistance.’ Griselda Pollock, 
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‘Critical Positions’, in Looking Back to the Future: Essays on Art, Life and Death, 
pp.11-21 (p.17). 
26 So, at least, the claim made in the exhibition catalogue that speaks of this time 
‘after’ photography, taking it as its theoretical starting point. Hubertus von 
Amelunxen, ed., Photography After Photography (Amsterdam: G+B Arts 
International, 1997). 
27 I insist on pluralizing the word ‘medium’ as ‘media.’ The plural form ‘mediums’ 
has become widely accepted in English but, it should be noted, is usually not used 
with regards to popular formations such as press, TV and the Internet, which are 
referred to as the ‘media.’ Thus, we can observe a semantic branching out of the word 
‘medium’: while the word ‘mediums’ tends to stand for the more abstract mediating 
space of film, photography, etc., the word ‘media’ is reserved for ‘concrete’ media 
forms like newspapers, that is, that which we see or read ‘in the (mass) media.’ But 
the effect of this split is highly problematic in that it allows the term ‘media,’ when 
applied to forms of mass media, to be disassociated from its connotation of 
‘mediating.’ 
28  Writers such as Kracauer, Barthes and Bazin have embedded their work on 
photography in arguments that rely on an indexical theory of photography. Peirce’s 
economy of signs (index, symbol, icon) is outlined in several of his essays. A good 
overview give, for example, Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Nomenclature and Divisions of 
Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined’ [1903] and ‘New Elements’ 
[1904], in The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 2, ed. Nathan 
Houser (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp.289-99 
and pp.300-24; and the section ‘Three Kinds of Signs’ [1885], in The Essential 
Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol. 1, ed. Nathan Houser (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp.225-28, therein Peirce writes: ‘The 
index asserts nothing; it only says “There!” It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and 
forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops.’ (p.226). For a revision 
of Peirce’s theory of the index, see Mary Ann Doane’s introduction ‘Indexicality: 
Trace and Sign’ to a special issue of the journal differences dedicated to the topic of 
the ‘index.’ Mary Ann Doane, ‘Indexicality: Trace and Sign’, differences 18:1 (2007), 
pp.1-6. 
29 ‘Looking back, the life-span of film and photography as the predominant media of 
their era has been comparatively short, bounded by a defined beginning, the fixing of 
the indexical image, and end, the perfect imitation of the indexical image by digital 
technology. The mechanical, even banal, presence of the photographic image as index 
takes on a new kind of resonance, touched perhaps by nostalgia, but no longer tied to 
old debates about the truth of photographic evidence.’ Laura Mulvey, Death 24x a 
Second: Stillness and the Moving Image (London: Reaktion Books, 2006), p.31. 
30 Henry Fox Talbot, ‘A Brief Description of the Photogenic Drawings Exhibited at 
the Meeting of the British Association at Birmingham in August, 1839’, p.58. 
31 Gavin Jantjes, A South African Colouring Book (Geneva: International University 
Exchange Fund, 1978). Jantjes’ A South African Colouring Book consists of eleven 
silkscreen prints made around 1974/75 which were subsequently distributed in print 
in an edition of twenty in the unspectacular form of loose A4 sheets held in a simple 
black file. The sheets play on/out a politics of colour, carrying titles like ‘colour this 
whites only,’ ‘classify this coloured,’ ‘colour this labour dirt cheap,’ ‘colour these 
workers sold out,’ ‘colour these people dead.’ 
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32 Here I have in mind the solipsistic and self-referential sufficiency of the field of 
contemporary visual arts, that is, the practice of making work through other artwork, 
be this a strategy of subversion, parody, ruination, etc., and which shows little 
effective interaction with the political currents even though it might claim to do 
otherwise. 
33Apartheid’s emblematic status is linked to the obsessive actualization of its racist 
ideology in the form of an all-encompassing state structure – which is not to say, 
however, that those outside of that ‘state’ and its legal space have not been implicated 
in its maintenance. Yet, as Derrida points out, ‘[w]hile all racisms have their basis in 
culture and in institutions, not all of them give rise to state-controlled structures.’ For 
a reflection on the signifying weight that bears on the word ‘apartheid’ and the 
circulating connotations around its signifier, see Jacques Derrida, ‘Racim’s Last 
Word’ [1983], trans. Peggy Kamuf, Critical Inquiry 12 (Autumn 1985), pp.290-99 
(p.294). 
34 ‘COLOUR THESE BLACKS WHITE’ functions as a kind of instructive caption to 
the work. Its ambiguity (the colours of races or the materials of colouring?) as well as 
my own ambiguous use of it in the relating paragraph can neither be ignored nor can 
it be taken apart: its essentializing face shows us racism’s search for an absolute 
ordering spectrum, its differential face shows us the irreducibility of the construct of 
racial difference. 
35 ‘Having judged, condemned, abandoned his cultural forms, his language, his food 
habits, his sexual behaviour, his way of sitting down, of resting, of laughing, of 
enjoying himself, the oppressed flings himself upon the imposed culture with the 
desperation of a drowning men.’ 
36 Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), p.29. 
37 Kaja Silverman, The Threshold of the Visible World, p.29. 
38 Jantjes’ use of the negative conveys, aesthetically, an identificatory gap as enforced 
by the racist regulations of Apartheid by guarding a process of identification that 
disallows identity the possibility of ever catching up with what it idealizes on its path 
of subjective projection: what is to be ‘identified’ with is a politically sanctioned ideal 
of ‘whiteness’ but, at the same time, one remains in a position of ‘never white 
enough.’ Thus, for racism, the gap needs to persist. As Silverman puts its: ‘The 
struggle here is not to close the distance between visual imago and the proprioceptive 
body, as in the classic account if identification, but to maintain it – to keep the screen 
of “blackness” at a safe remove from the sensational ego, lest it assume precisely that 
quality of self-sameness which is synonymous with a coherent ego.’ Kaja Silverman, 
The Threshold of the Visible World, p.28. 
39 Judith Butler expands on the work of identification vis-à-vis an ethics of a 
politically effective image in the light of the violent events associated with the 
unmistakable figures of 9/11 in her Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence [2004] (London and New York: Verso, 2006), pp.142-47 (p.145). 
40 Judith Butler, Precarious Life, p.146. 
41 I use the term ‘racialist’ here to denote the structural implication of photography’s 
design based on a ‘racial’ imaginary to distinguish it from the term ‘racist’ which I 
would identify more closely with the sphere of a politics grounded in a belief in a 
‘racialized’ order. 
42 For an overview of the ideological inscription of ‘white’ in photographic/filmic 
representation and a historical analysis of its related material practices, see Richard 
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Dyer’s chapter ‘The Light of the World’ in his book White. As Dyer eloquently sums 
it up: ‘Photography, as it has been invented, refined and elaborated, and the dominant 
uses of that technology, as they have become fixed and naturalized, assume and 
privilege the white subject.’ Richard Dyer, White [1997] (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp.82-144 (p.103). 
43 Richard Dyer, The Matter of Images: Essays on Representation [1993] (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2002), p.145. 
44 Richard Dyer, White, p.115. 
45 A critical warning shall be issued here: it would be dangerously simplistic to claim 
that photographic imaging (still) cannot ‘do’ black skin – that would just reiterate the 
same pattern of racial prejudice. The point being made here is that photography 
carries with itself a historical legacy of racial preference, which is to stress the link 
between technology and history and the ideologies that span between them.  
46 This is not to say, however, that we could just resign from our attempts of capturing 
and visualizing a referent because no image could ever adequately transpire the truth. 
Drawing on Lévinas, Butler argues: ‘The reality is not conveyed by what is 
represented within the image, but through the challenge to representation that reality 
delivers.’ Judith Butler, Precarious Life, p.146. For a related discussion on Butler’s 
interpretation of Lévinas’s ethics of the face in relation to the politics of media 
representation of atrocity, see Nicola Foster, ‘Photography and the Gaze: The Ethics 
of Vision Inverted’, parallax 14:2 (2008), pp.78-92. 
47 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience’ [1949], trans. Bruce Fink, in Écrits (New York and 
London: Norton & Company, 2006), pp.75-81 (p.76). 
48 ‘Indeed, for imagos […] the specular image seems to be the threshold of the visible 
word, if we take into account the mirrored disposition of the imago of own’s own 
body in hallucinations and dreams, whether it involves one’s individual features, or 
even one’s infirmities or object projections […].’ Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage 
as Formative of the I Function’, p.77. 
49 In its classic version, this optical experiment is set up with the bouquet hidden. 
Lacan playfully turns it later round (!) so that it becomes the experiment with the 
inverted vase, favouring to hide the vase so as to make a critical point of the fact that 
it is the vase (as specular image) that will appear to contain the messy diversity of the 
flowers thereby reflecting the organizing impetus of the mirror stage as giving the yet 
incomprehensible body-mass a coherent outline in what is known in psychoanalytic 
fields as ‘imaginary or primary identification.’ See Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the 
Field of Vision (London: Verso, 1986), p.179. 
50 Irit Rogoff, ‘Studying Visual Culture’, in The Visual Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas 
Mirzoeff (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp.14-26 (p.17). 
51 Laura Mulvey’s hypercanonical essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ of 
1975 continues to reference this important historical moment and its emerging 
analyses of subjectivity in relation to spectacle, technology and capitalism against the 
background of structuralist ideology critique (Althusser) and psychoanalytic theories 
of vision (Lacan) – more catchily referred to as ‘apparatus theory.’  Key texts include: 
Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an 
Investigation)’ [1969], in Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, trans. Ben 
Brewster (London: NLB, 1971), pp. 121-73; Jean-Louis Comolli, ‘Machines of the 
Visible’, in The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp.121-44; Jean-Louis Baudry, ‘Ideological 
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Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus’ [1970], trans. Alan Williams, in 
Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.286-98; Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and 
Narrative Cinema’, Screen 16:3 (1975), pp.6-18; Christian Metz, ‘The Imaginary 
Signifier’, trans. Ben Brewster, Screen 16:2 (1975), pp.14-76; Julia Kristeva, ‘Ellipsis 
on the Dread and the Specular Seduction’ [1975], trans. Dolores Burdick, in 
Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, ed. Philip Rosen (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), pp.236-43. One may also add the work of Guy 
Debord and his influential The Society of the Spectacle [1967], trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995). A good reflection of the then 
prevailing debates is given in The Cinematic Apparatus, ed. Teresa de Lauretis and 
Stephen Heath (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980) and in Structural Film 
Anthology, ed. Peter Gidal (London: British Film Institute, 1976). 
52 The experiment ties together Lacan’s core ideas (the topoi of the Imaginary and the 
Symbolic, the mirror phase and the Gaze, ego formation via imaginary identification 
(ideal ego) and symbolic identification (ego-ideal)). It is a distinctive feature of many 
Lacanian books – though usually overshadowed by the triangular schema of the 
screen. 
53 ‘The odd thing is that an entire system of metaphysics has been founded on 
geometry and mechanics, by looking to them for models of understanding, but up to 
now it doesn’t seem as though optics has been exploited as much as it could have 
been. Yet it should lend itself to a few dreams, this strange science which sets itself to 
produce, by means of apparatuses, that peculiar thing called images, in contrast to 
other sciences, which import into nature a cutting up, a dissection, an anatomy.’   
Lacques Lacan, ‘The Topic of the Imaginary’ [1954], in The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book I, ed. Jacques Alain-Miller, trans. John Forrester (New York and 
London: Norten & Company, 1991), pp.73-88 (p.76). 
54 The ‘inverted bouquet’ belongs to physic’s staple of optical experiments. It is 
documented in Henri Bouasse, Bibliothèque scientifique de l’ingénieur et du 
physicien: Optique et photometrie. Dites géométriques (Paris: Delagrave, 1934), p.87. 
55 Lacan describes the phenomenological results of the first stage of the experiment as 
follows: ‘At that moment, while you do not see the real bouquet, which is hidden, if 
you are in the right field, you will see a very peculiar imaginary bouquet appear, 
taking shape exactly in the neck of the vase. Since your eyes have to move linearly in 
the same plane, you will have an impression of reality, all the while sensing that 
something is strange, blurred, because the rays don’t quite cross over very well. The 
further away you are, the more parallax comes into play, and the more complete the 
illusion will be.’ Lacques Lacan, ‘The Topic of the Imaginary’, p.78. 
56 Lacan’s model of subjectification has been critiqued for being of a universalizing 
nature by reinstating a disembodied eye, that is, the grounding of much of his theories 
in abstracting geometrical paradigms. Although producing a de-centred notion of 
subjectivity, he is often considered to be following Enlightenment’s path of an ‘ocular 
epistemology’ because his formulations such as the ‘gaze’ and the ‘screen’ are 
regarded to favour a ‘pure’ realm of the visual over other aspects of embodied 
subjectivity such as haptic or olfactory ones. Yet while other theories emphasize a 
visuality that cannot be that easily unhooked from corporeality such as Merleau-
Ponty’s vision of the ‘chiasmus,’ it should be said that we must not confuse the 
representation of a theory with the substance of that theory, although, admittedly, 
there are links. One could argue that Lacan’s gaze starts from an abstract dot (the 
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representation of the gaze does so in his ‘screen’ model) rather than the particularity 
of a fleshy eye. That is true but at the same time the representation of a dot (to 
represent a theoretical model) does not necessarily entail discounting individual 
embodiment as such. For a critique that makes a claim on Lacan’s disembodying 
tendencies, see Amelia Jones, Self/Image: Technology, Representation and the 
Contemporary Subject (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), particularly her 
chapter ‘Cinematic Self Imaging and the New Televisual Body’, pp.134-62. 
57 On the build-up of the Lacanian theory of idenitification, see Dylan Evans,  
‘Identification’, in An Intoductiory Dictionary of Lacanian Analysis (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.80-82. Jacqueline Rose’s summary is useful here: 
‘The ideal ego would therefore be a projected image with which the subject identifies, 
and comparable to the imaginary captation of the mirror-phase; the ego-ideal would 
be a secondary introjection whereby the image returns to the subject invested with 
those new properties which […] are necessary for the subject to be able to retain its 
narcissism while shifting its “perspective.”’ Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of 
Vision, p.177. 
58 We could also align imaginary identification with Vorstellung and symbolic 
identification with Darstellung. 
59 ‘Jacques Lacan, ‘What is a Picture?’ [1964], in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psycho-analysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Vintage, 
1998), pp.105-22 (p.106). 
60 It might be either Lacan’s theoretical virtuosity or the virtuosity of the accident that 
in ‘What is a Picture?’ the trope of the photographer does not appear. Yet scholarly 
reflections on this text do not hesitate in extending the discussion to the figure of the 
photographer, which is of course not the same as just being ‘photo-graphed.’ While 
my argument can only be sustained if we keep to a textual analysis of this particular 
essay, it is nonetheless telling, I think, how the ‘other,’ in Lacan’s sense, installs itself 
via the reader’s projection of the human figure of the photographer into this 
metaphor. For a discussion of Lacan’s ‘What is a Picture?’ vis-à-vis photography, see 
Margaret Iversen, ‘What is a Photograph?’, Art History 17:3 (September 1994), 
pp.450-63. 
61 ‘All the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography derives an 
advantage from his absence.’ André Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image’, p.13. 
62 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze’ [1964], in The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan 
Sheridan (London: Vintage, 1998), pp.67-78 (p.73). 
63 Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p.177. 
64 For a consideration of the ‘performative’ in the professional task of art criticism, 
see Gavin Butt, ed., After Criticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). 
65 For a critique of Lacan’s privileging of the Symbolic and the subject of the 
signifier, see Jean-Luc Nancy and Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter: A 
Reading of Lacan [1973], trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1992). 
66 Friedrich Kittler, ‘Film’, in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter [1986], trans. and intr. 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999), pp.115-82 (p.170)  
67 This sound entanglement of material reality and ideological projection is what the 
famous metaphor of Marx and Engels’ camera obscura tries to demonstrate in The 
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German Ideology: ‘If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear as upside-
down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their 
historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their 
physical life-process.’ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology [1845-
46], ed. Christopher J. Arthur (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p.47. Here, the 
camera, with its image-inverting principle in its dark interior, is made to serve as a 
model through which the workings of ideology could be understood. Closed off from 
the outside reality, it conceals its distorting operations of ideology in its secretive 
inside. Their analogy suggests that, just as inversion is inevitable in the camera, 
ideology is inevitable in real life – it is an inescapable part of it and we need to be 
aware of that. However, such an interpretation of their ‘camera’ also poses 
immediately the problem of how one could ever ‘see’ through this totalizing structure 
if one is to grasp the ideological effects. For a critique of their inconclusive 
construction of their metaphor – one that relies itself on inversion to align 
successfully two dissimilar concepts – see Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura: Of 
Ideology [1973], trans. Will Straw (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp.1-20. 
68 We may note that the signification ‘bearer’ emphasizes the relational, its role is that 
of enabling flow and exchange within a system of signs. This is evident on paper 
money, for example, in the sentence ‘Promise to Pay the Bearer on Demand the Sum 
of,’ attesting to the relational indebtedness in which a financial economy is based. See 
Brian Rotman, Signifying Nothing: The Semiotics of Zero (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1987), pp.46-52.  
69 I take the notion of the ‘negative as prototype’ from Vilém Flusser’s Towards a 
Philosophy of Photography [1983], trans. Anthony Mathews (London: Reaktion 
Books, 2005). 
70 ‘Denn wenn auch unser Gehirn die Negativität begreift, so können unsere Augen 
doch nicht “negativ sehen.”’ Michel Frizot, ‘Negative Ikonozität: Das Paradigma der 
Umkehrung’, pp.413-33 (p.433). 
71 André Green’s study on the ‘negative’ in psychoanalytic theory is possibly one of 
the most comprehensive on this topic. See André Green, The Work of the Negative, 
trans. Andrew Weller (London: Free Association Books, 1999), p.77. 
72 François Soulages reflects on this displacing dynamic of the negative image: every 
time the spectator looks at a photographic negative, the negative image as such 
inevitably distances itself from the viewing subject once more, because ‘all’ the 
spectator can see is another, albeit inverted, image. Thus, every instance of viewing 
sets off another withdrawal of the negative image, thereby evoking an aesthetics of 
distance. In this way, the negative makes itself unreachable to the spectator. See 
François Soulages, Esthétique de la Photographie: La perte et le reste, pp.112-24. 
73 See the exhibition catalogue Inventories and Transformations: The Photographs of 
Thomas Barrow, ed. Kathleen McCarthy Gauss (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1986), pp.112-29. The series Cancellations was begun in 1974. 
74 Kathleen McCarthy Gauss discusses these aspects of Barrow’s Cancellations series 
in the above-mentioned catalogue. She also points out the photograph’s illusion as if 
‘the image […] were shot through a cracked picture window’ as well as the work’s 
symbolic combination of the labour of the hand (the scratching) and the labour of the 
machine (the image-taking). 
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75 Roland Barthes, ‘The Photographic Message’ [1961], in Image-Music-Text, ed. and 
trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp.15-31 (p.19). 
76 That the photographic negative’s visibility links itself up with notions of damage – 
the negative as tearing things away – cannot be generalized and must be seen in the 
context of this particular work and my reading of it. 
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Facing Lacan (Self-portrait with Jacques Lacan) 
 
 
 
2007 
Photographic tableau composed of  
54 gelatin silver photographs (unique specimen) 
183.5 x 216.8 cm 
 
 
Facing Lacan is a photographic meditation on the life and work of the 
celebrated French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. The photographic 
artwork was created with a camera obscura set up opposite Lacanʼs 
study in rue de Lille no. 5 in Paris VII, where he practised from 1941 until 
his death forty years later.  
 
In Facing Lacan, the photographer produces an image of Lacanʼs study, 
at the same time as creating a self-portrait. He achieves this self-portrait 
ʻwith Lacanʼ by placing himself inside the camera obscura, as he takes 
the image of rue de Lille. By placing himself between the image plane 
and the light opening, the photographer creates his own shadow within 
the camera obscura. The shadow of his figure falls onto the photographic 
paper so his form appears as a cut-out within the image of Lacanʼs study. 
Since the resulting tableau is a negative photographic image, the 
ʻshadowʼ is rendered in white.  
 
Facing Lacan addresses several conceptual areas: the actual space of 
the camera (the ʻblack boxʼ) that is necessary to produce the 
photographic image; the symbolic space of Lacanʼs psychoanalytic 
practice that lends the self-portrait its ʻbackdropʼ; the psychic space of 
the imaginary screen onto which the portrayed self projects its image; the 
phenomenological space of the developed silver gelatin photograph; the 
physical space of encounter with the exhibited work, which can be 
installed either upside down or downside up, thereby referring back to 
the inverting process within photography through which the image was 
created. 
 
The play on inversion, on self and shadow, as well as on presence and 
absence within Facing Lacan relates to intellectual concerns within 
Lacanʼs own work. For instance, Lacanʼs model of infantile development, 
which led him to introduce the concept of the mirror stage, comes to 
mind in this regard. Jacques Lacanʼs intellectual work, as a whole, 
continues to have widespread influence. His persona and his approach 
to psychoanalysis have become legendary. While Lacanʼs oeuvre left its 
mark on psychoanalysis, his concepts of méconnaissance, the mirror 
stage, the screen and the gaze also influenced thinking about the 
photographic image and its spectator.  
 
In this photographic project, the photographer ʻfacesʼ up to the legends of 
Lacan and the mythic legacy of his famous psychoanalytic practice rue 
de Lille no. 5 in Paris. 
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 Facing Lacan (Self-portrait with Jacques Lacan) 
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 Facing Lacan (sheet 8) 
 
 
  
 Facing Lacan (sheet 10) 
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 Facing Lacan (sheet 22) 
 
 
 
 Facing Lacan (sheet 24) 
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 Facing Lacan (sheet 47) 
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Chapter III 
Images of Sublation 
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Aufheben, Aufhebung – 
supprimer, suppression; abolir, abolition; sursumer, sursomption; 
assumer, assomption; dépasser, surpasser, abroger, sur-primer, 
 mettre en grange; enlever, enlèvement; relève. 
Dictionnaire des intraduisibles1 
 
Even ‘to preserve’ includes a negative element, namely, that  
something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence  
which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. 
G. W. F. Hegel2 
 
The archive cannot be described in its totality;  
and in its presence it is unavoidable.  
Michel Foucault3 
 
 
 
Searching for Sublation in Hegel’s Archive 
 
Photographs – latent, inverted, sublated. If we have had to wrestle throughout with 
the work of translation which we can say is also always a work of interpretation, then 
we cannot avoid returning to it again. Latent images remain invisible and cannot be 
located. Inverted images are visible but struggle to correspond. So how are we to 
understand our third image in this proposed chain? We need, once more, the help of 
the translator. Indeed, in attempting to answer this, we need to resort first to the 
lexicological treasures of the ‘archive’ whose preserving space our term under 
question designates at the same time: what falls under the substantival spell of 
sublation becomes aufgehoben, our translator could tell us but not without taking 
recourse to German so as to grasp the multiple meanings of this word. Whatever falls 
into the signifying space of Aufhebung is preserved but also altered through its 
preservation. What is sublated enters a precinct of preservation, it is taken aside and 
held in preserve. Kept but altered. And that which has been altered, ceases to be as 
such but is preserved in, or perhaps, through its alteration. Readers of Hegel’s 
philosophical works will recognize this transformative move as his Aufhebung, 
binding together through its signifying work the antithetical and thus, bringing into 
oscillation a dialectical movement. The moment of Aufhebung is one of theoretical 
delicacy in so far as it is a moment of becoming but a becoming that is precipitated in 
the counter-dependent traversing of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be. In his Science of 
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Logic, he describes this movement exhaustively but we can take the following as 
indicative: ‘[…] we call dialectic the higher movement of reason in which such 
seemingly utterly separate terms pass over into each other spontaneously, through 
that which they are, a movement in which the presupposition sublates itself.’4 
 
What is in sublation – to return Aufhebung to its dedicated English signifier – finds 
itself in a transformative stance encompassing a cancelling preservation as well as a 
preserving cancellation.5 It is the case of a ‘double determination,’ as Hegel would 
state. Things in sublation, it appears, lose their signifying borders while reconstituting 
themselves anew. They pass over into each other but do so by going beyond a mere 
congruous blend. What has passed through the work of sublation is transformed in 
such a way that it might not be recognizable in relation to what it was beforehand 
because it is sublated, or more precisely, because our presupposition has sublated 
itself. Hegel’s sublating moments convey a confident outlook in so far as they 
manage to integrate and productively overcome difference. They thrive on the 
relation that difference brings forth. In fact, there is no difference that sublation could 
not overcome. As such, sublation is the key to unlock Hegel’s approach to the work 
of negation, a negation whose negativity is productive in the sense that it is 
transformative. If I introduce only now the term of negation – a key word in Hegel’s 
philosophical system – then it is also to posit his ‘negation’ outside a flattening vision 
of an all-eradicating nihility. Rather, negativity is becoming, or conversely, becoming 
comes through negativity. ‘To understand this correctly,’ Judith Butler writes in 
recapitulating Hegel’s scheme, ‘we must not assume that negation is nothingness; on 
the contrary, as a differentiating relation that mediates the terms that initially counter 
each other, negation, understood in the sense of Aufhebung, cancels, preserves, and 
transcends the apparent differences it interrelates.’6 
 
Hence, one cannot understand Hegel’s ‘negation’ without considering its inflection 
with ‘sublation.’ This negation is of a sublating kind. In sublation, then, preservation 
and cancellation flow into each other and bring forth a transcendence of the 
differential caused by dyadic opposites. The signifying formation of sublation entails 
preservation and cancellation, two opposites themselves, one can remark, that this 
word must harness and perform at once if it is to be effective on Hegel’s terms. It is 
sublation that can seemingly cope with these two contradictory terms and bring them 
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together so as to enable a transcendence of their differences. It is as if their 
differences, which in this word are not supposed to differentiate themselves anymore, 
provide the grounds for sublation to launch itself. In spelling out that to sublate a 
thing entails transcendence grounded in preservation and cancellation so that both the 
thing and its opposite survive as moments in the sublated whole, we cannot but return 
to the German idiom of Aufhebung and its polysemic abilities. ‘Elevated,’ as it 
became thanks to Hegel, to its central role for his philosophical work, Aufhebung was 
also given a special commentary in the Science of Logic to stress the significance of 
this word.7  
 
Indeed, few other words of western philosophy’s vocabulary have provided such an 
unruly ground for translators of philosophical texts, a ground that has actually resisted 
giving in fully to the demand of effortless translation and its ideal of doing things 
invisibly as it were. Our own indecisive moves, swerving between sublation and 
Aufhebung as we do, attest to this. Aufhebung could be seen as an emancipatory gift 
to the translator. Aufhebung allows for a materialization of the work of translation. 
My choice for the opening epigraph speaks of this fertile field for translation to come 
into its appearance other than being unremarkably indexed into the translated work. 
Like many other translations of ‘untranslatables,’ it allows the translator to come to 
the fore in the textual domain through forewords (the ‘translator’s note’), explanatory 
remarks, italicized insertions, etc. Of course, Hegel’s treasured word is far from being 
a unique case in challenging translation. And we hardly need to resort to a dictionary 
of untranslatables to argue this – even though a translator working into French has 
indeed many options to choose from. What can or cannot be translated is also always 
a question of fine-tuning our attention to the particular instance of reading whereby 
the focus cannot solely be on isolating the word and its implied linguistic layers and 
etymological chains, but focus must also be placed on an analytical emphasis of the 
word’s syntagmatic context and its work within the condensing and displacing effects 
of metaphor and metonymy. Yet, given its complex signified, Aufhebung features as a 
rather special case. If we think of the work of translation as a resolving and, indeed, 
transcending act, or more eagerly argued, translation’s endeavour of transcending two 
language systems – the matching up of two differing signifiers so as to allow the 
signified to slip across – then Aufhebung does not do this very well. In the space of 
translation, Aufhebung struggles to do what it signifies. In the alterities of those 
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languages that are an other to Aufhebung, it does not happily find its dedicated 
signifiers and instead continues to fall back to itself. It holds on to itself and thus, 
affirms only its own material space that forms the signifier A u f h e b u n g. 
 
From within an era coloured by post-structuralism, Hegel’s notion of sublation is 
often looked upon with some suspicion precisely because Hegel’s focus on sublation 
is on an overcoming of difference. Sublation transcends differences. It feeds itself off 
a differential discrepancy, and in the following sentence Hegel attests boldly to this 
aspect: ‘[s]omething is sublated only in so far as it has entered into unity with its 
opposite.’8 Even though that unity is not a harmonious unity as we have seen, having 
inside itself already a negative, destabilizing ‘element,’ Hegel’s sublation is 
nonetheless built across a differential axis, which it can claim to span. And even 
though difference remains, and indeed, difference manifests itself as an inexhaustible 
component because in the moment of sublation alterity is (re-)produced, that is to say 
once more that what is aufgehoben does not remain what it was beforehand, Hegel’s 
sublation nevertheless asserts itself in the very possibility of difference – its bridging 
logic pronouncing itself in every moment of Aufhebung. In sublation, difference 
persists but the alterity of the other, or one’s alterity within oneself, it seems, can be 
infiltrated. Aufgehoben. Sublation mediates and ultimately transcends that space of 
otherness. Hegel thus writes: ‘What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. 
Nothing is immediate; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of mediation.’9 
Yet, if Hegel’s sublation can facilitate the work of mediation between two opposing 
spheres it is far from evening out the differences of this world because every moment 
of sublation is a moment that produces new differences. 
 
 
Aufhebung after Derrida 
 
Derrida, however, regards Hegel’s sublation with suspicion in that it affirms its 
signifying position so as to keep meaning to itself. From within post-structuralism, 
from the momentary positions of our textual, and always inevitably displacing 
positionalities, Hegel’s Aufhebung reappears as a metaphysical fastener of his 
philosophical discourse. In the centre of Hegel’s vast logos could be Aufhebung. Not 
for nothing has it been said that Hegel’s philosophy can be condensed into a question 
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of Aufhebung. For Derrida, then, it is also Aufhebung that is the semiotic manager of 
Hegel’s philosophical thought and its signifying structures. While the Hegelian 
subject is endlessly posited through Aufhebung, the very process of its wanderings 
that have neither a beginning nor an ending are enabled by the reliability of the 
meaning of this word. What emerges with Derrida’s help is the closure of Hegel’s 
signifying framework, that is to say, a framework that implies as its limits the 
materials of which it is built. For Derrida, Hegel’s philosophical discourse is a 
discourse limited to discursive materials, that is, it remains committed to the 
signifying sign and the organization of knowledge that opens up with it. Or put 
differently, it makes sense of itself only through words – words that obey to one word 
and its signification: Aufhebung. While Aufhebung engenders a ‘subject’ in 
continually changing landscapes of dialectical matter, Aufhebung itself remains the 
constant. Thus, for Derrida, ‘the Hegelian Aufhebung is produced entirely from 
within discourse, from within the system or the work of signification. A 
determination is negated and conserved in another determination which reveals the 
truth of the former. From infinite indetermination one passes to infinite 
determination, and this transition, produced by the anxiety of the infinite, 
continuously links meaning up to itself. The Aufhebung is included within the circle 
of absolute knowledge, never exceeds its closure, never suspends the totality of 
discourse, work, meaning, law, etc.’10 
 
The doubts that Derrida brings towards Hegel’s Aufhebung is founded in his 
argument that Aufhebung is ultimately of a restricting nature, the restriction being the 
postulation of Aufhebung itself through which affirmative negation is brought forth. 
While the Hegelian subject is so radical that it is no subject at all, composing and 
decomposing itself dialectically against the labouring backdrop of the negative, 
Derrida gives us something else to think: while Hegel’s achievement was to take the 
labour of the negative serious, he did it so much so that he did it too seriously – to the 
letter as it were. The problem with the negative begins right there: ‘in giving meaning 
to its labour.’11 By calling upon negativity, by drawing upon its signifying reserve, by 
naming the negative a ‘negative,’ by bringing it into language and by thinking it 
through language, by fixing its meaning through the semantic lens of Aufhebung, 
Derrida’s Hegel oversees or possibly disregards the radicalness of his meditations on 
the negative. ‘In naming the without-reserve of absolute expenditure “abstract 
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negativity,” Hegel, through precipitation, blinded himself to that which he had laid 
bare under the rubric of negativity.’12 The impossibility of the negative, as that 
outside of signification, as an unknown, and what psychoanalytically could be 
theorized as an unconscious, is undone by Hegel’s Aufhebung. Supplied with 
Derrida’s perceptive remarks, we can thus begin to see how Aufhebung would assume 
a position of concealment within Hegel’s landscapes of meaning-rendering negatives. 
What Aufhebung conceals is its restricting effects on the ‘worlds’ it can claim to 
evoke and surpass through its sublating work. What appears to be Aufhebung’s 
radically transforming and boundless nature in its assigned role within Hegel’s 
idealism – its cancelling/preserving/transcending performance – comes to form in fact 
its own shield of defence behind which Aufhebung conceals the limits of its creative 
powers. In interpreting Derrida’s scepticism, we could say that Aufhebung professes 
itself as staying in flux with and through the world, but the production of that world is 
ultimately precipated upon the concept of Aufhebung. By shunning not to remain 
silent even in the face of the ultimately unspeakable negative, Aufhebung operates in 
and relies on what Derrida framed as a ‘restricted economy.’ It oversees what is 
outside its logos. That is what Aufhebung conceals, that is its suppression of itself. 
 
Hence, Aufhebung hides well inside its transgressive appearance, an appearance that 
can never be taken for granted as far we have been able to grasp from its 
performances in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Those who keep with Hegel’s works, 
and in particular those who read his Phenomenology, are often counselled to practise 
a reading that excels in continuation so as to read its texts phenomenologically. That 
is a suggestion seemingly in line with the work and its attributed intentions (one also 
given by Alexandre Kojève – himself a professionally avid reader of Hegel) albeit 
also a slightly paradoxical one in the sense that all textual matters can be interpreted 
against the light of phenomenology and all reading is experiential – so why limit 
oneself to an ambitious corset of phenomenology?13 Or more fairly put: what are the 
consequences of this instruction to ‘read’ phenomenologically? One answer to this 
would be to say that another category, namely the field of phenomenology, takes care 
of the Hegelian subject so that we do not lose sight of it in the midst of all these 
dialectically changing worlds of text. The call to a phenomenological attention is also 
a call to track the Hegelian subject in reading. And the fulfilment of this task, in 
keeping to the filament of the text, presupposes some awareness to the teachings of 
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phenomenology – what enables the appearance of the Hegelian subject is the 
‘phenomenological discourse,’ itself a specialist discourse in the shaping hands of 
language. How would we otherwise keep our readerly focus phenomenologically on 
track? This is a track that cannot be laid out by the phenomenal world but one that 
tracks a world brought into phenomeno-logical arrangements by the assuming 
frameworks of phenomenology. How would we compose this subject otherwise? It 
was Derrida who has diverged us so vividly from our learned attempts to keep track 
of the Hegelian subject, running as it does through every single line of the 
Phenomenology, by allowing this subject-on-the-run to be adjoined by another 
subject. The pages of Glas offer a taste of choosing the impossible: their layout 
organizes multiple narrative threads so that they run concurrently alongside each 
other and thus invite themselves to be read at the same time. Yet with two or more 
texts to be watched out phenomenologically, which is a watching out for the 
phenomena of our voice(s), we are also thereby drained of the possibility of 
reconstituting the (Hegelian) ‘subject’ in the presence of our reading voice.14 
 
 
Aufhebung – Hegel’s Blind Spot? 
 
Derrida’s passionate scepticism towards Hegel’s Aufhebung is voiced in many of his 
essays even though he goes on to appropriate its semantic effects by giving his 
preference to ‘la relève’ and ‘relever’ so as to allow Aufhebung its différance. Indeed, 
as indicated already above, he sees Aufhebung, that is to say Hegel’s Aufhebung, as 
restricting itself by foreclosing the (nonsignifying) excesses of meaning that it could 
produce through its polysemic and/or homonymic bodies. Instead, it promises to 
purify the logos without leaving behind any residues, there is nothing that could not 
be put back into the cycles of signification or that could ever fall out. For Derrida, 
that is Aufhebung’s deception, a deception also towards itself – for Aufhebung 
performs Aufhebung all too transparently. Not that it would fail to leave things behind 
but it gives an impression of leaving nothing behind of itself, that is of its own labour. 
Hegel’s Aufhebung preserves and cancels but it cannot see what is wasted during its 
own performative appearances. Refusing to be infected by its own signification, it 
does not seem to sublate its signified. Aufhebung shows no concession to its own 
idealized work. It does not alter itself in the process of sublation, thereby reinstating 
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itself effortlessly without getting anything wasted in its course of (re-)emergence. It 
endures the perfect balance. In voicing Aufhebung, its voice proper remains still. How 
then to think and write this Aufhebung differently – through différance? Not so 
surprisingly, that was one of Derrida’s concerns. 
 
Derrida encouraged Aufhebung to write itself differently, to let go of its inscription 
into a Hegelian homocentricity. In a deconstructing différance, Aufhebung also begins 
to state and reinstate itself in differing moments to itself. As such, he unbuttons 
Aufhebung from its fixed position, a position that, as we have seen, is fixed in such a 
way that it always appears as fleeting. That is the life of Aufhebung as denoting the 
Hegelian subject whose Schein or appearance we can set out to follow in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. In its pages, Aufhebung does not take stock of its own 
transcending position and of what there is actually needed to sustain that position 
within an economy of differential relations. In Aufhebung, nothing of its own 
cherished substance is sacrificed; the work of its transcendence – its restlessly 
creative mediation of opposites – its not weighed in. In fact, its signifying substance 
does not seem to be dissipated at all, or to dissipate itself. It resists itself but does not 
recognize the ‘cost’ of that resistance. This then would also delimit the boundaries of 
its sphere within which its operations can remain effective in accordance with a 
Hegelian vision. But the surrender to this kind of Aufhebung entails a work of 
concealment that Derrida brings into relief through his différance. Relying on a 
signifying and nameable negativity, Hegel’s subject presupposes the possibility of 
appropriating its difference to otherness in Aufhebung yet ultimately, as Derrida 
would summarize in a note in Writing and Difference, ‘alterity, difference, and time 
are not suppressed but retained by absolute knowledge in the form of Aufhebung.’15 
 
The subject of Aufhebung is oblivious to its own presence. Supplemented by 
différance, it does indeed become a kind of ‘blind spot of Hegelianism, around which 
can be organized the representation of meaning.’16 But to do that, it has to suppress its 
own difference within itself. This is not a suppression of a Hegelian sublating kind (in 
the way early French translations of Hegel have employed the word ‘suppression’ to 
render Aufhebung, one that is more closely linked to a psychoanalytic idea of 
sublimation) but this suppression of itself becomes a categorically fixed suppression 
of non-disclosure, of resolute concealment.17 Thus, within Aufhebung there is a 
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suppression that is not in Aufhebung’s interests, a suppression that is no longer in line 
with Hegel’s speculative outline of sublation as mediating transcendence. As such, 
whatever Aufhebung transcends, whatever difference it mediates, it can only do so 
while at the same time accumulating within itself the weight of its own falsehood 
because Aufhebung cannot achieve what it claims to do. From within our Derridian 
approach, Aufhebung restricts and thus moves actually towards the reverse of what it 
promises to do. Hence, the signifying work of Aufhebung comes to perform, contrary 
to its claim of ‘Aufhebung’ as it were, also a warding off of its own shortcomings. 
 
 
Aufhebung’s Appearances 
 
Derrida’s critical reservations towards Hegel’s subject in and of Aufhebung are 
perhaps only matched by Jean-Luc Nancy’s emphatic reappraisal of the critical 
potentialities of the negative in Hegel’s thought.18 What Nancy delivers in his 
reflective guide to Hegel’s insomniac subject is a tour with no beginnings and 
endings. In exposing the radical openendedness of Hegel’s philosophical thinking, 
Nancy plunges into the productive negativity of this thought-in-motion in which the 
Hegelian subject moves and which it continues to open up. But this subject is, we 
need to underscore again, beyond a positionality of ‘subjectivity.’ The Hegelian 
subject is, in a way, no subject at all because it cannot be comprehended by its 
(momentary) outlines. It does not stand on its own because it has no foundations it 
could call its own. It cannot comprehend itself through itself, that is, by relating itself 
to its self. Rather, it is always in flux with the world: ‘the subject is what it does, it is 
its act, and its doing is the experience of consciousness of the negativity of 
substance.’19 It has no beginning and no ending. It disperses. Restless, it is and 
restless it remains in passage. ‘It neither seeks itself (as if it were for itself an exterior 
end) nor finds itself (as if it were a thing here and there), but it effectuates itself: it is 
the living restlessness of its own concrete effectivity.’20 
 
The Hegelian subject is a ‘subject’ that has no intrinsic core but it also has no 
extrinsic casing. It is no subject at all in the sense that it would occupy a specific 
position – though, of course, we now can say, alongside Derrida, that the possibility 
of this non-specifiable position is secured by resting in Aufhebung – a sublation that 
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is built on an assumption of an all-encompassing sphere of knowledge that is 
ultimately giving itself its own limits: everything changes, Aufhebung remains. 
Sublating subjects. And by the same token we can also say mediating subjects, for 
Hegel’s subject has a thirst for difference, a difference that it can and must mediate if 
it is to survive its dialectical deaths – deaths not just in the sense of the ongoing 
affirmative negations occurring inside the dialectic, but also deaths provoked by those 
who have walked out on its systemic logic. As such, it ‘ought to realize the 
negativity, and it realizes itself in and through action.’21 We cannot ‘see’ or localize 
the Hegelian subject because it is of an immanent nature. It is always already in 
mediation. It is nothing other than mediation. Nancy brings this aspect to bear when 
he writes that sublation ‘is the concept of dialectical mediation, which is nothing 
other than manifestation considered according to the form of its operation.’22  
 
Nancy, ostensibly untouched by Derrida’s scepticism in his appreciation of 
Aufhebung and its transcending powers, presents Aufhebung in appealing Hegelian 
dress. However, in pushing Aufhebung’s sublating prowess, he brings out the 
impossibility of bringing out any self-supporting outline of Aufhebung. Since 
Aufhebung, or the subject moving in its guise, mediates, it is also never just itself. 
One could say it cannot rely on its self – for it has none. Always in mediation, indeed, 
enabling mediation itself, we can also not isolate it, or extract its ‘essence’ from the 
circumstances it mediates. Although Hegel’s spirit or Geist seems to distil itself in 
every moment of sublation – not unlike in the physical process of distillation – the 
spirit penned down by a radically interpreted Hegel is not following this analogy. The 
cycles of Aufhebung do not work towards attaining a 100% distillate. That would 
ultimately lead to a resolution, and to an actualization of spirit as an essence in itself, 
a perfect solution – a solution in which spirit can only dissolve. As such, the distillate 
would be just that, a distillate that is evident to itself. But Aufhebung is not an 
‘essencing’ for its own ends. Rather, as Stephen Houlgate pledges in reiterating some 
of Hegel’s legacies, there cannot be a spirit for its own sake as ‘all things have the 
“germ of decease” within themselves: “the hour of their birth is the hour of their 
death.” And this is due not to the external relations in which things stand, but to the 
fact that being as such turns dialectically into non-being through itself.’23 
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This then raises also the stakes for thinking Aufhebung in our discussion because 
Hegel’s Aufhebung would not willingly lend us its own distinct outline. To that, at 
least, would the Phenomenology attest. The ‘subject’ is always in and of Aufhebung, 
it is that what is in mediation. As such, it does not hold on well to terms like 
‘discrete’ or ‘evident’ because it is not. What it is, is in mediation. It is not at ease by 
itself. Unhomed, perhaps. And in so far as it can only ever be in mediation, in the 
space of difference, it is never just itself and never simply for itself. What follows 
thus is that the work of Aufhebung, as Nancy suggests, can never be thought in 
isolation, or if so, only for the purpose of an unassuming analysis whose ‘position’ 
remains inadequate to portray an image of Aufhebung. If we give full thrust to 
Hegel’s Aufhebung, then it is not isolatable. Being mediation, it cannot explicate 
itself. It has nothing to say to itself. Instead, it can only carry on as mediating 
sublation. Thus, what Aufhebung invites us to think, perhaps instead of its 
(unpresentable) self, ‘is to think the impossibility of keeping determinacies 
isolated.’24 Hence, a presentation of Aufhebung would be of a purely notional gesture, 
because we are always in it; any attempt to distance ourselves from it is a mere 
academic exercise (in the pejorative sense). The difficulty that Aufhebung poses to us 
when we state Aufhebung, when Aufhebung is meant to pose for us, brings actually 
into relief the impossibility of doing so because, being mediation, it ‘should not be 
isolated, nor can it be.’25 
 
‘Mediation: we cannot pronounce it at a distance, as one would enunciate a law of 
things. We cannot because we are ourselves in it.’26 Nancy’s declaratory words 
emphasize the inherently problematic nature of ‘delineating’ Aufhebung, and with it, 
the subject that drifts in its shadow. Insofar as our sublating subject works in 
mediation, the ‘given always gives itself as something other than simply given.’27 As 
such, Aufhebung continues to reveal by revelling in difference – not the given as self-
determined given but the given as an other to itself. If Aufhebung reveals, then it can 
only do so by othering on its course of revelation. It mediates (only) in transforming. 
Or, conversely, it is in transforming that it can effect mediation. That is indeed what 
carries the mark of Hegel’s Aufhebung: an alteration that is brought forth in 
Aufhebung’s abilities of preservation and cancellation. However, given these 
parameters, we cannot but fail to find Aufhebung revealing itself. It is never for itself 
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(bracketing off in this instance Derrida’s critique of Aufhebung’s concealed ‘self-
suppression’). 
 
If Aufhebung could deliver us an ethics of mediation, then it would not settle for an 
account of the agreement in the middle. That would be, in any case, a naïve 
impression of mediation of any kind (as compromise, negotiation, settlement, etc.) for 
there can be no productive outcome that would not in turn impact on either side. But 
Hegel’s Aufhebung – if we allow ourselves to take up the challenge of its seriously 
optimistic outlook of idealism – can help us to appreciate its ‘mediating work’ in that 
it does not shy away from the differential that constitutes a disagreement. And 
moreover, the transformative impact, inevitable to any successful outcome of 
mediation, would not be seen as a defeat. In fact, the reverse is the case. The 
transformative is not a disfiguring defacement but can only give rise to further 
revelation. Its tone is affirmative but never plainly evident. As such, it embraces the 
alteration that comes about in mediation. At the same time, it would also remind us 
that whatever manifests itself to us, including the manifestation of our selves, is 
always already a manifestation brought about by dialectical mediation, which, let us 
stress again with Nancy’s words, ‘is nothing other than manifestation according to the 
form of its operation.’28 Hence, mediation is not of an arbitrating kind, or of an 
additional layer of intervention. Rather, Aufhebung’s mediation is always already an 
instance (or Hegel would possibly opt for saying ‘moment’) of a particular 
manifestation – of what we already appear to be to ourselves. And therefore, it can 
only ever lead to further revelation. Nancy, again: ‘it is simply the step out of the in-
itself: self is relieved of its function of being in-itself. Being does not remain in itself: 
it liberates itself.’29 
 
 
Revealing, Lifting, Translating: Aufheben 
 
The at times arduous business of translating Aufhebung has left a hefty trail of cross-
lingual philosophical debates, particularly in French-speaking circles.30 While Hegel 
appreciated this word for its double signification of preservation and cancellation, of 
the conserving and the annulling, it has also a third meaning close to describing an 
action of lifting or picking up, of raising things, in short, of elevation. Although 
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Hegel was seemingly uninterested in that aspect of the word (in his remark on 
Aufhebung he does not mention it, claiming only that it has a ‘gedoppelten Sinn,’ a 
twofold sense) this extra layer of implicit signification was a practical amplifier of 
Hegel’s well-spirited idealism and its receptive discipleship.31 Through Aufhebung, as 
elevation, the dialectical movement becomes also imbued with a sense of verticality, 
underscoring indirectly the inherent optimism of his philosophical approach. The 
inclination of Aufhebung to lean towards the vertical then brings with it the hard to 
avoid connotations (in Barthes’ terms) that ‘verticality’ is always able to gather. Any 
Aufhebung is another actualization of Spirit, which simply entails another revelation, 
but that revelation-in-verticality intensifies the highlighting of its own movement – it 
highlights a sense of clear improvement, of ever improving clarity, of gaining an 
overview. Any Aufhebung would seem to render itself therefore also as a self-
correcting act that gives an appearance of approximating the vertical and its 
signifying lines of stepping up, of bettering, of advancing purposefully along the lines 
(pre-)conditioned by verticality. Aufhebung’s verticalizing inclinations move us into 
higher spheres that can be readily read as morally healthier. Vertical self-help.  
 
Hegelian lexicographer Michael Inwood also endorses the fact of Hegel’s 
indifference to Aufhebung’s elevating attitude, confirming Hegel’s theoretical 
keenness on Aufhebung as preservation and cancellation. However, he is able to draw 
the conclusion that Aufhebung’s additional signifying value does no harm to Hegel’s 
wider intentions, or let us rather say to the intentions that we claim Hegel is supposed 
to have for his work. ‘Thus, despite Hegel’s silence on the matter, it is reasonable to 
see […] “elevation,” as an ingredient in its Hegelian meaning.’32 This is sensible to 
the extent that it is a part of Aufhebung’s signification and in the sense that Hegel’s 
dialectics are of a revelatory nature – Spirit can only get to know itself better, its 
movement is the ongoing realization of itself. Still, the lifting of Aufhebung does not 
necessarily have to be interpreted as an unwaveringly making higher, bringing with 
itself the values that we attach whenever we believe to be in need of putting things on 
a pedestal – the category of art a very apposite contender in this respect, both with 
regards to art’s privileged treatment on the platform of art historical writing as well as 
the preserving practices of display that its status as ‘encased object’ necessitates, or 
indeed the pedestal that art, for to be art, claims for itself.33 Yet, accepting the lift of 
Aufhebung does not have to be such an imposing stance of self-importance. Nor is 
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there a need to think Aufhebung’s lifting so that its progressing manifestations would 
reach higher levels in the sense that they could build themselves up as a matter of a 
compressing or suppressing solidification. 
 
Likewise, to conceive of Aufhebung as pulling itself vertically along into ever-higher 
spheres, from the soiled earth to the pristine heaven as it were, would be a one-
dimensional approach to things. A line – simply. The subject of Aufhebung may lift 
itself, but its sublating work cannot just put forth a ground that would be more stable 
so that it could also stabilize itself thereby. It is only a matter of bringing to fruition 
an abstraction in the moment of becoming an other to oneself but even then Hegel 
would have inserted us in a totality by deeming that ‘the abstract is already posited as 
infected with a negation.’34 Aufhebung has within itself always already a negative 
element, yet its implicit ‘lifting’ puts in jeopardy Aufhebung’s complex design. In 
making an effort to think Aufhebung’s elevation beyond this self-straightening body 
of thought as a kind of enduringly self-erecting logic, we should take the risk of 
thinking the lift of Aufhebung as a more banal event of everyday life, of life itself. 
Taking a step back from the determined Hegel of teleological idealism, Aufhebung 
reappears indeed as a necessary and tiny gesture of the everyday: the Aufheben or 
picking (up) of a thing. And of being picked up. Done so habitually that we do not 
take account of it anymore. Regardless of our intention, regardless of whether this is 
done deliberately or not, whatever is aufgehoben, calls thereby also briefly for our 
attention. This lifting Aufhebung as picking up, by taking place, speaks of a 
momentary reshuffling encounter. Even if we pick up a thing just to get it out of our 
way, to throw it away again, to destroy or of being destroyed, this encounter remains 
of a picking up kind but does not predictably stabilize. In Aufhebung, things can only 
dissolve again. Mulling it over out of this ordinary angle, we take away some of the 
principled polish of Hegel’s teleological finish so as to untie Aufhebung from its 
raising duties. The thing, after its moment of Aufhebung, may fall back into the 
periphery of our vision, becoming yet an other to itself by becoming irrelevant to us. 
At the same time, to make this argument feasible, we might just have moved closer to 
Derrida’s position, one that entails the opening up of ourselves to an openended 
economy to allow the dispersal and loss of meaning outside the capturing economics 
of the logos. As such, Aufhebung’s connotations of verticality and enhancement are 
slowed down and begin to lose their ideological orientations towards advancement 
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and unrestrained improvement. This Aufhebung does not reach out to a stable 
advancement – which brings us back into the eliding space of Derrida’s différance.  
 
Despite Derrida’s questioning hesitance towards the Hegelian Aufhebung, his own 
circumscription of différance remains a close neighbour. Like Aufhebung, Derrida’s 
différance is also often called an untranslatable. However, its difference is apparent: 
the decisive resistance of its own nontranslatability. We can only reiterate. 
Différance. As such, it is already more than an operation of systemically organizing 
meaning. More than a belief in an unfailing system of langue. But also less so. On the 
other hand, Aufhebung, notwithstanding the quandaries surrounding the viability of 
Aufhebung’s translation, has eventually become a citizen more or less well enough 
integrated in other languages: an English sublation, a French relève, a Russian 
snyatie.35 Thus, while Hegel’s Aufhebung has undertaken, somehow, and against its 
own odds, its adventurous journey from German into other tongues, différance 
remains the genuine foreigner among us. Not only in this English text, but also in the 
environs of what we would call its French homeland. This is a significant foreigner, 
its ‘signification’ (a truly paradoxical thing to say) precisely being the reminder of its 
inability to fulfil the duties of signification, of securing the signified. No quick fix 
here. Just another secret in the temporary installations of meaning. As such, it cannot 
be translated if it is to retain its ‘work’ along- or inside the logos, a work that 
accompanies us in signifiance and which could always transpire as the unlikely 
probability of an undoing of the logos. The critical difference of différance (its 
phonetic ‘a’) is thus also neither a word nor a concept, as we have learned, and hence 
beyond the technological grasp of translation.36 Hegel, on the other hand, had to 
occupy himself with combining Aufhebung’s plural semantics, bundling up the 
severality of its signifying operations. As such, Aufhebung is firmly embedded in (its) 
logics. Différance, while appearing closely related, depletes the repletion of the logos 
and with it also Aufhebung’s sense of its own logical operations. 
 
In Derrida’s appropriation, then, Aufhebung becomes designated as ‘la relève.’ 
Through this translating interference, akin to an act of copying out, Derrida tries to 
shake up Aufhebung’s Hegelian solid core with some différance. While ‘relève’ 
indicates a ‘lifting up,’ just like Aufhebung, as Derrida’s translator Alan Bass notes, 
‘it also means to relay, to relieve, as when one soldier on duty relieves another. Thus 
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the conserving-and-negating lift has become la relève, a “lift” in which is inscribed 
an effect of substitution and difference’ – which is to say all those uncontainable and 
non-meaningful effects that continue to dis/appear in différance.37 Hence, Derrida 
achieves thereby his articulation of Aufhebung in deconstructive terms, infusing it 
with his own theoretical innovations. At the same time, and strangely indeed, in so 
doing he also put it through a thorough translation regime. What the signifier 
différance must never do, namely to pass through translation so as to keep its 
functionality to tell us about its theoretical purpose, has had to happen to Aufhebung 
so as to be instilled with différance.38 Having become ‘la relève’ in French, he 
achieves to let Aufhebung write itself in French – otherwise. ‘The Aufhebung – la 
relève – is constrained into writing itself otherwise. Or perhaps simply into writing 
itself. Or, better, into taking account of its consumption of writing.’39 
 
Quite clearly then, both Derrida and Hegel share a passionate taste for the difference. 
Difference not as an obstacle, of an engulfing burdensome kind, but a difference that 
is to be worked with. A difference that will keep us busy. A difference that is to be 
embraced even though it cannot be held. But if Hegel’s Aufhebung could be said to 
make sense only through difference, then Derrida’s relève could be said to bring 
about its sense in difference. Aufhebung bridges the difference. It finds its way 
through the difference, surpassing it. Relève must remain in difference. It sets itself 
up in the waxing and waning of differentiation. Remaining indifferent to the 
difference, it does not seek to overcome it and instead allows itself to be carried away 
by it so as to give space to another. Thus, in asking ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction 
“relevante”?’ Derrida inserts his relève in a text with the same question as title and in 
which la relève comes to labour in terms that would have been unheard of for 
Aufhebung.40 In this contemplation on the work of translation – or more precisely, of 
the question of the ‘relevant translation’ – Derrida puts this signifier to use in his 
allegorical elaborations on the space of translation but he does so not by 
problematizing translation through another untranslatable (to which we are used to 
bear witness through Aufhebung) so as to help us see its irreducibility but through a 
signifier that has passed through translation without translation’s detection. 
‘Relevant,’ a word that is in French, English or German equally effective, eludes the 
work of translation. Indeed, confronted with this word, translation is rather thrown 
back to itself by inevitably having to ask ‘à quelle langue appartient le mot 
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“relevante”?’41 As such, this signifier becomes a splicer of different languages as 
well as of their differences while eliding the manipulating hands of translation. The 
space of translation, if conceived as the working means through which to mediate the 
difference, has thus become une traduction ‘relevante.’ Facing up to the relevant 
signifier, translation might lose in it its self-image of what it considered to be relevant 
for itself. La relève – a translation of a relieving relevance. Aufhebung relevée. 
 
Relieving Aufhebung of its attachment to its signifier, Derrida’s translation has 
transferred its signified into a new body at the same time as releasing it from its 
intractable Hegelian multitasking of simultaneously cancelling, preserving and lifting.  
If the intent of Hegel’s Aufhebung is confined, in every one of its performing acts, to 
always accomplish a double task (preserving, cancelling), and, arguably, at times 
even a triple task (preserving, cancelling, lifting), so as to effectuate successfully its 
model undertaking of transcending difference, then it can never just single out one of 
these things: just preserve, just cancel, just lift. The debates whether Aufhebung is 
supposed to operate within the two meanings Hegel decided to focus on, or whether it 
should also lift itself up at the same time, attests already to the difficulties of this 
imposed integrating procedure. Whereas Derrida’s relève becomes the cipher for an 
Aufhebung resounding in différance, Hegel’s Aufhebung must continue its 
engagement in the double-act of its gedoppelten Sinn. It can only make sense in its 
double sense. And it is in its double sense that it makes sense of itself.42 That is the 
brief that Hegel gave to this word. As such, it must reach beyond its singularly 
identified self, always amalgamating all two or three of its possible meanings – and 
all that at once. Let us do it now: aufheben. In this instance, it must overcome its own 
internal differences that open themselves up between preserving, cancelling, lifting. 
Its semantic layers united in unison, Aufhebung conceals its multilayered potentiality 
by positing its invisible differences as a co-incidence. And yet, according to Hegel, 
Aufhebung carries on falling back into singing its songs discordantly. In spite of this 
momentary insistence on an all-at-once Aufhebung, its crucial asset is that it fails to 
keep its differences united, spreading them out again in itself so that in turn we can 
state, with Hegel, that ‘even “to preserve” includes a negative element.’43 
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Sublation as Archival Mode 
 
Against this multifaceted complex built out of the crossings of philosophical, 
semiotic and linguistic debates that have given Aufhebung its (provisional) residence, 
we are going to piggyback Aufhebung’s corpus so as to consider through it the 
modality of the archive. Aufhebung, it will have become clear by now, ushers us into 
the spaces of the archive. On the one hand, as a predicate, it engenders an archival 
space. What we declare to be in need of Aufhebung, what we decide to keep 
[aufheben] also immediately claims for itself an archival space of preservation. It 
inaugurates an archive whose space we need to respect. On the other hand, as a 
subject, what comes to find itself in Aufhebung, what can be described as preserved 
[aufgehoben] is also thereby inscribed in space of difference, of archival difference. 
Hence, if we are attempting to think of images of sublation as images in 
archivization, which is the task we set ourselves in this chapter, then we cannot do so 
without keeping Aufhebung ready to hand. Our exegesis through the multifarious 
territories of this word should have prepared us well enough for this particular 
complication.  
 
Aufhebung: its modality preserves and cancels. What is aufgehoben, is altered. 
Aufhebung, then, provides us also with a loose itinerary for theorizing the modality of 
the archive. Indeed, it is not difficult to see how the operating mode of the archive 
can be regarded as one of Aufhebung, this unremarkable word of the German 
language which served Hegel so perfectly to set his philosophical thought in ongoing 
motion. In servicing our argument of the archive as a space of Aufhebung and 
archiving as a sublating act, we need to separate out momentarily – against 
Aufhebung’s signifying will – its semantic layers so as to align them alongside the 
operating layers of the archive – an archive that we must keep in mind as that what 
Derrida has outlined as the ‘privileged topology’ of the archive, that is to say an 
archive that is at the ‘intersection of the topological and the nomological, of the place 
and the law, of the substrate and the authority, a scene of domiciliation [that] 
becomes at once visible and invisible.’44  
 
The archive hebt auf, its pursuit could be described as aufhebend [preserving or 
keeping]. In the topological sense, the archive is a delimiting place, a space of 
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storage, a space that also needs to be defended if it is to guarantee the wellbeing of 
the things it archives. Yet every act of archivization is also an act of nomination, of 
designation. No archive without an archiving principle, or put differently, there is 
always a law that underpins the work of the archive and, indeed, through which the 
archive in itself is established in the first place. In this nomological sense, the archive 
governs the things it archives by nominating them. The nomological aspect of the 
archive need not be restricted to a notion of a formally instituted archive such as a 
library or museum but should also be thought of as discipline or any other structuring 
discourse. For example, the history of art, as a disciplinary formation, is a prominent 
candidate in this regard by working out a set of discursive, one might more clearly 
say, ideological forces that ultimately orbit around the shaping of the epistemological 
formations of a canon. Moreover, and more significantly perhaps, is the fact that a 
discipline such as the history of art is allowed to legitimize itself as the legitimizing 
authority – or is accepted as a legitimizing arbiter – over the things it attempts to 
study. In this sense it also acts in accordance with the authority of the archive, 
establishing itself as an ‘archontic principle of legitimization.’45 
 
Michel Foucault cannot remain silent here. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
Foucault posits ‘the archive’ also as a privileged site (‘a region’) but he does so by 
drawing attention to the dynamics that are played out between the archived and the 
non-archived. Thus, the archival site provokes a dynamics of epistemological 
differentiation and places us and our presences in a differentiating relation to the 
archive. In the archive we find that what we are no longer. Or conversely, to 
recognize something in need of archivization is also to recognize that what we have 
ceased to be. The designation of something as archival, and hence as aufgehoben, 
marks that altering step. What is archived is no longer part of our present-day fabric 
and discourse. The archive, for Foucault, is ‘at once close to us, and different from 
our existence, it is the border of time that surrounds our presence, which overhangs it, 
and which indicates it in its otherness; it is that which, outside ourselves, delimits 
us.’46 As a topology, the archive comes to signify an other, an outside, an exclosure in 
relation to our selves whose shapes are impressed by it nonetheless. The Foucauldian 
archive positions us (that is, the positions of our subjectivities) differentially, that is to 
say, ‘its locus is the gap between our own discursive practices.’47 And here we can 
align Aufhebung again, but this time in its cancelling signification. What is archived 
 150 
is aufgehoben [cancelled] and therefore represents an epistemological discontinuity 
but that is at the same time its critical value, a value that is productive in absentia by 
invisibly supporting other visible layers. Although Foucault speaks largely of 
discursive ontologies (making thereby his critical intervention to the a priori 
horizontal vision of ‘history’ with its levelling effects) and their drifting layers of 
which this present one right in front of you, my reader, forms also a part, it is not 
farfetched to think the concrete contents of institutional archives along these lines, be 
this a public, semi-public, familial or personal archive. Whatever falls into the 
shadow of the archival space, whatever has been declared as archival must also be 
read and understood from within the structuring rules of this archive, even if it is just 
a box of old photographs and even if these photographs have found their way into this 
box by mere accident. 
 
 
The Photograph’s Archive 
 
Indeed, what could be closer to our familiar understanding of the archive than a box 
of photographs? And what could better preserve and embalm the presence of the 
present (‘the moment’) than a photograph? Archives are full of photographs. They are 
bursting with images so much so that we cannot avoid asking: who depends on 
whom? And who institutes whom? Do photographs actually establish archives? Or 
more poignantly, does the photographic camera by itself, does photography through 
its potentiality of a relentless image production, always already work towards an 
archive? Is it the enduring stream of images – or what John Tagg has called the 
‘troubling productivity’ of photography – that provokes a disciplinary archive so as to 
contain and organize the images photography never ceases to produce?48 And further, 
would this mean that the photograph, as a materially signifying unit, could bestow 
upon itself the designation of the ‘archive’? Indeed, is the photograph not already an 
archive in its own right? If the image of a box of old photographs is a well-known and 
memorable one in cultures practising so-called ‘familial’ photography, conjuring up, 
as it does, a sense of archivality at the same time, then we can conversely also ask 
what photography would do without an archival space for its ongoing floods of 
images.49 Or, we might indeed ask what kind of archontic principle is engendered in 
the doings of and by photography itself, thus raising the stakes not only for thinking 
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how photography would work as an archival system unto itself but also for thinking 
as to how photography would always already organize itself, that is to say, be its own 
archive that remains ultimately unaffected by our attempts of restructuring its 
photographs according to timely priorities. 
 
The archive posits its materials as irreplaceable. And inversely, in starting up an 
archive, in framing something as archival, that something becomes original.50 That 
would be the law of the archive. After all, we also visit archives in search of the 
original thing, of the one and only, of the irreplaceable. Do we not always enter an 
archive to find materials we would not find anywhere else? Archival treasures. But 
the archive, to call itself a respectable archive, must be originary in itself. It must be 
built on originary foundations that inaugurate it. Somehow, it contains itself, by the 
nomos that the archive as archive declares to itself and to which it turns its gaze. The 
archive is a function of the law to which it must abide if it is not to fall apart and lose 
its foundation. Derrida rightly asks whether ‘one [can] imagine an archive without 
foundation, without substrate, without substance, without subjectile?’51 This would 
challenge our very notion of the archive: how would it organize itself? What would 
its purpose be? We can take issue with this question by thinking the photograph as 
archive. 
 
Photographs are aufhebend (they keep an instant) and photographs themselves are 
aufgehoben (we keep the photograph to keep the instant).52 As conceptual domains, 
the photograph and the archive form a couple with strong ties between them, both in 
terms of providing much critical terrain for shaping each other’s theoretical 
paradigms as well as in terms of intersecting in their material dimensions. Spurred on 
by deconstruction as well as by the interrogating work of feminism and postcolonial 
critiques which has made us pay so much critical attention not only to the archival 
politics – who enters into whose archive – but also the working modes and 
materialities of the archive and its own structuring inscription on the things it 
archives, we could propose more drastically the view that photographic practice 
might simply equal archival practice and vice versa.53 Indeed, working in the midst of 
this ‘archival consciousness’ we could say that to photograph is to archive. (Are we 
not also taking photographs of ourselves to archive our selves?) But could we just 
select a single photograph to sustain the same thesis? Is one photograph already an 
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archive in itself? One is advised to answer this question with a ‘yes and no.’ On the 
one hand, every photograph attests to an originary photographic impression for which 
we simply have no language at hand. This is Barthes’ punctum. This is an 
irreplaceable stratum that clings on to each photograph or, at least, to the theoretical 
space that circumscribes our dealings with the photographic image. Every photograph 
bears out an origin that is the origin of its self. Irreducible. Therefore, one could say 
that it establishes thereby a nomological axis of a truly archival kind – because it is 
originary. 
 
That we indeed consult the archive in search of the ‘unique’ reflects the law of the 
archive to which we subject ourselves. In the case of the photograph, this founding 
law is embedded in the work of inscription, calling forth an image uniquely tied to the 
photographic event. At the level of impression, every single photograph, if we isolate 
it as image, would thus remain incomparable to anything else, even though its mode 
of inscription – photographic – is not so. The entity of the photograph becomes the 
keeper of some thing, an impression that is unique in its structure. It could thus lay 
down a nomos for an archive yet at the same time it cannot because it cannot 
articulate that nomos. It cannot stretch beyond itself and tell us what this nomological 
principle would be. Thus, how could we make sense of this inward-looking, self-
preoccupied, narcissistic thing? If each photograph could call upon itself its own 
archontic domain, establish through itself its own archival autarky, then this would 
also come to represent a total archive that cannot be operated anymore. It would 
become dysfunctional. Hence, it remains silent. It does so, admittedly, because our 
assumption rests on overlaying the indexical of the photograph with the nomological 
of the archive. Barthes can say that the photographic sign is a message without a 
code, because, as a sign, each photographic image constitutes a singular entity and, 
thus, does not contribute to a syntax. Or again, because each of them cannot be 
comprehended within a concept of a sign system as conceived by semiotics.54 
Photographs are not clear-cut signs belonging to a semiotic system that we could call 
photography. Rather, each of them attests to, or makes possible, a different sign 
system whereby, of course, it is illogical to speak of a system in this context because 
we cannot establish any systemic principle if each photograph forms a system unto 
itself. Instead, it gives us, every photograph anew, its ‘analogical plenitude.’55 In 
other words, it finds no equivalent in anything but itself. That this evokes a sense of 
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stubborn behaviour, a plain thing impossible to move and seemingly content with 
itself, indicates a kind of resistance to our attempts of making sense of it so as to 
integrate it more effortlessly in our signifying systems and to put it to use in the work 
of communication. In this sense, we are dealing with a noumenal thing that gives us 
just itself, remaining indifferent to our presence and our attempts of deciphering it. 
 
Therefore, what we could call the photograph’s archive – imagined as the space 
where the photograph’s originary impression is kept – transpires as a properly closed 
container that cannot tell us what it actually keeps inside its space. We cannot gain 
access so as to decode it meaningfully. And yet, the photograph shows off its image 
so blatantly that we cannot ignore it and believe instead to have accessed it already. 
Indeed, at most times, we are only concerned with its impressing image, forgetting 
about the wider photographic structures of support, reproduction, display and 
rendering. Thus, if we have set out to answer the question of whether the photograph 
in itself could put forth an archival principle with a speculative ‘yes,’ then it is about 
time to add our ‘no’ on the grounds of photography’s notorious reproducibility. Even 
though the photograph may contain an indexical impression that the photograph can 
claim uniquely for itself, the very same impression can be replicated endlessly, thus, 
paradoxically, multiplying the originary space of the impression. Photography, 
therefore, produces in every photographic impression an original entity, yet, at the 
same time, counteracts that production by distributing the original content in 
indefinite copies. Original copies. 
 
 
Documents, Disciplines, Histories 
 
In the photograph, the two constituents of an archive, the file and the record, are 
brought together. More generally, in an archive, a record denotes the actual archived 
content whereas the file denotes the fact of the content’s archivization, that is, the 
archive’s work of administrative containment and legal organization.56 The 
photograph, then, produces an impression (record) at the same time as providing an 
archival space (file) for the record it has created. Moreover, the photograph represents 
also the structural unit that enables the indefinite dissemination of the record. In this 
sense, then, the photograph is a peculiar archival space: its unique ‘content’ laid bare 
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for us to see in an open file. At the same time, we can rest assured that we do not lose 
any of the records because the photographic apparatus, in principle, can also be 
understood as being a filing system in itself, allowing thereby the tracking of all its 
‘documents.’ What has been photographed is also already recorded: it is a record in 
the archival sense. Thus, and here I follow Derrida’s footsteps, one can say that the 
photograph joins in its space the work of ‘copy, archive and signature.’57 The 
handling – theoretically as well as manually – of the photograph becomes less than a 
straightforward matter. It attains particularly complex dimensions once we start 
considering the interrelations between the photograph and its subsequent insertion in 
other archives. One archival record writing itself on another, and so on… Perhaps we 
are then in a situation where we are far from knowing what this photographic thing 
then actually is that we hold in our hands when visiting an archive. 
 
The doubts evoked in the above lines suggest an encounter with the archival space, 
photographic or otherwise, that is affected by suspicion, evoking an odd distancing in 
its proximity. The archive, quite contrary to its accustomed promotional self-image, is 
less stable than it conveys at first impression – at least under the probing eyes of a 
poststructuralist critique. Not that the archive would not continue working on 
demarcating a space of unyielding steadiness according to its archontic principle, but 
it is also more than that, or rather, it cannot achieve the full realization of its archival 
drive because, if it is to remain functional, it must keep itself open to an outside – an 
outside that is of a potentially disturbing force. If we are to invoke images of 
archives, then they give themselves quickly away as static spaces, enduring volumes 
filled with inertia. Vaults of stillness. They give a sense of permanence and 
protection. Nothing that could disturb them. Archives ask for respect – is not one of 
the duties of the archivist to enforce this space of respectability? On the other hand, 
Aufhebung would remind us that it keeps an archival content but it does so not 
without keeping it in motion at the same time. But no archive could work in total 
closure. Unbreakable walls may well surround it but they cannot fully close it if is to 
remain of some use. This is the impossible logic of the archive. It wants to preserve, 
slow down, freeze. Yet, at the same time, it needs to signify. We need it to signify, 
and thus need access to it. But that in turn unsettles the ideality of its preserving 
function. Working against itself, it is founded upon a contradiction. Thick walls (built 
in stone, words or encrypted data) may well guarantee the preservation of the things it 
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archives to keep their ‘status quo,’ (a ‘status quo,’ however, as laid down by the law 
of the archive) but they may equally take it out of the signifying chain. If the drive of 
the archive is to work centrifugally around its own nomos, then it must also accept 
the possibility of ending up in the non-signifying eye of its proper storm that 
accumulates all the things coming under its purview. 
 
The path that this archival storm takes depends on the instituting of the archive, 
which is not just a matter of what it accumulates but also how the accumulation takes 
place. ‘The first archivist institutes the archive as it should be, that is to say, not only 
in exhibiting the document, but in establishing it.’58 Therefore, when Derrida in 
Archive Fever asks what would psychoanalysis be if Freud, who also established the 
nomological aspects of the psychoanalytic archive, had had access to the media 
technologies that evolved hundred years on after Freud’s writing, then he opens up 
the issue of production of this archive and its signifying substance.59 On the one hand, 
we cannot strictly disentangle the signifying contents of this archive from the 
materials with which they were laid down. On the other hand, Freud was a successful 
archivist because he instituted a discourse called psychoanalysis by laying down a 
mode of reading, ordering, treating – so successful that we still recognize his name as 
being foundational to the archive of psychoanalysis, which in turn can only confirm 
the gravitational force of the Freudian archive and shows, by way of extension, the 
archival pull of any disciplinary discourse. As such, we must resort again to Foucault 
to help us change this disciplinary impulse and its self-affirming tendencies. The 
archive, he writes, ‘deprives us of our continuities; it dissipates that temporal identity 
in which we are pleased to look at ourselves when we wish to exorcise the 
discontinuities of history; it breaks the thread of transcendental teleologies.’60  
 
Although it is not so difficult to see how a discipline might have its nomological 
aspects and how it might treasure its works (texts, narratives, theories, tropes, etc.) to 
which we are asked to return so as to work with them, in the poststructuralist light of 
things, however, the discipline’s request for taking part in its discursive archive 
becomes a possible step into discontinuity – even though the very existence of a 
discipline and its practice in the here and now speaks of the work of the present. 
Thus, in thinking a discipline as archive, the discipline becomes a critical faulting of 
differentiation. A discipline such as the history of art is invested in its laws because it 
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is the force of the law that keeps it as discipline. No collection without a keeper. Yet, 
while a discipline claims its own discourse, which is also the substance of its archive, 
entering this archive with Foucault would bring with it an experience that is of a 
differentiating force. What is at stake, then, is to work with this differentiation. That 
would be the task that the archive prompts us to recognize in its space.61 Foucault’s 
archaeological metaphor is of good service here because, as archaeologists should 
know all too well, any archaeological dig immediately changes the things it uncovers. 
It cannot avoid the contaminating bearings of its excavating work. And even if 
archaeology itself, as a discipline, ends up at most times presenting us its own found 
objects in a ‘historically authentic fashion,’ the same objects cannot remain the same. 
They need to be preserved, immediately, not only to keep them but also to bring them 
in accordance with the archaeologist’s method. What begins to emerge, then, as 
disciplinary archive, is an intricate interlacing of presenting and absenting. The 
historian discovers and uncovers things but must build them into the disciplinary 
discourse that is relevant to the now. And thereby he preserves them but has also 
altered them, which is to say they have ceased to be what they were before the 
historian’s work. Aufgehoben. 
 
 
An Epilogue as After-effect 
 
‘The Hegelian ground is neither fundament nor foundation, neither groundwork nor 
substrate. It is the depth in which one is submerged, into which one sinks and goes to 
the bottom. More precisely, this ground founds only to the extent that it sinks in itself: 
for foundation should be a hollowing out. Thus thought is not grasped in its depth 
without such a hollowing out. […] It hollows out the point of passage, and the point 
itself is such a hollowing out: work of the negative, but right at the surface.’62 
 
The subject of Aufhebung is an uneasy sitter for an image. It cannot sit still. The task 
of being imaged is senseless, for what it is, is in sublation. It cannot present itself but 
is rather sense itself. Never for itself, it cannot be fixed. 
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In 1993, a film was released.63 (Figure 10) It had the name of a colour. Blue. The 
same colour filled its projected image – an image as long as the film. A film without 
frames. And a moving image. Appearing still. 
 
 
  
 Figure 10. Derek Jarman, filmstrip of Blue. 
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Jarman and was released in 1993, shortly before his AIDS-related death in 1994. The 
feature-length film undoes the concept of cinematographic film – the photographic 
sequence of 24 images per second upon which cinematic illusion rests – by 
consisting, in principle, of only one continuous, non-figurative image of blue that is 
as long as the entire film strip. The film deals with Jarman’s deteriorating sight and 
possible blindness as a consequence of his HIV infection. The film’s voiceover 
comprises an eclectic mix of short autobiographical accounts and poetic memoirs, 
spoken by Jarman and three other narrators. A meditation of the faculty of vision, the 
film shows and narrates through the colour blue and its symbolic spaces and tropes, 
whereby the various mutations of the figure Blue are central to the changing 
dynamics of the film’s narrative. Blue opens up a conceptual space that is located 
between the still and moving image, defying conventional categorization. Moving, 
but no visible movement is graspable as such. Still in appearance, but nevertheless 
time-based.  
As for the colour blue, one may note that the human eye perceives colour before 
fixing the image of an object and identifying its form. An image of an object can only 
be perceived once the fovea, the centre of our field of vision and that part of our eyes 
where visual acuity is highest (the retina’s cones), is developed fully at the age of 
sixteen months – the period of the mirror stage. But before that developmental stage, 
the eye can perceive colour through peripheral vision (the retina’s rods). The colours 
with short wavelength such as blue enter visual perception first. Julia Kristeva 
demonstrates this in her study of the blue in Giotto’s frescoes at Padua’s Arena 
Chapel whereby its blue is perceived first in the darkness of the church. Thus, for her, 
all colours, but blue in particular would have a noncentred or decentring effect, 
lessening both object identification and phenomenal fixation. Julia Kristeva, ‘Giotto’s 
Joy’, in Calligram: Essays in New Art History from France, ed. Norman Bryson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp.27-52 (p.41). 
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Fields 
 
 
 
2006 
Black-and-white negative with gelatin silver contact print 
10 x 8 inch (framed 14 x 12 inch) 
 
 
The series Fields explores the ability of black-and-white photography to 
ʻre-presentʼ. Working on English landscape, the series brings together a 
variety of panoramic shots as well as motifs of its topographical features. 
Using a large format camera, each image is carefully composed as a 
scenic view onto the picturesque landscape, underscoring the depictive 
potential of photographic technology in general, and that of large format 
photography in particular. 
 
Each photographic artwork in Fields consists of a 10 x 8 inch negative 
placed over its positive contact print. By superimposing the negative on 
the positive, the photographic image becomes ʻnegatedʼ and appears to 
be black. The photographic detail retreats into a monochromatic field of 
black. The outlines and contours of the image are discernable only from 
close view.  
 
In a way, one could say that the image becomes suspended between the 
black fields produced by the negative and the positive. As each image is 
formed, the ability to reproduce each image, typical of photography, is 
brought to a halt. The role of the camera to record is stalled, just as the 
photographerʼs purpose, to select and frame the scene, is troubled. The 
work also counteracts the picturesque quality of each view by turning it 
into a dark field. The depicted motifs disappear into the blackness of the 
photographic grain. Landscape rendered black. 
 
Creative and ʻdegenerativeʼ at the same time, the joining together of 
negative and positive in Fields causes the image to collapse into its own 
shadow. Rather than being confined to a photographic album or to an 
archive to be later employed as the prototype image for an infinite 
number of prints, in Fields the photographic negative together with its 
positive leads to a new artwork based on an unexpected visual 
convergence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 View of exhibition Declining Images, South Square Gallery, Bradford (2008). 
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Almost every artist I know wants to be critical. 
So what should an art critic do if the art itself is critical?  
Boris Groys1 
 
A theorist is one who has been undone by theory. 
Irit Rogoff2 
 
Art, in its transhistorical quality, and bourgeois society,  
work from diverging ontologies so that its appropriate  
specificity must go unrecognized.  
Adrian Rifkin3 
 
 
 
The Rhetorics of Practice 
 
Much has been said about the term ‘practice’ in the last decade or so: a large amount 
of thinking went into all sorts of terrains pertaining to the doings of practice as well 
as to the operational fields of those who call themselves practitioners. And much has 
been thought out as practice, including the academic model of ‘practice-led’ research. 
Notions of ‘practice’ have also inflected themselves in this project in different 
contexts and to differing ends: in tracing the Bahnen of deconstruction; in framing the 
activities of an artist; in thinking about the ethical conducts of research; in catching 
up with the performative moments of the live act; in pursuing the roles of a cultural 
practitioner, photographer, theorist; in adhering to professional models of academia; 
in working suitably to disciplinary ideals… The actualities of ‘practice’ are many, its 
signifying space polysemic. On the one hand, the presence of practice in this thesis – 
and my responsiveness to its manifestations – maps out the critical attention given to 
this term in the institutions of academic research and cultural production. As such, 
this project cannot deny that it is also a child of its time. On the other hand, the 
present inevitability of this term for anyone working in the humanities must invite 
serious questioning as to why it has achieved such a prominent and, for some, 
critically acclaimed status in the arena of research. In these concluding remarks I 
want to challenge, by way of a postscript, some of the claims, concerns and 
confusions relating to the spaces of art practice as I have encountered them 
throughout the four years of this project. 
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One cannot avoid hearing it: the artist practises. In the books and journals of art 
history and theory, in the course outlines and programmes of art education, on the 
websites and CVs of artists, etc., ‘practice’ is a term very much in need nowadays. Of 
course, this might simply confirm our custom of describing the actions of an artist as 
practice. It is a fact of banality: artists practise. That they indeed practise is 
reproduced in a myriad of institutional and disciplinary forms: the organizational 
clarity of the North American education system and its distinctions of ‘studio 
practice’; the continuing emergence of centres for so-called ‘practice-led’ research in 
mainly UK higher education; symposia and conferences seeking to evaluate the 
spaces of practice and the activities of practitioners of all kinds whereby the artist is 
conveniently thrown into a larger crowd of practitioners ranging from the 
psychoanalyst to the documentary film maker; an expanding list of publications 
around the topic of practice including its viability as research method; and, again in 
the UK, all those little appearances of practice in universities’ regulations of student 
admission and degree structures (applicants in ‘creative’ subjects are usually required 
to show evidence of being ‘practitioners’), public relations materials of museums, arts 
councils and other lobbying groups (practice is emphasized by referring to artists as 
being ‘practising’ artists), as well as in strategic papers of funding bodies that have 
set an agenda for practice. 
 
Practice flourishes, certainly institutionally, and especially on the British Isles.4 One 
could see its current notoriety as an ungainly backlash to the bodies of 
poststructuralist knowledge that one associates with Theory. Yet in this revisionist 
framing we would just give rise to the simplistic formula of the theory/practice 
opposition and its stale ideologies. Surely, if there is a point to Theory, then it is its 
assertion of itself as a practice, that is, the assertion of its own workings as happening 
from within the things it addresses. Ideas have materials. And the ideas put forward 
by textuality, deconstruction, performativity and, to some extent, psychoanalysis too, 
theorize by doing. They are examples of intellectual projects wherein theory is 
practised, and indeed, where the ideological divisions of theorizing and practising 
become untenable: theorizing is not oppositional to but inseparable from practising – 
gaining critical thrust precisely by thriving on the moments that enable the undoing of 
the positions upon which theory rest.5 Theory gives space to an articulation of the 
positionalities of theory so that it brings into relief how its ideas are always already 
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entangled in and conditioned by a set of formats, conventions, materials, 
temporalities, geographies, genealogies, histories. Even the signified needs a signifier 
in the signified. Derrida recognized philosophy’s practices in the spaces of the 
technologies of writing, in philosophies’ historical tropes and rhetorics. We may only 
think of his signal book Of Grammatology published in 1967.6 And yet, with the 
beginning institutionalization of art practice in the moulds of research three decades 
later, the ‘new subject’ of art justifies itself with a practice-led agenda that – one 
cannot help but think – is particularly attached to its own idea of practice as uniquely 
to itself.  
 
No doubt, the current availability of all things ‘practical’ in academia is an easy route 
for those who regard theory as extraneous or even think it is antagonistic to their 
work.7 Ironically, these academic ‘practitioners’ can wear the robes of theoretical 
appeal because of the status that practice has lately attained in the institutional spaces 
and discourses at this particular historical moment that integrates certain dominant 
forms of art practice in the nomenclatures of a twenty-first century research scheme. 
Yet, what could bring about a crucial paradigm shift that would help us move away 
from an individualistically expressive approach in the arts, let alone help us recover 
from the ongoing hangovers of romantic interiority, is more often than not just a 
swapping of terms and a redistribution of economic resources in a changing political 
landscape: the art school becomes a university, artworks become research outputs, 
artists become researchers. And practice, it seems, has thereby become the favourite 
pastime of the newly born artist-researcher. One is persuaded to consider this current 
inevitability of practice from within the critical frameworks with which the social 
history of art has intervened several decades ago. Practice could thereby be brought 
into focus as a leftover of the ideological fictions of artistic creation, which has 
gained another lease of life in the name of research. Instead of reflecting upon the 
concrete procedures and materials that surround the production of work and lend its 
making meaning, ‘practice’ comes in handy, giving the artist-researcher’s work a 
pseudo-appearance of critical rigour. 
 
One of the challenges of setting out to combine the terms and conditions of research 
with those of art practice is the need to recognize that such a merger ultimately 
remains unsound if it is not thought in historical terms just as it requires an awareness 
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of how the wider apparatus of art history and criticism produces its objects of art – 
and practice is one these objects. On the one hand, practice is a term that is repeatedly 
problematized in, and is indeed central to, modern art theory. Thus, practice is an 
already disciplinary sanctioned object of investigation and research in itself. On the 
other hand, the claim to a practice is a convenient tool for the artist-researcher to lend 
his work analytical and methodological credibility so as to qualify it as research and 
to conform to its technical terminology. It is needless to say that this short-sighted 
approach to things falls short of its supposedly critical purpose of ‘researching 
through practising,’ not the least because, as indicated earlier, practice is such a loose 
term that could not possibly cover the diverging forms of cultural production. Rather 
we end up with a practice for the sake of practice that gives us nothing but its own 
academically reified version.  
 
The twenty-first century marriage of art and research – as understood in their current 
political and institutional forms of their respective traditions and conventions – is not 
critically served if we think we can close the case by institutionally legitimizing a 
certain genealogy of art practice as research. Not only does this remain a superficial 
enterprise as long as we are not considering art’s historical conditioning, but it also 
cannot work if one party claims priority over the other.8 This is the trouble with 
endorsing practice-led research. The risk of relying on the lead of practice is one of 
decontextualizing practice from the political and ethical arguments that bear their 
specific weights on it. Such an art practice, as sophisticatedly argued as it might be, 
might not be able to contribute much original knowledge other than the pretty forms 
it has produced, in fact, for itself. This state of affairs is reminiscent of the purifying 
terrains of High Modernism and its aesthetic regimes. Thus, instead of engendering 
effective practices of reflection and analysis that also do something, the efforts made 
in ensuring that practice could be some kind of auto-powered vehicle of research 
leads us into a space of empty rhetorics – politically correct but hardly political. 
 
 
Desiring the Lead of Practice 
 
The wish for practice-led research might, at best, echo the real need for thinking up 
alternative models for conducting and disseminating research, which is an issue of 
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relevance to all fields of research, encompassing both the humanities and the sciences 
– models that do not solely constrict us in analytical hardness but models wherein the 
performative can take place, models that bring into play the transparent and obscure, 
the articulable and the inarticulable, the accidental and the deliberate, models than 
can cope with the personal inside the political, models that recognize the desires and 
sexual interests that permeate the work, models that entrust themselves to the poetic 
alongside the analytical. Models that practise theory. Yet little of this can be gained if 
practice is severed from the ideological spaces that regulate and operate it. These 
include the discourses of art history and museology, art criticism, media theory, etc., 
but also the institutional geographies of cultural industries, mass media, education, 
exhibition and conservation.  
 
Likewise, given that modern research asks for the production of original knowledge, 
we cannot simply assume that whatever happens in art practice can lay claim to 
originality – certainly not in the space of research where the creation of work is not 
required to respond (which is not to say that it can escape) to a bourgeois framework 
of artistic creativity upon which the trope of originality is established in the first place 
and kept alive, with all sorts of tricks, as a particular value within a capitalist state of 
affairs. Such an assumption is only available to those who work in certain traditions 
of art history by keeping their focus on writing the historical events as they refract in 
the figure of the artist and his work. This, however, also necessitates a realization of 
how the figure of the artist is projected into its historical and societal position, 
including the art historian’s own (re-)projecting of the artist.9 Of course, the artist can 
double as a historian and conceptualize his practice against the theoretical 
background of history – a kind of seismographic work of the present in respect of the 
genealogies of art’s histories, which is also one of the main lines of reasoning when 
explaining what a ‘practitioner’ can actually research with his ‘practice’ or as to how 
it can produce meaning. Nonetheless, in order to keep this model in its signifying 
place, one needs some conviction to not see how it still supports itself on the 
privileged spaces of art as ideologically already secured, which it thereby also re-
inscribes in its own doings.  
 
However, as soon as an art practice is not conceived within these parameters, then the 
claim to contributing new forms of knowledge – which is, after all, the aim of 
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research as conceived within a scientific culture – is harder to sustain. (And perhaps, 
for the strict art theorist, the meaning of art would be equally endangered.) Practice 
becomes then more comparable to any professional’s practice: in medicine, when a 
general practitioner (GP) practises, then it is a matter of execution, of evaluating 
phenomena against existing records, of applying protocols, of adhering to ethical 
standards. This practice does not set out to research so as to produce new forms of 
knowledge but relies on the results that have come out of research. Still, we would be 
rushing our case if we were not to see that even in the GP’s wider medical world and 
its divisions of labour the researching bit is organized around its own set of practices: 
all the procedures that might not feature directly in the research output but which 
have nonetheless shaped its forms – even though the clear division of medical 
research on the one hand and practice on the other might easily mislead us into 
thinking in absolute terms. The same, then, could also be said about the GP’s regular 
duties carried out in practice: although its stated goal is not directed towards 
researching novel phenomena but towards applying consistently the established 
orders of medicine – indeed, he would be in trouble not to do so – the pursuit of 
research need not be excluded from the scopes of the GP’s practice. But the foci of 
this research will be necessarily restricted as they are embedded within medicine’s 
professional structures that regulate how medical practice ought to function, which is 
to say that such ‘practice-led’ research can attain useful results only if it concerns 
itself with itself – with addressing and researching practice itself such as its ethical 
frameworks, its economic efficiencies, its spaces of interaction and communication, 
etc. Otherwise the broad distinction between the spaces of practice on the one hand, 
and those of research on the other, would be useless as there would be no need to 
establish such a division of labour in the first place. 
 
Regarding the model of practice-led research in the arts and its speculation of 
granting art practice a lead in the work of research, we might be cautious in making 
too direct a comparison with the practices of medicine or, for the matter, any other 
practice of a liberal profession in whose spaces of activity an overarching notion of 
practice is perhaps most profoundly visible: medics, architects, lawyers, etc. They all 
practise, just as they all like to have a practice. And one can add to this list, even 
though not professionally regulated as such, the contemporary figure of the artist in 
all its modern shades.10 The artist of avant-garde modernism, as brought into relief by 
 178 
modern art theory, is not regulated anymore like an academician used to be once with 
regards to subject treatment, style, tradition, etc. The Académie Royale de Peinture et 
de Sculpture in Paris, inaugurated in 1648, is hailed as the forerunner of the modern 
art school, ensuring that its ‘students’ would not only ‘make’ but would do so with 
intellectual sensibility towards their subject matter, which is to say towards the 
idealized representations of the classes they were required to work with. The 
Academy did so by ensuring a discursive framework of ideological positions. But 
most crucially, the Academy in itself was the best device to ensure that its outputs 
achieve consistency. Today one would call its strategy a politics of regulation and 
professionalization. The practice of the academic artist, tightly networked and rigidly 
taught by his Academy, compares well with any other liberal profession whose 
procedures and standards are safeguarded by a guild, association or other types of 
professional bodies. If the quality of an academician’s output was largely guaranteed 
by a clearly identifiable institution that, at the same time, also helped secure the 
academician’s reputation, then the artist of today is unbound from such centralized 
quality assurance.  
 
The postmodern artists of a globalizing twenty-first century, as we are all too 
upsettingly aware of, can do what they like and their practices are not subjected to a 
regulatory system of accreditation the way academicians used to be. The higher 
education system, from where most of today’s art professionals are emitted, awards 
the student of art various degrees and different shades of prestige depending on the 
esteem of the institution and the standing of its teachers. A university may have its 
own artistic lineage and intellectual outlook – both of which may impact on the 
student and possibly come to bear on her work should she develop a career as 
professional artist with all the conventional decorum (a representing gallery, a string 
of publications, international exposure, work in relevant collections, etc.) that is 
required to go with it. Nonetheless, this type of artist cannot guarantee you any 
standards with regards to her work because there is no single dominating framework 
that would be checking on the artist’s practice. All there is, we could argue in 
stressing our argument, is an artist and her practice. Sure, there are the appropriate 
spaces where art ought to happen and be received, as an institutional theory of art 
would have it.11 And there is of course the critic to help us interpreting the artist’s 
practice. Just as there are social conventions and historical representations exerting 
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pressures on the artist’s practice. Yet that does not prevent the contemporary artist 
from doing, potentially, what and how she pleases to do. In this complex network of 
manifold institutional forces and individual players, overall resembling more an 
exploded view of the academician’s centralized world, we fall back on the artist’s 
‘practice’ from where things are supposed to take their critical beginning. This 
practice can be well cultivated in idiosyncrasy – the signature of the artist – at the 
same time as promising to be, to paraphrase Barthes, the artist’s ‘search of his 
“truth,”’ forming ‘an order in itself […] whose readability feeds on a sort of totality 
of the artist.’12 With less romantic charge, however, practice can emerge as an 
intellectual enquiry and art as a discursive, or what one otherwise would call a 
theoretical, subject – attributes that enabled art practice to meet the criteria as an 
academic subject just as academia argued for integrating it into its subject spectrum.13 
And in the context of this practice, any sign-object is useful. Just as any sign-object 
can be qualified as art.14 Anything.  
  
That anything can become meaningful in this matrix of art practice is made possible 
by a configuration of an ‘artist’ who bears the marks of modern art scholarship and its 
theories of the avant-garde, and in particular that stinging mark of the Duchampian 
moment of 1917 that continues to be of so much concern to art historiography. Or 
rather, perhaps, art historiography cannot let go of this moment because it concerns 
the work of art scholarship itself and its institutions of evaluation. And it is thanks to 
the story of the avant-garde that we can no longer be certain about the whereabouts of 
art – not even art’s space par excellence, the museum, can convince us that what it 
displays is ‘art,’ colouring our experience in, to borrow from Groys, a 
‘phenomenology of suspicion.’15 What we all know, however tentatively, is that we 
do not know where or what art might be. We could call this awkward mode – a 
certain uncertain certainty – a professionalized form of the historico-theoretical 
concept of avant-garde practice, which serves, by way of proxy, as a ghostly structure 
around which the mainstream of contemporary art practice and its teachings has 
found its purposeful bearings. Indeed, the critique of the avant-garde has been 
absorbed so well that it is now possible to rely on the name of Duchamp in advising 
us about the strategies of practice-led research.16 Duchamp’s coming of age as an 
emblem of avant-gardism-cum-innovation is a reminder of historical change but also 
a reminder that what is now valued as ‘innovative’ in the practice of the avant-garde 
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cannot be interpreted without its specific context. If Duchamp is supposed to be our 
guiding light in today’s art practice, then this name comes to represent the opposite of 
what made the message of the avant-garde so radical, a message grounded in the 
refusal of regulatory frameworks through which academic art was suspended in 
aesthetic autonomy. In this particular socio-historical state of affairs – the 
constellation of a bourgeois society – the radical avant-garde artist might well not 
obey any longer to any professionally accepted framework but he does so, according 
to Bürger’s theory of art, to ‘demand that art become practical once again.’ The 
practice of this artist breaks through the forms of academic aestheticism so as to 
critique thereby ‘the way art functions in society, a process that does as much to 
determine the effect that works have as does the particular content.’17 In other words, 
the avant-garde stands for an overcoming or sublation of the separation of ‘art’ and 
‘life’ so as to achieve an integration of art into the praxis of life.18 
 
If there is something in the model of the avant-garde that can still be rescued for our 
times, then, I think, it is the need to look for the site of an actuality before one sets 
out to practice if practice is supposed to be a critical one, rendering impractical the 
formal notion of ‘practice-led’ as an a priori defined practising. Otherwise those cases 
made for practice which argue its importance to lie in the experiential will not move 
us closer to praxis, a term to which practice is obviously linked – in other words, to 
the phenomenological sphere of experiencing in the now, reminding us of practice as 
residing inside the live act and as taking place in the performative event. 
Psychoanalysis has developed a particular sensitivity to these issues, since it relies on 
speech as a means of doing its work. Or, alternatively, one could say that 
psychoanalysis has chosen to pay attention to the embodied dimensions of speech, 
which inevitably will make them the subject of psychoanalytic research and it 
therefore also has to face up to this particular material.19 Lacan’s definition of praxis 
is useful here; for him, praxis designates ‘a concerted human action, whatever it may 
be, which places man in a position to treat the real by the symbolic.’20 For Lacan, the 
symbolic would thus pass through the sphere of praxis so as to touch on the real. 
Leaving aside the distinctively Lacanian tone of being reigned by the symbolic, 
praxis would be the sphere of treatment – but with the symbolic. This helps us to 
conceptualize one possible axis that could be spanned between art practice and 
research so as to develop a more formally articulated purpose of their alliance. On the 
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one hand, it shows us that for to work within the paradigms of research, the sphere of 
art must be still treated symbolically, which means historically, theoretically, 
empirically, etc. On the other hand, the space of art practice, if more formally 
conceived as a culturally specific conduit of creation, helps us relativize the hardness 
of scientific research by not expecting full symbolization. Still, the current academic 
fixation on the ‘lead of practice’ and its institutional formations provokes a rather 
different picture which, I suggest, should be read as a symptom of its own 
paradoxical doings: if the role of practice (in the widest sense) is an ethical one that 
allows poiesis to emerge within the work of research, as deconstruction continues to 
show us, then a privileging of ‘practice’ per se fails what it sets out to do: instead of 
relativizing the analytical hardness of science, it finds itself hung up engendering its 
own hardening. 
 
In this light, then, one could also comprehend the motivations of people who hold out 
the torch of practice-led research by making claims for research-by-making-art as the 
‘enactment of thinking,’ thereby enlarging our notions of the spaces of thinking by 
emphasizing their embodied or performed dimensions.21 But, a direct reply to this 
proposition must be that thinking the research conducted by art as the enactment of 
thinking is seriously essentializing. Should the artist-researcher really be better 
equipped for enacting thinking than another researcher? Surely, any researcher, from 
the archaeologist to the zoologist, enacts thinking in their individual practices. Every 
professional research field constructs, consciously or not, a set of practices for itself, 
which enables the researcher to work methodologically at the same time as defining 
the forms the research takes. And while there speaks nothing against conceiving 
practice-led research as, say, a phenomenologically or hermeneutically driven 
reflection on thinking and on the means such thinking employs – in this case the 
signifiers associated with art – it would be naïve to believe that such an expertise 
would be specific to the artist-researcher. Such an assumption of practice-led research 
leaves an unpleasant aftertaste of the privileged tropes of artistic individuality. After 
all, no research field will take practice lightly because it is good practice that sustains 
the work of the researcher – not to mention the financial risks that working without 
one would entail. 
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Uncoupling 
 
The networks invested in art will continue to develop art’s own institutions just as 
they will be made to adapt to changing social and political circumstances. The 
territorialization (in the Deleuzian sense) of largely individualistically conceived 
forms of art practice by the regulating protocols of research of a scientific culture, 
which we have been witnessing since the 1990s in the UK and beyond, ought to be 
seen within the politics and possibilities of an advanced capitalist system and an 
information-driven economy. As such, art’s diverse producers have been given a 
structural overhaul in this transformation instigated by top-down policies. 
Academia’s institutional outgrowths of so-called ‘centres for practice-led research’ 
and the establishment of practice-led research paths demarcate this particular 
historical moment.22 Yet thinking that art practice could be simply cast into a research 
method of its own, in other words, a practice that does not consider the 
epistemological grounds upon which its rests, remains a frail enterprise if one is to 
take the institutional offer of research earnestly and wants to work with its critical 
frameworks – instead of practitioners who rest content with, and are limited to, an 
institutional critique that is served by fulfilling the diverting role of the semi-
intellectual. Therefore, let us ask again: why should practice lead research? Research 
that is led by practice, if we take it to the letter, seeks to put the methods of a certain 
model of ‘practice’ first, accepting its regulatory framework as a method of research 
in itself. Advocates of practice-led research have taken pains to argue for ‘practice’ 
and its spearheading role, producing a remarkable array of incisively argued 
publications in support of their intended cause.23 Yet while their campaigning work 
might well satisfy the acronymic spaces of RAE, AHRC and NESTA, presuming a 
practice as one of its own – as terminologically secured as it might be – will only 
satisfy itself if it does not put theoretically into question not just the need for practice 
but also the spaces that engender its existence.24 
 
The result is a conflation of practices: of the researcher on the one side; of the 
professionally working artist on the other; and, between the two, of those posited by 
the theories and histories of art – all of which give rise to much confusion. It is a 
confusion that takes its roots precisely in the assumption that one could research 
(solely) by leading a practice of art. This is replicated in the conceptualization of most 
 183 
research programmes which demand that applicants be practitioners; or, at least, 
formulate some vision of a practice. This coming together of two roles of labour 
(researcher/artists) and their historically specific frameworks of operations is 
complex. It attains a particular complexity of an easily deceiving kind if the research 
project expects of itself to house the category of ‘art’ or to be inhabited by a an 
‘artist’ – which should not be taken as a given. This manifests itself also in the not 
infrequently posed question whether work produced in a research project makes good 
art, a query that is thrown up, remarkably, by the teaching staff themselves.25 But the 
question is badly put: it should not ask for art but it should ask why it asks for art. 
The answer to this, I suggest, directs us back to the institutional conception of 
practice-led research and its suggestive fixing of practice as a self-reliant corpus. 
However, a way out of this loop is to accept the difficult answer that a research 
project of this sort is not centred on making or addressing art but equally that there is 
no need to exclude that as a possibility either.26 A research project concerns itself 
with a problem. It has to look to this problem and establish a critical context for it so 
as to see its complexity more fully. Unless the research concerns itself with the 
category of art, there is no need to be preoccupied with the issue of whether the work 
would interrogate or entertain a discourse with the ideational images of bourgeois art 
production. Again, the assumption that there is some ‘art’ coming out of all this 
research, an ‘art’ that is deemed to satisfy the criteria of prevailing modalities of art in 
a particular time and place, reveals itself as a potential red-herring for the kind of 
critical work that does not want to abstain from engaging actively – as a practice – 
with contemporary issues in the wider fields of the humanities as well as with their 
diversifying means of research production and representation which has enabled us to 
work beyond the domain of words and the conventions of academic writing styles – a 
diversification that, arguably, has also been stimulated by taking a closer look at the 
practices of art. What this attests to, then, is a new mode of contemporary practice 
that is in the process of peeling itself out of the institutions and histories of art, but 
which no longer pursues its work within the paradigms of art or artist. 
 
If we assume, for apparent reasons perhaps, that in order to do research in the 
academic subject of art one practises art, then what I propose will stand as a 
contradiction by not taking at face value the formula that art practice leads research. 
Or, again, as I argued above, this equation is only sensible if it poses the problem of 
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art and its practice (its institutions, ethics, histories, etc.), examining through its 
means the conditions and qualities of its self – a field of research that is, by the way, 
not exclusive to art practice and is equally carried out, albeit with different means, in 
art history, sociology, anthropology and philosophy. Still, this set of problems must 
be considered within the wider historical development of post-war art practices and 
their repertoire of art forms variously framed by art historians and artists themselves, 
which have moved art from being a formal, aesthetic object of autonomy that is the 
subject of evaluation in the space of art criticism and under the discerning eye of the 
figure of the critic – rendered so brilliantly by Greenberg – to analytically and 
discursively sustained practices of art that have shifted our focus from aesthetic 
contemplation to an institutional critique of art concerned with art’s values, functions 
and spaces. The way we largely understand and teach art today derives its critical 
vigour from this legacy that enabled the ‘making of art’ to become an intellectual 
practice as well as an academic subject. At the same time, the aesthetic autonomy of 
the art object has been worn out, although I have no illusions about it simultaneously 
living on. Inextricably related to this historical development is a refiguring of the 
professions and the softening of their profiles so that we do no longer have to think of 
the artist as running steadily side by side an art practice, let alone coincide with it, as 
a more humanist outlook might encourage us to think. We can broadly associate this 
with the postmodern moment that took issue with art’s institutions by putting forth a 
critique engendered in the very practice of art and its spaces. It seems, practice-led 
research would anticipate doing so too if it wants to entertain critical work with ‘art’ 
and ‘research’ through ‘practice.’ However, we should not forget that the practices of 
‘institutional critique’ were critically effective because of their specific historical 
context. The continuation of such practices without an appreciation of the dialectics 
that nourished art’s critical productivity leads us into the well-oiled art machine of 
what Rainer Rochlitz aptly called the art of ‘subversion and subsidy.’27 
 
Thus, the materials sustaining a critical practice of intellectual enquiry acting in and 
upon contemporaneity should be thought in the light of this historical trajectory, 
which Irit Rogoff has convincingly outlined as having moved from the appraising 
work of criticism and its theories of art to the self-consciously exerted critique 
directed to its own institutions to a space she calls criticality: a space wherein work 
unfolds in the performative moment of meaning ‘taking place’ and which, at the same 
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time, is critically productive precisely because, knowing that our subjectivities 
constitute themselves in difference, such a practice avails itself of the possibility of 
not predetermining its locus or mode of operation.28 This, however, entails accepting 
that what is at stake in practice is not inherently an occupation with ‘art’ but finding 
the spaces for a performing of critical practice for which neither the subject nor its 
site can be taken as an already given. This is also what the critic Craig Owens 
proposed already in 1987: ‘A radical critical practice presumably would work through 
whatever channels are available both within and without the specific institutions and 
align itself with the position that these other practices represent vis-à-vis them.’29 
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